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CHESS STRATEGETICS ILLUSTRATED 



WORKS ON CHESS BY FRANKLIN K. YOUNG 



THE MINOR TACTICS OF CHESS 
THE MAJOR TACTICS OF CHESS 
THE GRAND TACTICS OF CHESS 
CHESS STRATEGETICS 

SELF-TEACHING CHESSBOARDS 



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CHESS STRATEGETICS 

ILLUSTRATED 

MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE ADAPTED TO 
THE CHESSBOARD 



•12 '^ 
BY ZX 

JO 

FRANKLIN K^ YOUNG 

AUTHOR OF "the MINOR TACTICS OF CHESS ;" "THE MAJOR 

TACTICS OF chess;" " THE GRAND TACTICS OF 

CHESS ; " " THE SELF-TEACHING 

CHESSBOARD," ETC. 



Positions anH HEiampUs from f$lorpI}g's ffiames 



^ 



BOSTON 
LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY 

1900 



42791 






i-itotrt^ty of Con<.if«9s 

SEP 4 1900 

C«ryngh1 •ntry 

SECOND COPY. 

Odnwrvd to 
OROt« DIVISION, 

SEP 10 i^no 



^K/^5/ 

n 



Copyright, 1900, 
By Franklin K. Young. 

All rights reserved. 



74460 



Hntbersttg ^^«ss : 
John Wilson and Son, Cambridge, U. S. A. 



TO 

OF 

CHAELES PAUL MOEPHY 

The Incomparable Chess-player 

THIS PRESENTATION OF THAT ART AND SCIENCE 
OF WHICH HE IS THE 

UNEQUALLED EXPONENT 

WITH PROFOUNDEST REVERENCE 

i^ost ?^umtlg ts Sctiicatetr 

BY 
THE AUTHOR 



PREFACE. 



THIS book teaches how to apply, in actual play over 
the board, that theory of chess fountied upon 
the practice of the greater Masters ; the laws and 
principles of which for the first time are formulated 
and put into language in the preceding volumes of this 
series. 

No amount of knowledge, however well classified 
and arranged, is of avail until those processes whereby 
it may be put to practical use are made clear. 

This is the reason why the theorist, or mere man of 
learning, is the most useless of mankind ; and why the 
artist, or man of action, is so infinitely his superior in 
every walk of life. 

That is to say, science of itself is of little value, and 
as between the two, art is vastly to be preferred ; for 
the reason that a man may know much, but from lack 
of understanding of the processes whereby only can his 
knowledge be put to practical use, he, in all directions, 
is outclassed by a man of little education, but who 
understands the secret for putting to practical use all 
the knowledge of which he is possessed. 

The three preceding volumes of this series contain 
the laws and principles which appertain to the Science 



Vlll PREFACE. 

of Chess ; in this fourth and final volume is illustrated 
those Minor, Major, and Grand Processes of Greater 
Logistics which appertain to the Art of Chessplay. 

This book teaches how to combine the processes of 
the art of chessplay with the formulas of the science 
of chess, and discloses those two great secrets which 
govern the Science of Strategetics, whether the con- 
tending pieces are made of wood and ivory or of flesh 
and blood. 

Boston, 1900. 



CONTENTS. 



PA&E 

INTRODUCTORY , xix 

This book the fourth and concluding volume of the " Chess Strate- 

getics Series." 
The " Synthetic Method of Chessplay " formulated and put into 

language for the first time in these volumes. 
Unqualified indorsement of this series of chessbooks by the highest 

chessic, literary, and military critics. 
" Replete with logic and common sense." — Emmanuel Lasker. 
After six months' study English critic defeats on even terms opponent 

who for years had given him odds and a beating. — London [Eng.) 

Spectator. 
"Most useful to beginners of all standard works." — Complete Hoyle. 
These books " mark an epoch in the literature of chess," — The 

Green Bag. 
" Show how a game of chess is played by a great player." — Providence 

Journal. 
" Best books on chess are by Franklin K. Young." His books are 

" the most important productions of modern chess literature." — 

American Chess Magazine. 
These books "deserve nothing but commendation." — New York 

Clipper. 
" Really the higher mathematics of chess." — New York Sun. 
" Is to the student of chess what Clausewitz and Von Hohenlohe 

are to the soldier at arms. Principles of grand strategy and 

logistics applied to chess in a unique and scientific way. Author 

entitled to gratitude of all devotees of the royal game." — Army 

and Navy Register. 

CHESS STRATEGETICS ILLUSTRATED ... 3 
Principles underlying science of war and science of chess are 

the same 3 

Processes of art of warfare and art of chessplay daily used 

in the mathematics 3 



X CONTENTS. 

PAGB 

CHESS STRATEGETICS — confznue(f. 

Both sciences based upon the mathematical truth that two men 

can whip one man 3 

The art consists in those processes whereby the two men are 

made simultaneously to attack the one man 3 

The forces may properly become a collection of individuals 
termed armies and be posted either on the battlefield or 

on the chessboard 3 

The fundamental law of war as laid down by Napoleon ... 3 

The race is to the swift and the battle to the strong .... 4 
No use for a man to study strategetics unless equipped with 

the ability to reason 4 

What Frederick the Great thought of men who could not or 

who would not learn 4 

Definition of the word "force" when used in the military 

sense 5 

Eirst corollary of the fundamental law of strategetics .... 5 
Eorce which at a given time is inactive has no value, 

says Napoleon 5 

Force of the chesspieces is equal 6 

They differ only in their facilities for bringing force into 

action 6 

Difference in their manner of moving typifies topographical 

differences in chessboard 7 

As many different surfaces to the chessboard as there are pieces 7 
Mathematical chessboard is a composite of all the topo- 
graphical horizons contained in a given situation 7 

Topographical Horizon 8 

Of the Pawn 8 

Knight 9 

Bishop 10 

Eook 11 

Queen 12 

King 13 

Minor Front 14 

Major Front 15 

Grand Front 16 

Lines or Communication 17 

Points" " 17 

First Law or the Art of Chessplay 18 

Corollary 1 20 

Corollary II 21 



CONTENTS. xi 

PAGE 

PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS 22 

Each chesspiece typifies a complete corps d'armee equipped with 
all its infantry, cavalry, artillery and in highest state of 
discipline and physical vigor 22 

Contending armies equal, each consisting of sixteen com- 
plete corps d'armee 22 

These corps, however, are separated from each other by 
natural obstacles typified by their different manners of move- 
ment 22 

This is in violation of the Napoleonic dictum, "Unity is 
the soul of strategy " 22 

Possibility of the arrival on the scene of action of corps not con- 
tained in the original order of battle a most important con- 
sideration 22 

Chessplayer confronted by a hostile army while eight other 
hostile corps are advancing against his rear 23 

Three great objects which must be harmonized in every 
calculation 23 

Principle which governs the column of manoeuvre 27 

Principle which governs the column of support 37 

Principle which governs the column of attack 41 

At every move those principles must be harmonized for the 
defence of the kindred and the attack of the adverse 
position 69 

Actual calculations of chessplayer comprehend 96 pieces and 
a board of 176 squares, two-thirds of which are invisible . . 70 

Second Law" of the Art of Chessplat 70 

Thied Law of the Akt of Chessplat 71 

Fourth Law of the Art of Chessplat 71 

PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS (Major) .... 75 
Before studying this book, student should first master *' Minor " 

and " Major " and " Grand Tactics " 75 

No man can attain excellence at chess by " climbing in through 

the cabin window " 75 

Mathematics of war and of chess identical 76 

Basic axiom of each is that two men can whip one man ... 76 
Higher tactics of warfare and of chessplay, the same and com- 
mon aim of each to attack one man with two men .... 76 
Abstract principles governing both sciences simple and indisput- 
able 76 

These principles comprehended and used even by savages . . 76 



XU CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS (Major)— continued. 

Concrete processes of military art comprehended by only eleven 
men out of billions which have inhabited the earth . . , , 76 

Results from fact that minds of average men seldom rise beyond 
processes of simple arithmetic . ' 77 

Inferiority of man of learning to man of action 77 

Theorist the most useless of mankind 77 

Better to have little knowledge with abUity to use it, than vast 
erudition without faculty to apply it 77 

Morphy and Napoleon united thorough knowledge of the sci- 
ence with thorough understanding of the art 77 

Anybody can attack one man with two men if given time 
enough, and can overwhelm the single man if he make no 
resistance 78 

The proper use of time to overcome the enemy's resistance de- 
notes the master at war and at chess 78 

Processes of Napoleon and of Morphy are of the differential 
calculus 78 

" Genius " the faculty for comprehending that truth is true and 
that what is wrong never is right 78 

Processes of Morphy and Napoleon in no sense miraculous, — 
only mathematically exact 78 

Prmciple governs all things 79 

The master at war and at chess gains renown by strictly con- 
forming to strategic laws and merely allowing his opponent 
to violate these laws and thus become his own executioner . 79 

These laws taken collectively constitute the theory of warfare, 
whether on the battlefield or on the chessboard 79 

Morphy had a theory in regard to chess ; Napoleon had a theory 
in regard to war 79 

Each thoroughly understood the art of applying his theory for 
the overcoming of time and the resistance of the enemy . . 79 

Reason why mass of mankind are not Morphys nor Napoleons 
is because they base their conclusions upon results .... 79 

Causes — not results — are the prime elements for success in 
anything 79 

Napoleon won his victories before his battles were fought . . 80 

How Jomini watched Napoleon set up a military problem on 
his map of Europe 80 

Napoleon, his map, his dividers, and his little pins surmounted 
with diverse colored balls of sealing-wax 80 

Jomini an enthusiastic and industrious historian, but no strate- 
gist 81 



CONTENTS. xiii 

PAGE 

PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS {Uxjo^) — continued. 

" Questions of high tactics/' says Napoleon, " would turn La- 
grange and Laplace pale " 82 

Jomini unable to decipher Napoleon's secret method for calcu- 
lating victory 82 

Neither the greater captains at war nor the greater captains at 
chess ever put into language that system which gave them 
their renown 83 

When they died they took their vast knowledge out of the 
world with them 83 

But they were unable to obliterate the paths made by their 
armies over the surfaces of the earth and of the chessboard . 83 

Hence can be detected that ^imilarity of plan and procedure 
common to all 83 

This similarity of method the basis of the true system both of 
warfare and of chessplay 83 

Napoleon's dictum in regard to the only way to make war . . 83 

Frederick's dictum in regard to the art of the great captain . . 83 

Mathematics the bond which harmonizes strategy, tactics, and 
logistics 84 

Things that are equal to the same thing always are equal to 
each other 84 

Shylock the Jew was a strategist : he realized that he lost his 
house, if he lost the prop by which his house stood .... 84 

The science of war and of chess determines the prop of the 
enemy's position ; the art of warfare and of chessplay selects 
that process whereby this prop may be removed 85 

How Napoleon played at the game of war with a map for a 
board and little red and yellow and green images for armies . 85 

How Napoleon planned decisive movements and combined a 
logistic operation 85 

The Tactical Key and its relation to the field of battle and the 
chessboard 86 

Objects of the lines of manoeuvre in war and in chess .... 86 

The Strategic Key and its relations to a given logistic operation 88 
Fifth Law of the Art of Chesspi-ay 88 

First object of the great general, v/hether at chess or at war, to 
exactly reconnoitre the situation formed by the combined posi- 
tions of the contending armies 90 

Next, "to divide up his enemy's force," and then, " to act against 
the communications of the opposing force thus divided " . , 91 

Napoleon's process for attacking a divided adverse force, whether 
located on the map or on the chessboard 91 



XIV CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS (Tsixjo^) — continued. 

The Topographical Centre 92 

Principle of Topographical Centre 93 

Demonstration of Topographical Centre 93 

Application of this principle of military art and science to 

chessplay 95 

Sixth Law of the Art of Chessplay 95 

Napoleon's method for determining the strategic key of any 

situation 95 

Application of this principle of military art and science to the 

chessboard 97 

Napoleon's method for combining a logistic operation .... 98 

Kindred corps of the centre 99 

" " " right 100 

" left 100 

Points of Departure 101 

Seventh Law of the Art of Chessplay 101 

. The Strategic Vertices 101 

Napoleon's processes always based upon the violation of the 

basic law of strategy by the enemy 101 

Points of Manoeuvre 102 

Eighth Law of the Art of Chessplay 102 

Corps Offensive 102 

Application of this principle of military art and science to the 

chessboard 104 

STRATEGIC HORIZONS 106 

Ninth Law of the Art of Chessplay 110 

Of Class 1 Ill 

2 112 

3 113 

4 114 

5 115 

6 .116 

7 117 

8 118 

9 119 

10 120 

" 11 121 

" 12 122 

13 123 

" 14 124 

" 15 125 



CONTENTS. XV 

PAGE 

TACTICAL HORIZONS 126 

Tenth Law of the Art of Chessplay 127 

Of Class 1 128 

II 130 

III 132 

IV 134 

V 136 

VL . 138 

VII 140 

" VIII 142 

IX 144 

X 146 

LOGISTIC RADII 148 

Eleventh Law of the Art of Chessplay 149 

POINTS OFFENSIVE 150 

Strategetic Horizons 150 

Of the Second Dimension 1 50 

" First Dimension 151 

Geometrically expressed 152 

Topography of 154 

LINES OF MANOEUVRE 159 

Compound and Complex 159 

First Class Geometrically expressed 160 

Second Class Geometrically expressed 162 

Third Class Geometrically expressed 164 

LINES OF OPERATION 166 

Algebraic expression of 167 

Geometrically expressed 171 

Twelfth Law of the Art of Chessplay 170 

PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS (Minor) .... 181 
Minor logistic processes appertain exclusively to the simple 

Line of Manoeuvre .181 

Never contemplate either the gain or the defence of material . 181 

Sole object to divide up the opposing force 181 

In the opening object of these minor processes is to perpetuate 
unscientific isolation of adverse pieces which exists to normal 

position 181 

Always must be combined with line of mobilization or of devel- 
opment 181 

Thirteenth Law of the Art of Chessplay 181 



XVI CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS {'^li-^oi^) — continued. 
Never permit Black to establish K P at K 4, Q P at Q 3, and 

K B at Q B 4, as in this position he may draw the game . . 1 82 
"White should win by the advantage of the first move .... 183 
Secret of keeping the advantage for White lies in preventing 

Black from playiug K B — Q B 4 184 

All openings by White which permit this move by Black are 

inferior 184 

Play to compel deployraeDt of Black K B at K 2 184 

White should not castle until he can determine on which side 

Black will castle 1 84 

Keep the Black Q P at Q 2 as long as possible 185 

Correct post for Black Q P is at Q 3 so long as White has K P 

or Kt ready to play to K 5 after Black has castled K R . . 185 
Black never should leave his K B P defended only by his King . 186 

Dislodge the Black K Kt from his K B 3 187 

Wlien possible hold Black K P at K 3 187 

TOPOGRAPHICAL KEYS 190 

Class 1 190 

" II . 190 

" III 190 

Simple Li>'e of ^Ianceutre 191 

Geometrically Expressed 191 

PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS (Grand) .... 195 

Crucial phase of chessic art and science 195 

The irrepressible conflict between theory and practice . . . . 195 
The theorist a worshipper of abstract propositions, the tactician 

enamoured of tangible and material detail 195 

The theorist and the tactician contrasted 196 

Both people also have the utmost contempt for the methods of 

the other 196 

The theorist despises the lack of system in the tactician, and the 
latter mocks at what he calls the egotistical pedantry of the 

other 196 

Reason why the tactician outranks the theorist in every walk of 

life . .' 196 

The theorist is handicapped by a world-wide fallacy which ren- 
ders his knowledge of little use to himself or to anybody else 196 
The great secret which governs the application of knowledge to 

practical uses 196 

This secret unknown to the theorist but understood by the 

tactician 196 



CONTENTS. xvii 

fAGK 

PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS (Grand)— conimuec/. 
Morphy and Napoleon combined in themselves both the educa- 
tion of the theorist and the skill of the tactician 197 

Moreover, they knew the secret whereby is bridged tlie seem- 
ingly impassable gulf between science and art 197 

This secret is a method of calculation whereby the principles of 
the science and the laws of the art are harmonized and made 

to co-operate to produce the desired end 198 

" A Genius " is one who comprehends that method of calcula- 
tion whereby are harmonized the principles of the science and 

the processes of the art 199 

That calculation whereby the true Strategetic Horizon can be 
detected is the connecting link between the science of chess 

and the art of chessplay 201 

Basic Proposition of Greater Logistics 202 

THE TACTICAL SEQUENCE 204 

Fourteenth Law of the Art of Chessplay 204 

First Tactical Sequence 205 

Illustration of the order of marches contained therein .... 205 

Second Tactical Sequence 212 

Illustration of the order of marches contained therein . . . 212 

Third Tactical Sequence 217 

Illustration of the order of marches contained therein . . .217 

CORPS DEFENSIVE 222 

Sustaining corps 223 

Supporting corps 224 

Covering corps 225 

Surprised 226 

Surrounded 227 

Isolated 228 

Commanded 229 

Outflanked 230 

Outfronted 231 

CORPS DETACHED 232 

Fifteenth Law of the Art of Chessplay 233 

PLANS OF CAMPAIGN 234 

Factors subordinate 234 

Sixteenth Law of the Art of Chessplay 234 

Rules for making a Reconnoissance on the Chessboard . 235 

The strategetic offensive 235 

The strategetic defensive 236 



XVlli CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

PRIME LOGISTIC OPERATIONS 237 

ORDERS OF BATTLE 240 

Offensive 241 

Defensive 242 

The Tactician's Rule 243 

THE INITIATIVE 245 

Seventeenth Law of the Art of Chessplat 248 

GRAND LAW OF THE ART OF CHESSPLAY .... 249 

APPENDIX. 

The Battle of Waterloo historicallt and technically 

illustrated on the chessboard 253 

Capture of Souhaiu 258 

" Papelotte 260 

" La Haye Sainte 261 

" " the Park of Hougoumont . .' 262 

Rout of the Dutch Belgians 264 

Biilovp- attacking at Planchenoit 266 

" turns the French right 267 

Reille attacking Hougoumont 269 

Grand assault on Mont St. Jean 272 

French army changes front 275 

Arrival of Bliicher 277 

Napoleon's Last Battle-Line 279 

Destruction of the " Old Guard " 282 

Flight of the French 284 



INTRODUCTORY. 



IN placing before the public this fourth and final vol- 
ume of the " Chess Strategetics Series," the author 
completes a work — undertaken merely as a relief from 
more arduous labors — which has been accorded rec- 
ognition in technical literature far exceeding his expec- 
tations ; a recognition which commands his deepest and 
sincere appreciation. 

The synthetic method of chessplay — which for the 
first time is formulated and put into language in these 
volumes — early received the indorsement of Emmanuel 
Lasker, who, in a personal letter to Mr. Edwin C. Howell, 
collaborator in " Minor Tactics," stated that the new 
method of chessplay " was replete with logic and com- 
mon sense." 

This distinguished stamp of approval, placed upon the 
new synthetic method by the Chess Champion of the 
World, was supplemented a few months later by recog- 
nition, high and flattering, in another sphere. The 
" London (Eng.) Spectator," in its issue of June 1, 1895, 
devoted a page and a half to an intelligent and compli- 
mentary review of the " Minor Tactics of Chess," and 
stated : — 

" The book is clearly written, but an effort is required to 
master the theory — and it needs to be mastered entire — 
before the light dawns. The reviewer, a poor player, 



XX INTRODUCTORY. 

played for many years with a friend from whom he usually 
received odds and a beating. After acquiring (by six 
months' study) the new theory, he has played a series of 
games with the same friend (to whom this theory was un- 
known) without taking odds, and has not only won the 
majority of the games, but made a much better fight in 
those which he lost than he had been able to make before 
becoming acquainted with the theory." 

On this side of the Atlantic the reception accorded the 
new method was equally cordial, and that high authority, 
R. F. Foster, in his " Complete Hoyle " said : — 

^'Of all the standard works on the game, 'The Minor 
Tactics of Chess ' will be found most useful to beginners." 

The appearance of " The Grand Tactics of Chess," the 
second volume of the series to be published, " marks 
an epoch in the literature of the game ; and is," said 
"The Green Bag," "a revelation of the possibilities of 
chess." " The Providence Journal " treated the volume 
editorially, viz. : — 

" He (Mr. Young) is brief in his explanations, clear in his 
definitions, and with the aid of diagrams, exemplary in his 
instructions. His plan of treating the materials is syste- 
matic from beginning to end. He leads the reader up from 
general principles and laws by a logical course of procedure, 
and he actually shows how a good game of chess should be 
played ; how, indeed, it always is played by a great player." 

It was at this point in his chess writings that the 
author first came to believe that his work would be un- 
derstood and appreciated in his own lifetime. This was 
a consummation hardly to be hoped for, — it is difficult 
to teach old dogs new tricks ; the chess-players of the 
day were wedded to their books of analysis, and it was 
too much to expect that the new synthetic method would 



INTRODUCTORY. xxi 

find converts outside of a rising generation, whose mind 
was free from the effect of prior teachings and of estab- 
lished habit. 

But the simple system of " logic and common-sense " 
found supporters, and particularly did it attract to itself 
those who are in the daily habit of using their intellects, 
— men who buy books and who study them, — the pro- 
fessional class. Lawyers, doctors, the clergy, and grad- 
uates of army and navy colleges eagerly perused the 
new argumentative treatises on a game which they all 
admire and practise, — treatises which went to the root 
of things, which gave the whys and wherefores, and 
fitted the reader to evolve for himself better analysis 
than he can buy ready-made. 

But, more surprising still, the obvious merit of the new 
synthetic method carried by storm the very citadel of the 
established order of things Caissic in America ; and that 
high conservator of things that are — " The American 
Chess Magazine" — in its issue for Sei)tember, 1898, 
says : — 

"For the student who desires to enter the broader chan- 
nels of chess, the best books are by Franklin K. Young ; 
his ' Minor Tactics of Chess ' and his more elaborate ' Grand 
Tactics ' are the most important productions of modern chess 
literature." 

Backed by such high indorsements as these, the 
growth of the new system of chessplay naturally was 
rapid and most satisfying to the author. But that 
highest authority whose approval he most desired still 
was silent. By his writings it was the object of the 
author to show that the mathematics of the science of 
war and the mathematics of the science of chess are 
identical, and that the high tactics of warfare and of 



XXll INTROD UCTOR Y. 

chessplaj are the same ; and most of all did the author 
desire public recognition of his labors in this regard 
from an admitted military authority. 

It was not until the publication of " The Major 
Tactics of Chess " in December, 1898, that the accuracy 
of the author's treatment of chessic art and science was 
placed beyond dispute. 

The " New York Clipper " pronounced the third volume 
a book which " deserves nothing but commendation." 

The " New York Sun " said : " It is really the higher 
mathematics of chess, — the combination that, to a mind 
quick at geometrical evolution, will be a means of con- 
founding the adversary ; the insight into it a surprise 
and delight, and the outcome having the unexpectedness 
of a happy piece of wit." 

On Dec. 23, 1899, that sphinx, for which the author 
so long had waited, opened its mouth, and with the great 
voice of military authority, " The Army and Navy Reg- 
ister" (Washington, D. C), said : — 

^'This additional contribution to chess literature from 
the able pen of Mr. Young will be received with even more 
delight than were his former scientific treatises, as it is 
a more complete development of his unique system. It 
forms the second volume of the Chess Strategetics Series, 
and, as the author confesses, may not improperly be termed 
a book of chess tricks. In the words of the text, 'Major 
Tactics is that branch of the science of chess strategetics 
which treats of the evolutions appertaining to any given 
integer of chess force when acting either alone, or in 
co-operation with a kindred integer, against any adverse 
integer of chess force ; the latter acting alone, or in com- 
bination with any of its kindred integers.' This definition 
is a little discouraging to the student, but he should take 
heart, and, if he can handle simple equations, he luill not 



INTRODUCTORY. ^^^H 

find the book difficult The secret of Major Tactics in 
chess is to attack an adverse piece at a time when it cannot 
move, at a point where it is defenceless, and with a force 
that is irresistible. The hook is to the student of chess 
what Clausewitz and Von Hohenlohe are to the soldier at 
arms. It is not intended for the beginner any more than 
is a treatise on ballistics recommended for the recruit. In 
it one finds the 2^^'inci2?les of grand strategy and logistics 
ajp'plied to chess in a unique and scientific way. The treat- 
ment is so clear and masterful a,s to win for the author 
the gratitude of all devotees of the royal game. Every 
move is given its place in the plan of attack and defence, 
and is discussed in the light of examples from the historic 
contests of the great generals of the game. In print, paper, 
and general presentment the book leaves no room for 
adverse comment.'' 



CHESS STRATEGETICS ILLUSTRATED. 



CHESS STRATEGETICS ILLUSTRATED, 



TOPOGRAPHICAL HORIZON. 

THE principles which underlie the science of war 
and those which underlie the science of chess 
are one and the same ; those processes whereby these 
principles are applied in actual warfare and in actual 
chessplay are nothing more nor less than processes in 
daily and common use in the various branches of the 
mathematics. 

The science of mathematics is founded upon the 
proposition that one and one make two ; the science 
of war is founded upon the proposition that two men, 
all else being equal, can whip one man. The art of 
warfare consists in those processes whereby two men 
are made simultaneously to attack one man, and the 
art of chessplay consists in these processes whereby 
two kindred chesspieces are made simultaneously to 
attack a single adverse piece. 

In the elaboration of these processes the individual 
properly may become a collection of individuals, as, for 
example, armies and covpB d'armee^ and whether posted 
on the battlefield or on the chessboard ; but in either 
case the law remains the same, — a law promulgated by 
one whose authority few will dispute : — 

"The fundamental law of war," says Napoleon, "is 
this, — the greater force always overcomes the lesser." 



4 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

The reader will observe that the master of military 
science does not qualify his statement ; he does not say 
that the greater force usually overcomes the lesser ; 
nor that it almost always overcomes the lesser ; he 
says " ALWAYS overcomes the lesser." 

There are men who up to this moment have held a 
different opinion. The mind of average humanity is 
illogical ; it does not think, — it merely receives impres- 
sions through the senses. Thus its conclusions neces- 
sarily are based upon results, — i. 6?., upon things which 
can be seen, heard, and felt, — and hence it readily is de- 
ceived and imposed upon through the defects and limita- 
tions of the bodily organism. Consequently, many men 
are of the opinion that it is possible for the weak to 
overcome the powerful, for grapes to grow on thorns, 
for the tail to wag the dog, and who would be astounded 
to know that the race is to the swift and the 
battle to the strong, the Scriptures to the contrary, 
notwithstanding. 

Furthermore, there are men who even after reading 
the law as laid down by the illustrious Corsican will 
continue to hold to their different opinion. Of such, 
this is all that need be said : he who is not endowed 
with an understanding of mathematics sufficient to 
sense by mere instinct, as it were, the grand mechani- 
cal fact underlying Napoleon's dictum, should not waste 
his time in the perusal of these volumes ; Nature has 
not equipped him for the study of strategetics, — whetlier 
the latter relate to war or to chess. In the terse sen- 
tences of Frederick the Great : — 

" Nothing can serve to enlighten stupidity and stub- 
bornness; a mule would not improve in his tactics, though 
he made twenty campaigns with Prince Eugene." 



TOPOGRAPHICAL HORIZON. 5 

But those who approach this subject with the desire 
to learn, readily will detect the peculiar wording of the 
law. They will note that the great captain uses the 
term, "/orce," that he does not say "bodies of men," 
neither does he say " greater number of men ; " and 
that, in short, he does not say anything whatsoever about 
men, either individually or collectively but he says — 

" FORCE." 

Now it is essential that the student of this theory, 
once and for all, comprehend that this " force " which 
the great master of military science is talking about 
has no relation to inert masses of men, but is a pure 
mechanical power. li\ war, this force is the weight 
multiplied by the square of the velocity of flying pro- 
jectiles from small arms and artillery, and of the bodily 
impact of charging men and horses, whereby hostile 
troops and material are put hors du combat ; in chess 
it is the power inherent in kindred chessmen to elimi- 
nate adverse pieces from the surface of the chessboard. 

Hence, the first corollary of the fundamental law of 
Strategetics obviously is : — 

A mass of troops or of chessmen does not achieve vic- 
tory merely because it numerically is superior to the 
opponent, — the mass that wins may be in the aggregate 
either larger or smaller than the enemy, all that is 
matter of indifference, — the winning is effected in 
each and every case by operating against a vital point 
a ''force ; " i. e., a power to destroy greater than the 
power to defend which at the given time and place is 
operated by the enemy. Says Napoleon : — 

"It "is only the force brought into action which avails 
in battles and campaigns, — the rest does not count." 

Of this force, as applied to the chesspieces, a most 



b CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

erroneous idea commonly is held. The Queen, for in- 
stance, is termed the " strongest," or the " most power- 
ful " of the chesspieces ; the Rook, the " next strongest," 
and so on. As a matter of fact, the chesspieces are of 
equal strength: none is either more or less powerful 
than the other. The Pawn can capture — i. e., destroy 
— any adverse chesspiece by eliminating the latter from 
the surface of the chessboard ; so can the Rook, the 
Bishop, the Knight, and the King — the Queen can do 
no more. Hence, obviously, the force for destruction 
exerted by one piece is equal to that possessed by any 
other chesspiece. 

The fact that the Queen can attack at eight different 
points at one and the same time, and that she can 
traverse the length of the chessboard in a single move, 
are in no sense manifestations of " force " (for she can 
capture and destroy at only one point in a single move, 
and any other of the pieces is able to do likewise), but 
of superiority in mobility ; i. e., in freedom of movement. 

This superiority of the Queen over the other pieces in 
mobility is a tremendous advantage in special positions, 
and greatly enhances her value in the abstract ; but this 
advantage does not take the form of "force," but of 
extraordinary facilities for bringing force into action. It 
is as if, of two equal forces, one, the Queen, by virtue of 
good roads, could reach the battlefield in an hour ; while 
the other, the Pawn, en route through a broken country, 
might require two, three, four, five, or even more hours, 
to reach the scene of action. 

In this connection the student will observe that the 
fact of one piece not being able to move on a diagonal, 
while another cannot move on a vertical or a horizontal, 
and still yet another cannot move on an oblique, is typi- 
cal merely of those topographical conditions which pre- 



TOPOGRAPHICAL HORIZON. 7 

vent a body of troops from crossing an unfordable river, 
an impassable morass, an impenetrable forest, or an in- 
accessible range of heights ; and that the swifter march 
of one piece as compared with the slower march of an- 
other piece merely typifies favorable and unfavorable 
physical conditions of ground and of troops, which accel- 
lerate the one army and impede the other. 

Thus, the student readily will see instead of the 
chessboard having but a single surface common to all 
the pieces, that in any given situation there necessarily 
are as many different surfaces as there are different 
pieces, and that while the material or visible chessboard 
is a simple matter of one big square, subdivided into 
sixty-four smaller squares, alternately colored light and 
dark, that the invisible or mathematical chessboard is 
a composite of all the topographical horizons which ap- 
pertain to the chesspieces contained in the given situa- 
tion. The student should thoroughly comprehend the 
appended diagrams illustrative of the topographical 
horizons of the various chesspieces, before proceeding 
further. 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



TOPOGEAPHICAL HORIZON OF THE PAWN. 

FlGUKB 1. 

Black. 



i 



White. 



Note. — This diagram shows the points possible for 
the Pawn to reach in a single move. 



TOPOGRAPHICAL HORIZON. 



TOPOGRAPHICAL HORIZON OF THE KNIGHT. 
Figure 2. 

Blach. 









































H 




H 










B 








B 










^ 












B 








^» 








H 




H 























W^i'te. 



Note. — This diagram shows the points possible for 
the Knight to reach in a single move. 



10 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



TOPOGRAPHICAL HORIZON OF THE BISHOP. 

FiGUEE 3. 

Black. 





m 



White. 



Note. — This diagram shows the points possible for 
the Bishop to reach in a single move. 



TOPOGRAPHICAL HORIZON. 



11 



TOPOGRAPHICAL HORIZON OF THE ROOK. 
Figure 4. 

Black. 




m 




White. 



Note. — This diagram shows the points possible for 
the Rook to reach in a single move. 



12 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



TOPOGRAPHICAL HORIZON OF THE QUEEN. 

Figure 5. 
Black. 



iHi 






White. 



Note. — This diagram shows the points possible for 
the Queen to reach in a single move. 



TOPOGRAPHICAL HORIZON. 



13 



TOPOGRAPHICAL HORIZON OF THE KING. 
Figure 6. 

Black. 



i 



White. 



Note. — This diagram shows the points possible for 
the King to reach in a single move. 



14 



CHESS STRATEGETICS, 



TOPOGRAPHICAL HORIZON COMPOSITE. 
{a) 

Figure 7. 

Black. 



y///M 



^Si 



y:^//////^. 



'/<///A//%9. 



White. 



Note. — This diagram shows the points possible for 
the pieces contained in the Minor Right Oblique Doubly 
Aligned, to reach in a single move. Total, 39. 



TOPQiGRAPEICAL HORIZON. 



15 



TOPOGRAPHICAL HORIZON COMPOSITE. 
(6.) 

Figure 8. 

Black. 



'////////y/. 



'Z^//////^. 



ifil 





ill 






White. 



Note. — This diagram shows the points possible for 
the pieces contained in the Major Right Oblique Eche- 
loned en Appui, with Minor Crochet, to reach in a single 
move. Total, 45. 



16 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



TOPOGRAPHICAL HORIZON COMPOSITE. 

Figure 9. 

Black. 




m. 



iSl! 



mm 



m 



W4m. 



4m' 4a 



y//////////, 



i 



w^^ 



White. 



Note. — This diagram shows the points possible for 
the pieces contained in the Grand Right Oblique en Ap- 
pui, with Minor Crochet, to reach in a single move. 
Total, 49. 



TOPOGRAPHICAL HORIZON. 



17 



LINES OF COMMUNICATION. 
Whenever the topographical horizons appertaining 
to two or more kindred pieces contained in the same 
topographical zone have one or more points in common, 
then, such points are termed Points of Communication, 
and those horizontals, verticals, diagonals, and obliques 
appertaining to the given kindred pieces which intersect 
at such points of communication are term,^d Lines of 
Communication. 



LINES AND POINTS OF COMMUNICATION. 
Figure 10. 

Black. 




White. 

Note. — The line of communication between the two 
white knights takes the form of a triangle composed 



18 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

of two obliques, the vertex or point of communication 
being White's Q B 6. 

The line of communication between the two White 
Rooks takes the form of a vertical (obviously, it equally 
well may be a horizontal), every point contained in 
which is a point of communication. 

The line of communication between the Queen and 
the Rooks takes the form of a quadrilateral, and the 
points of communication are K R 2, K R 4, K B 7, and 
all the points contained in the third horizontal. 

The line of communication between the White Queen 
and the White Bishop is formed of two diagonals, and 
the points of communication are K B 4, K 3, K R 2, 
Q 4, and K B 6. 

The line of communication between the White Bishop 
and the White Pawn is formed of a diagonal, and the 
point of communication is Q B 3. 

Obviously, then, whenever two or more kindred pieces 
are united with each other by lines of communication 
they always can support each other in a single move, 
and in all cases wherein such lines of communication, 
do not exist it is impossible for them to give each 
other such support. 

Hence, to the student, whether of mathematics, of 
war, or of chess, it is evident that the following is true 
and valid ; 

FIRST LAW OF THE ART OF CHESSPLAY. 

Whenever tivo undefended kindred pieces having no 
line of communication are simidtaneously attacked hy 
an adverse force^ then one of the given kindred pieces 
is lost. 



TOPO GRAPHICAL HORIZON. 



19 



NO LINE OF COMMUNICATION EXISTING. 
Figure 11. 

Black. 




White. 



Note. — Both of the White Knights are isolated from 
each other and are simultaneously attacked by the 
Black Queen. No line of communication existing, one 
of the attacked pieces is lost. 

It also will be readily apparent to the student that 
although a line of communication exists, but is nullified 
from any cause, the resultant condition is as though the 
line of communication did not exist, and again one of 
the two adverse pieces is lost by the operation of the 
foregoing law. 



20 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



Hence, the truth of the following corollaries is self- 
evident : — 

Corollary I. — If neither of the attacked pieces can 
move, then, although a line of communication exists, 
one of the attacked pieces is lost. 



LINE OF COMMUNICATION NEUTRALIZED. 

(Corollary I.) 

ElGUEE 12. 

Black. 



1 











////////'//// 







^^ v///////A,_ 








White. 



Note. — A line of communication exists between the 
White Knights, but neither Knight can move. 



TOPOGRAPHICAL HORIZON. 



21 



Corollary II. — If neither of the attacked pieces 
can occupy the point of communication, then, although 
a line of communication exists, one of the attacked 
pieces is lost. 



LDs-E OF COMMUNICATION NEUTRALIZED. 

(Corollary II.) 

Figure i3. 

Black. 





\ 'mm. 'mm. v//////m 



m. wm.. 




^ m////A 



''^mm'm. 




White. 



Note. — A line of communication exists between the 
two White Knights, but the point of communication is 
commanded by a Black Pawn. 



PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS. 

. In contemplating the normal position, it is evident to 
the student of this theory that there are at the dis- 
posal both of himself and of his opponent sixteen chessic 
corps cfarmee^ all of which are equal in strength, that 
the positions of the contending Caissan armies are 
identical, and that at the present moment neither has 
any advantage over the other. 

But it is necessary that the student should observe 
much more than this. In addition to recognizing in 
pawn, knight, bishop, rook, queen, and king a com- 
plete army corps, having its full complement of in- 
fantry, cavalry, and artillery, and all in the highest 
condition of physical vigor, discipline, and equipment, 
and seemingly arrayed in a single mass, he must 
realize that in reality these corps are separated from 
each other by numerous impassable barriers, in viola- 
tion of the Napoleonic dictum : " Unity is the soul of 
strategy ; " and, furthermore, lie must fix his attention 
upon what is one of the greatest considerations known 
to the science of Strategetics — whether applied in war- 
fare or in chessplay — i. e., the possibility of the arrival 
in the topographical zone of a body of chesspieces not 
numbered in the original corps de hataille. 

In war, this most important factor for successful cam- 
paigning has its rise in tlie ability of the commander-in- 
chief to combine the movements of troops, which, though 
not a part of the same tactical formation, yet, through 
the harmonious working of the laws of military science. 



PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS. 23 

nevertheless, are manoeuvring strategically^ i. e., as a 
unit. In chess this factor is typified by the power of 
promotion possessed by the pawns; in consequence of 
which, as the student readily sees, the possibility always 
exists that one or even all of the kindred pawns, or of 
the adverse pawns, may reach the logistic horizon ; in 
which case, a force enormously greater than the original 
armies would become precipitated into the theatre of 
conflict. 

Consequently, it is imperative for the student thor- 
oughly to realize that the hostile force on his front is 
but a part of the difficulties that beset him, and that in 
addition to the sixteen corps of the enemy that face 
him, eight other hostile corps of equal force are ad- 
vancing against his strategetic rear. To be sure, this 
situation has its compensation, otherwise the beautiful 
mathematical harmony of this incomparable game would 
be destroyed, and Leibnitz could not in truth and in 
rapt admiration have declared, " Chess is an exact 
science^ 

For, like as the eight hostile corps are advancing 
across the adverse hypothetical zone, their movements 
depicted by the advance of the adverse pawns in the 
topographical zone, so likewise is to be seen an equal 
kindred force, marching across the kindred hypotheti- 
cal zone to the attack of the strategetic rear of the 
enemy. 

Hence, as the student readily will perceive, the strate- 
getic plane is the principal geometric figure in all 
calculations which appertain to the practical applica- 
tion of this theory in actual play. Moreover, it is 
equally evident that there are three great objects, the 
attainment of which is the motif of every calculation, 
viz. : — 



24 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

I. To destroy the Determinate Adverse Force. 

II. To occupy the Kindred Logistic Horizon. 

III. To defend the Kindred Strategetic Rear. 

It also is easy to see that, for the attainment of these 
objects, all the powers contained in the Kindred Deter- 
minate Force must be constantly devoted, and that every 
move made must, either directly or indirectly, harmonize 
in itself the principles upon which those processes for 
simultaneously attaining these objects are based. 

That is, at every move, the entire force of all the kin- 
dred pieces must be operated : 

I. To checkmate the adverse King. 

II. To queen a kindred Pawn. 

III. To prevent the queening of an adverse Pawn. 

That force, operated by all the kindred pieces, collec- 
tively, for the purpose of checkmating the adverse King, 
is termed in this theory : — 

The Column of Attack. 

That force, operated by all the kindred pieces, collec- 
tively, for the purpose of queening a kindred Pawn, is 
termed in this theory : — 

The Column of Support. 

That force, operated by all the kindred pieces, collec- 
tively, for the purpose of preventing any adverse Pawn 
from queening, is termed in this theory : — 

The Column of Manceuvre. 

In this connection, it is imperative that the student 
clearly understand that each of these three prime strate- 
getic factors is composed of all the kindred pieces ; and 
that, at every turn to move, the threefold duty devolves 
upon him of selecting that deployment, development, 
or manoeuvre wdiich in the given situation harmonizes 
in a single move the requirements of these three great 
cardinal eleynents. 



PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS. 25 

Thus, it is obvious tliat the object of the Column of 
Attack is to gain command of the Objective Plane. Any 
process wliich effects this end is a strategic line of 
operations and is the completion of a complex line of 
manoeuvre. Hence, it is easy to see that the column 
of attack ceases to exist whenever the net value of the 
Kindred Determinate Force, contained in the Topograph- 
ical Zone, is less than the mobility of the Objective 
Plane. 

The object of the Column of Support is to occupy a 
l^oint of junction on the kindred logistic horizon. Any 
process which effects this end is a logistic line of 
operations and is the completion of a compound line 
of manoeuvre. Hence, it is easy to see that the column 
of support ceases to exist whenever the last kindred 
Pawn is removed from the board. 

The object of the Column of Manoeuvre is to maintain 
a point of impenetrability upon the vertical occupied by 
each adverse pawn. Hence, it is obvious that the 
column of manoeuvre ceases to exist upon the removal 
from the board of the last adverse Pawn. 

In the performance of their various duties it well 
may happen that each of these prime strategetic factors 
may meet with more or less resistance from the Adverse 
Determinate Force, and in all cases of conflict it is 
legitimate for either column to use its full energies to 
destroy any or all of the opposing pieces. Aa\j process 
which effects this end is a tactical line of operations, 
provided do compensating benefit in time or in position 
or in material thereby accrues to the enemy. 

The attention of the student is now requested to the 
appended diagram, which shows a strategetic plane 
and the position of the various prime strategetic factors. 



26 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

Black. 



i^ ^i 



i 



i 



fill 



11 



lal 



w» 



?S'«^ 



fii ■ 



V///////. 



^f^%; 



f 



f 



W^l 



TFA/^e. 



PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS. 27 

Note. — In this diagram is depicted the Topograph- 
ical Zone and the White Hypothetical and the Black 
Hypothetical Zones. 

The White column of attack is represented by the 
white pieces contained in the Topographical Zone ; the 
White column of support by the White Queens (promot- 
able factors) contained in the Kindred Hypothetical 
Zone ; tlie White column of manoeuvre by the White 
Pawns contained in the Adverse Hypothetical Zone. 

The Black column of attack is represented by the 
black pieces contained in the Topographical Zone; 
the Black column of support by the Black Queens 
(promotable factors) contained in the Kindred Hypo- 
thetical Zone ; the Black column of manoeuvre by the 
Black Pawns contained in the Adverse Hypothetical 
Zone. 

The principle which governs the processes incident 
to the column of manoeuvre is derived from the fact 
that no Paivn can 2?ass a piecs situated on the same 
vertical. Such point, therefore, is a point of impene- 
trability ; and so long as it exists, it obviously is impos- 
sible for the given Pawn to pass it, and of course equally 
impossible for the given Pawn to reach the logistic 
horizon, hence, — 

PRINCIPLE. 

The .strategetic rear is clefendecl against an adverse 
Pawn in all eases ivherein a point of imjoenetr ability 
exists on the vertical a2?2?e7'taining to the given adverse 
Paiun. 



28 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

Black. 



White. 



PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS. 29 



Note. — Obviously, it is impossible for any one of the 
promotable factors {i. e.^ Queens), either with or without 
the move, to penetrate to its logistic horizon ; for the 
reason that it cannot pass the point occupied by the 
opposing Pawn. 

There are twenty- three basic situations, in which by 
means of the advantage in position a column of ma- 
noeuvre may hold in check a numerically superior 
column of support. 

This advantage in position is illustrated by the fol- 
lowing diagrams : — 



80 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

Black. 



i 



^ : : ^ 



^ : : ^ 



White. 



PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS. 31 



Note. — These situations are based upon the fact 
that the numerically larger column of support is obliged 
to move, and that the only moves open to it are viola- 
tions of the laws of major tactics. 

Consequently, the inferior column of manoeuvre is 
transformed into a column of support ; then it advances 
to its logistic horizon and occupies a kindred point of 
junction, thus becoming a column of attack; then it 
pursues, overtakes, and annihilates the adverse column 
of support. All this is done, as the student readily sees, 
in conformity to Prop. YII. of " Major Tactics." 



32 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



Black. 



m 



^ 



c := 



O O 









o 

Q- 









o 

02 
© 



o- 



© u 
t- o 

SI 



O n 

s r 



.^3 © 

•r o 
© <^ 



TFAiVe. 



PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS. 



33 



Black. 



± 





>-> 




o 




-tJ 




m 




^ 




^ 




fl 




cS 




o 




,^ 




© '^. 




tH 05 




t> O 












§ ^ 




5 CH 




a ^ 








t|_J T-S 




C c5 




^ ^ 








a - 




S «4-l 




-c ° 


B 


'^ •; 


^ 


, XI 


> 


o ^ 


1^2 




e 


^ g^ 


^ 


G Sh 


< 


.5 flH 


% 


2 o 




rJ3 -(J 


^ 


-^ 


o 


^ bC 




c; C 




g ? 


t^ 


S o 


vA 


o 


n 


^ s 


C) 


^ c^ 








■4^ 




-t^ i-i 




:= o 




o &- 




pG & 




if ^ 




S ^ 




<^— 1 




'^ O 




O 




rt 




- § 




•r s 




l^-o 




o 
















s ^ 




1 "^ 




1 =« 




H <I> 




H pG 




o -^ 




;zi ^ 








CS 








© 




n^ 



White. 



34 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 
Btach 






m i» 









m 






f 



"•i" 



l 



f 



i ^ 



w 



c5 .2 
o 

■5 i 



^ X! 



w 


>^ 










> 


c3 


O 


^ 




-^J 


p 


c 


t£ 


J^ 


c; 


^ 


< 


^ 


•n 


^ 


^ 


o 








^ 


X 


o 








s^ 




• V 


:z; 


cT 


CN 


;:3 


> 

c 


o 












o 




s 


o 


o 


CO 




1—^ 


trH 






o 




-i-3 












O 


s 




_ ^" 


ri 




-4-3 












^ 


o 




c 


2 




,^ 








> 






'^ 




^ 


rt 




;_ 


o 




o 












-1^ 


„^ 




1 


C5 




E 


;:; 




H 


• p— 1 




O 


>-, 




12; 


s 
■g 



ir/u-^e. 



A -J'. 



PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS. 



35 



Black. 



i=l 




a 




o 




o 




f^ 




!> 




s 




8 


::^ 


i=i 


aj 


a 


a 


B 


'■+3 
o 


O 


^ 




o 




C3 


o 


il 


J_, 


<^-i 


o 


o 






.2^ 


XI 


5=1 






Ph 




o 


t^ 


t-l 




Ci^ 


ri 




n 


o 






^ 




O) 


bo 


a 


C 




^ 


c 


;h 




o 


0") 


o 


rg 


s 


^ 


•V 


O) 




c 


o 


s 


&. 




13 


o 


OS 


r^ 


t4H 




o 


o 


a 




s 


~M 




^ 


8 


^ 


9 


o 




ri 


o 


-M 


>■ 




n-i 


1? 


C3 


:-i 


o 


0) 




r^ 


-*J 


-M 


,__, 


H 


'c^ 




-(-3 


1 


O 


1 


TU 


m 


rj 


H 


• rH 


^ 


s 




<4-3 




W 




O) 




r^ 



TFAiYe. 



36 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

Black. 



■ ^]^^ 



^^ 



^^■. 



:#:#!# 



^ 



9 1 



m i« 






m m 



]Vh>tf: 



PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS. 37 

Note. — Either with or without the move, the numer- 
ically inferior column of manoeuvre can destroy in detail 
the adverse column of support composed of two promot- 
able factors, and without the move, it can destroy in 
detail the adverse column of support composed of three 
promotable factors ; according to Prop. XL of " Major 
Tactics." 

COLUMN OF SUPPORT. 

The principle which governs the processes incident to 
the column of support is derived from the fact that, in 
the absence of a point of iyni^eyietr ability on its vertical, 
it is possible for a Pawn to penetrate to the kindred 
logistic horizon. Hence : — 

PRIXCIPLE. 
A Point of Junction is open to occupation whenever the 
number of Pawns advancing against the given logistic hori- 
zon exceeds the number of adverse points of iinpenetrability. 

There are four basic positions which underlie all 
situations in which the column of support penetrates 
through the adverse column of manoeuvre and gains 
possession of a point of junction on the logistic horizon, 
viz. : — 

(rt) A position in which there is no point of impene- 
trability. 

(5) In which an adverse point of impenetrability is 
overlapped by two adjacent kindred supporting elements. 

(c) In which the point of impenetrability is over- 
lapped by two separated kindred supporting elements. 

(f?) In which three points of impenetrability are 
opposed by three supporting elements, the latter having 
the move. 

These four basic positions are shown in the following 
diao-ram : — 



38 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

Black. 









White. 



PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS. 39 

Note. — These basic situations are founded on the 
fact that all the points of impenetrability and of resist- 
ance being eliminated from the attitude of the given 
Pawn the latter will queen without capture, according to 
Props, v., VI., VIII., IX., X., and XL (see " The Major 
Tactics of Chess," pp. 110-121). 

The student readily will see that the White Queen on 
the extreme left of the hypothetical zone has an unim- 
peded route of march to White's Q R 8 ; that the White 
Queens on the centre of the same zone will easily 
remove the point of impenetrability on their front, by 
attacking it with one Queen supported by the other 
Queen, and that if the Black Pawn captures the attack- 
ing Queen, the supporting Queen, by capturing in turn 
the Black Pawn, or by merely advancing along its logistic 
radius, will remain with an unimpeded route of march 
to its lo2:istic horizon. 

Again, if in the example on the extreme right, either 
White Queen attacks the Black Pawn, the result is that 
one of the White Queens will remain with an unimpeded 
route of march to its logistic horizon, for whether the 
Black Pawn captures the attacking White Queen or ad- 
vances or remains stationary, the point of impenetrabil- 
ity will be eliminated from the vertical of one, at least, 
of the White symbols of promotion, and it will be ob- 
served that either with or without the move, the White 
Queens may penetrate to their logistic horizon with 
equal jfertainty and facility. 

In the case of the three Black Queens, the student will 
observe that it is imperative that they have the move ; 
otherwise the white column of manoeuvre will securely 
cover the white strategetic rear by advancing the centre 
pawn one square towards the black symbols of promo- 



\ 



40 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



tion. This is the only move to maintain the integrity 
of the White defence, for if either of the other White 
Pawns advance, Black wins by attacking with one of the 
Black Queens the supporting White Pawn ; whereupon 
one of the Black Queens will find itself in one of the 
three situations just described^ and accordingly will be 
able to penetrate to its logistic horizon. 

This same situation results if Black has the first move 
and he wins by advancing the centre black symbol of 
promotion one step. See " Grand Tactics," page 59. 

COLUMN OF SUPPORT. 

Figure 23. 

Adolph Anderssen. 




Paul Morphy. 



PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS. 



41 



This position occuiTed in the first game of the match 
between these masters. 





THE 


PLAY. 




X 


[ll. MORPHY. 




Herr Anderssen. 


50. 


Kt - B 6. 




50. P X Kt. 


51. 


Q X P (ck). 




51. K-Ktl. 


52. 


Q - Kt 6 (ck). 




52. K - B 1. 


53. 


Q X P (ck). 




53. K-Kl. 


54. 


Q - Kt 6 (ck). 




54. K-Q2. 


55. 


P - E 6. 




55. Q - Q 4. 


56. 


P - E 7. 




56. Q X P (ck) 


57. 


K - Kt 1. 




57. Kt-Kt4 


^B>. 


P — K E 8 (Queen). 


b^. Q X 2ndQ. 


59. 


Q X Kt. 







COLUMN OF ATTACK. 

The principle which governs the processes. incident to 
the Column of Attack is derived from the fact that the 
possession of that central diagonal ivhich extends toward 
the objective j^lane gives such an advantage in mobility 
that the consequent facility wdth which the kindred 
pieces may act in co-operation both for attack and for 
defence must ultimately lead to the checkmate of the 
adverse king. Hence : — 



PRINCIPLE. 

- All else being equal, a properly constructed minor stra- 
tegic front establishes an equality in position ; a properly 
constructed major strategic front establishes the superiority 
in position ; and a p>roperly constructed grand strategic 
front establishes a ivinning advantage in position. 



42 



CRESS STRATEGETICS. 



MIXOR EIGHT OBLIQUE {White). 
MIlsOR LEFT OBLIQUE REFUSED [Black). 

Figure 24. 
Adolph Anderssen. 



Pi i pl^H i PI 

^X^ X ^1 ill 



i% ^y//////////. WY/z/yy/A 



WWM 



p ^AkM -mm 



p 1^1 ^ ^» 



Paul Morpht. 



This position occurred at move 14 in the fifth game 
of the Morphy-Anderssen match. 

The student will observe that the White pieces are 
posted in strict accord with this theory of chessplay, 
and that collectively they constitute the formation 
termed in " Minor Tactics^' p. 149, the 0PB2C. 

If the student will study carefully these fourteen 
opening moves and will compare them with the moves 



PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS. 



43 



given by the so-called " analytical authorities," he 
readily will see that Morphy made no pretence of con- 
forming to their dicta, but merely played to establish 
the best available primary base, on a strategic front 
directed by the right, and so manoeuvring as to prevent 
Black advancing his K P to K 4. 

MINOR LEFT OBLIQUE ALIGNED ( White). 

Figure 25. 

m. bornemann. 



i I 



^, Wy///////., 



m 







^ 






m 



fm m 
Hi* 







y/Tm//. 





W/A ^.. g^ 



Paul Morpht. 



This position occurred on the 18th move at Table 
No. 3 in the great blindfold match played at the Caf^ 
de la R^gence, Paris, September, 1858. 



44 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



The student will observe that the Black K is castled 
on the Queen's side, and that the White position is 
depicted in " Grand Tactics," Formula No. 17, page 136. 



MINOR LEFT OBLIQUE [White). 

Figure 26. 

Herr Harrwitz. 



{'/A 






4m 



W//. '///. 



m 'mm,. ^^..-M-..-.^^,, 



.w//////^.^ -0/////////.. 



fm g pi! 




Paul Morphy. 

This position occurred in the eighth game of the 
match between these nxasters. 



PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS. 



45 



MAJOR RIGHT OBLIQUE (White). 

Figure 27. 

Adolph Anderssen. 




k « mi 
i 






y^/////y/7 ^^^^^^^ 



ffif 



W/, %y////A 



f Si . IS 



ill- « 



iMi 







m 
^ « 






<^ — ^^^<^ 



i«l 



Paul Morpht. 



This position occurred in the eleventh game of tlie 
match between these masters. 



46 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



MAJOR RIGHT OBLIQUE {Black). 

FiGUEE 28. 

Paul Moephy. 




H. E. B] 



This position occurred at the 10th move in the cele- 
brated Philidor's Defence between these masters. 

The student will observe that Black has wrested from 
White the advantage of the initial move of the game, 
and has established a formation which properly should 
belong to the first player. 



PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS. 



47 



MAJOR LEFT OBLIQUE {White). 
(Objective Plane, Left.) 

Figure 29. 

m. bornemann. 




k 

i 81 



m'fmm'm 



m 




1 

m mwM 



m.....^„^ W^y,,^ iS, 












Paul Morpht. 



This situation occurred on the 29th move at Table 
No. 3 in the great blindfold exhibition at Paris, 1858. 



48 



CHESS STRATEGETICI 



MAJOR LEFT OBLIQUE {^yhite). 
(Objective Plane, Centre.) 

ElGUKE 30. 

Paul Moephy. 







m 



mi 



4 ■ i 




'//A . ■//. 














Adolph Axderssen. 



This position occurred at the 13th move in the third 
and last game won from Morphy by the great German 
master. 



4 



PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS, 49 





THE PLAY. 




Here Anderssen. 


Mr. Morphy. 






13. 


B - K Kt 5. 


14. 


Q-K4. 


14. 


Q X Q. 


15. 


Kt X Q. 


15. 


B xR. 


16. 


Kt X K B. 


16. 


B-R4. 


17. 


BxP. 


17. 


P X P. 


18. 


Kt X Kt P (ck). 


18. 


K - K 2. 


19. 


B - Q Kt 5. 


19. 


Ex P. 


20. 


R- Kl (ck). 


20. 


K-B3. 


21. 


R-K8. 


21. 


B - Kt a 


22. 


Kt - Q 6. 








White 


won. 





50 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



MAJOR LEFT OBLIQUE {White). 
(When Black Q P cannot occupy Q 3.) 

Figure 3L 

Paul Mokphy. 






///y///^//A 



11 iBi 



«. %. 



^_„-„__„i III i 



\.\..^m ^B 




M ''m>m. " 'MM. 






^ ii ^ ■ m km 




Adolph Anderssen. 



This situation occurred in the ninth game of the 
match between these masters. 



PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS. 51 



THE PLAY. 






Me. Morphy. 


Herr Andeessen. 


5. Kt-Kt5. 


5. 


P-Q3. 


6. B-KB4. 


6. 


P - K 4. 


To B - K 3. 


7. 


P-B4. 


8. QKt-B3. 


8. 


P - B 5. 


9. Kt-Q5. 


9. 


P X B. 


10. K Kt - B 7 (ck). 


10. 


K-B2. 


11. Q - B 3 (ck). 


11. 


Kt - B 3. 


12. B-B4. 


12. 


Kt - Q 5. 


13. Kt X Kt (dis ck). 


13. 


P-Q4. 


14. B X P (ck). 


14. 


K - Kt 3. 


15. Q - K E 5 (ck). 


15. 


K X Kt. 


16. P X P. 


16. 


Kt X P (ck), 


17. K-K2. 






White won. 







52 



CHESS STRATEGETICS 



GRAND RIGHT OBLIQUE EN APPUI {White). 
MAJOR LEFT OBLIQUE REFUSED (Black). 

Figure 32. 

Judge A. B. Meek. 





i 11 ^H II. ■ 



^„ w/////^. 






YA y/777777/y^. 




_ — m ^^ 

'"" IP 



'^<m; 



mm. 






Paul INIorpht. 



This position occurred on the 24th move of a Fian- 
chetto Defence. It shows the Strategetic Objective 
occupied by a pawn. 



PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS. 



53 



GKAND EIGHT OBLIQUE {White). 

Figure 33. 

Adolph Andekssen. 



'W\ 



WTm^ 



1 






m.'^.mm.\4M, * 







m iHi 



m.,„,,^/ t'^^4 



'>y//////m 

'mm,, m 




I ©I 
e 




i 




s 



Paul Morphy, 



This position occurred in the eleventh game of the 
match between these masters. It shows the Strategetic 
Objective occupied by a piece. 



54. 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



GEAND LEFT OBLIQUE EN APPUI WITH MINOR CROCHET 

{White). 

ElGUEE 34, 
S. S. BODEX. 









m is. 

.'V//////y/. '//^//tM 



wy////^. 



'Zy/////M. 




i Ill 







i 

'mm. m 







Paul Morpht. 



This position occurred on the 39th move of a Two 
Knights Defence. 



f 



PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS. 



55 



MINOR RIGHT OBLIQUE REFUSED AND ALIGNED {Black). 

Figure 35. 

Paul Morphy. 



II iwM. 




»////////.. 



m 



m 



Hi 



'^ « k 4m. i 





■ I 




W', W///////A 









Hi/ 









MONGREDIEN. 



This position occurred at the 14th move of the 
seventh game in the match between these masters. 



66 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



MINOR LEFT OBLIQUE REFUSED {Black). 

Figure 36. 

Paul Morpht. 



mmi 11 



ii i ■-iM i ill i 



Wi 





m„ 



jZv/////^. 




Mm.. 

m 








i 



^^ 



Judge McConnell. 



This situation occurred at the 11th mo^e of a French 
Defence. 

Black's position is the model of this form of defence 
against the Major Right Oblique En Potence. 



PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS. 57 

THE PLAY. 
Judge McConnell. Mk. Morpht. 







11. 


B X P (ck) 


12. P X B. 




12. 


Kt X Kt P. 


13. Q-Q2. 




13. 


E-B7. 


14. Q-Ql. 




14 


Kt - K 6. 




Black 


won. 





58 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



MINOE LEFT OBLIQUE EEFUSED AND ALIGNED {White). 

FlGUEE 37. 

Paul Morpht. 



iWi 



m 




m mm^.. 



■^mm/''''''^% 



^/S^..^ mm^y, ^/ 



■'^mi 



li 



1! i ■ 



y^^/^. 





\w WW 




HI 




4m 4k 












Adolph Andeessen. 



This position occurred in the tenth game of the match 
between these masters. It shows the defence of the 
K Kt at K B 3 by K B-K 2 against the Fianchetto of 
the adverse Q B. 

THE PLAY. 
Hekk Anderssen. Mr. Morphy. 



24. B-QKt2. 

25. Q - B 2 



24. Q-KB2, 

25. B-K2. 



PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS. 



59 



MAJOR RIGHT OBLIQUE REFUSED EN POTENCE {Black). 

Figure 38. 

Paul Morphy. 



1 /■"" 

4m 



7//////%'. 



i 





i #Si 




i% W//////A 



v//////y ■ J^ 7////////. 

i 



m #////^, 



i^„ _, W^^^y. 







Jacob Lowenthal. 



This position occurred at the 40th move of the ninth 
game in the match between these players. 



60 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



MAJOR CROCHET ( White). 

Figure 39. 

Mr. Barnes. 



■ il 




fifj 





i 



^11 i 



m 
'mm""'/% ''- 





4^A 'mmA...'^.'mm, 






m m. M 




«. -„% 




SI 



Paul Morpht. 



This position occurred at the 24th move in a King's 
Bishop's opening. White won by P-Q Kt 5. 



PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS. 



61 



THE ECHELOX ( White). 

Figure 40. 

Adolph Axderssen. 










m w 

Mi...^,..W//////A .. . . ^S^y. 



II i ■ i ■ u 






W///MM. 



'/^////////!',-f^zJ,f^^^^'.. 




m^m. mAm 



Paul Moephy. 



This situation occurred in the fifth game of the match 
between these masters. It shows the construction of 
tlie Echelon, the En Appui, and the En Potence in the 
Right Oblique by White. 



/ 



5f 

r 



^ 



62 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



THE PLAY. 



Mr. 


MOEPHY. 


Here Andeessen. 


15. 


P - K R 3. 


15. Q - B 1. 


16. 


K-E2. 


16. K-Rl. 


17. 


E - K Kt 1. 


17. E-KKtl. 


18. 


P - K Kt 4. 


18. P-KKt4. 


19. 


P - K B 4, etc. 





PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS. 



63 



THE EN POTENCE {White). 

Figure 41, 

Stauntox and Owen. 




m 










ww.^ ^^,„.%.^^^. 



w/////^. y^//////M:, 







'Z^//////yZi 




V. 



'^////////y'' '/y/^^//',. 




MoRPHY and Barnes. 



This position occurred at the 21st move in the second 
game of the famous consultation contest played at Bir- 
mingham, England, 1858. White won. 



64 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



THE FIANCHETTO [Black), 

ElGURE 42. 

Paul Morpht. 




m i 



m 








WHfM 




Wm 
m 4M 




fm.. m, * » 



Wa ^» ^Si ^^ 




Mr. Mongredien. 



This position occurred at the 43d move in the third 
jame between these players. 



m 



PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS. 



Qb 



CROCHET ALIGNED IN DOUBLE FRONT BY THE RIGHT 

( White). 

Figure 43. 
Jacob Lowenthal. 




i 





ill i M I ■ * iii * 



^^.^^^^...^^^^p. 



.^ M^4M ™ 

i 







W///////A rv^ $5^$?2^^ 



i ^ 1^1 




Paul Morpht. 



This situation occurred on the 20th move in the 
twelfth game of the match between these masters. 



66 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



CROCHET ALIGXED IN DOUBLE FRONT BY THE LEFT 

{White). 

Figure 44. 
Theodore Lichtexhein. 



^ 






11 







^ mm,.^^f;;;;^J^^M, 



4^11 i 
■ 



m^lM. ^ 





1^1 i 





i %#i~ 



Paul Morpht. 



This position occurred at the 20th move of a Petroff 
Defence. White won. 



PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS. 



67 



MINOR FRONT DOUBLY ALIGNED {White). 

Figure 45. 

Jacob Lowexthal. 



^i 



v/z/zz/yZ'. 'Z^zzzzz///'.^ 



Wz t^i,.„^,^a ^ Isl 

* 1 il i 

VZ///////Z/ 

WM. 



if i Pi 

vy//ZZZy VZy/y/yZZZy 





m. ■, 



i mi A fSi 

y/zzz/vzzz '^'' vzzzzzzzzzz ^^^^^^^^^ 

IS4 ™ ^ 

I MB 



'M 




yZZ/rtV/Z 
"%>... ^....."yZZZZZZy^. 



Paul Moephy. 



This situation occurred in the fourth game of the 
match between these masters. 



68 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

The student perceives that the column of attack is 
composed of a force represented by the combined action 
of all those kindred pawns and pieces which at *any 
given time are contained within the Topographical Zone, 
and that the movements and operations of the column 
of attack always are restricted to the limits of the 
visible, or material chessboard. 

It also is equally evident that the column of support 
is composed of a force represented by the combined 
action of all those kindred pawns and pieces which at 
any given time are contained within the Topographical 
Zone ; whose operations always are exclusively directed 
against the logistic horizon with the object of occupy- 
ing one or more points of junction with a kindred pawn ; 
but whose movements technically are restricted to the 
limits of the kindred Hypothetical Zone, z*. e., to that 
part of the mathematical or invisible chessboard wliich 
appertains to the kindred body of chesspieces. 

Lastly, it easily is seen that the column of manoeuvre 
is composed of a force represented by the combined 
action of all those kindred pawns and pieces which at 
any given time are contained within the Topographical 
Zone ; whose operations are exclusively directed against 
the adverse column of support and for the defence of 
the kindred strategetic rear, with the sole object of 
preventing any hostile pawn from penetrating to its 
logistic horizon and occupying a point of junction; but 
whose movements technically are restricted to the limits 
of the adverse Hypothetical Zone, i. e., to that part of 
the mathematical or invisible chessboard which apper- 
tains to the adverse body of chesspieces. 

As the student already has been taught, whenever a 
line of operations exists, all principles may be violated, 
all formations disrupted, which are not germane to the 



PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS. 69 

immediate calculation ; i. e.^ in all cases wherein the 
winning of the game can be mathematically demon- 
strated, either by the checkmate of the adverse king, by 
the queening of a kindred pawn, or by the gain of 
adverse material ; then, that analytical calculation 
whereby such determinate result is obtained is supreme. 
For all the elements being known, the situation may 
be depicted accurately, and consequently the process is 
exact and is merely one of simple arithmetic. 

But in all other cases, i. e., wherein no line of 
operations can be demonstrated, then, as the student 
likewise has been taught, the situation properly is one 
of manoeuvre, i. e., one in wliich a systematic attempt is 
being made to bring about the position termed a line 
of operations. 

In this case, one or more of the elements are not 
known, the situation, therefore, cannot be exactly de- 
picted ; it is first necessary out of the midst of the 
differences which exist to extract harmony ; conse- 
quently, the process is one of the differential calculus. 

Hence, as the student already has been taught in such 
situations, no principle of strategy nor of tactics, nor 
of logistics, should be violated ; no sacrifice of material 
should be made, and no formation constructed in ac- 
cordance with this theory should be disintegrated. 

The student thus will easily perceive, that in compli- 
ance to the requirements of these principles, and to the 
basic law of the Science of Chess Strategetics of which 
these principles are but the corollaries, at every move 
the column of attach., the column of support^ and the 
column of manoeuvre must act together as a unit for 
the defence of the kindred and for the attack of the 
adverse position. It equally is obvious that the three- 
fold duties which respectively appertain to these columns, 



70 , CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

taken collectively, are devolved, in the execution, upon 
the sixteen corps d\irmi^e which originally constitute the 
chessic army, ^. e., that these sixteen kindred chesspieces 
are required, as it were, to multiply themselves threefold, 
and to perform the labors of forty-eight corps cVarmce ; 
and that, instead of contemplating the movements of 
thirty-two men on a chessboard of sixty-four squares, 
the calculations of the chessplayer comprehend the 
deployments, developments, manoeuvres, and operations 
of combined kindred and adverse determinate and hy- 
pothetical forces represented by ninety-six pawns and 
pieces, over the surface of a mathematical chessboard 
composed of one hundred and seventy-six squares : tico- 
thirds of the chesspieces and two-thirds of the chessboard 
being invisible. 

The student of strategetics, whether of war or of 
chess, readily sees the mathematical exactness of this 
vast chessic proposition, and equally so, that in compre- 
hensiveness and in profundity it easily is equal to any 
proposition known to military art and science. Hence, 
to the soldier and to the chessplayer alike, it is obvious 
that the following is true and valid : 

SECOND LAW OF THE ART OF CHESSPLAY. 

At every turn to play and no line of operations existing, 
ahuays act simultaneously u'ith the Column of Attack in 
the Topographical Zone, icith the Column of Support in 
the Kindred Hypothetical Zone, and ivith the Column of 
Manoeuvre in the Adverse Hypothetical Zone, and always 
reject every move ichich violates those principles governing 
the processes incident to these Prime Strategetic Factors. 

The student furthermore will see that whenever the 
kindred force is insufficient to give checkmate it cannot 



PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS. 71 

win the game ; that whenever no kindred pawns remain 
on the board, no further reinforcement of the original 
kindred force is possible, and that whenever no adverse 
pawns remain on tlie board, there is no longer any 
necessity for guarding the strategetic rear. Hence, it is 
obvious that the following is true and valid : — 

THIRD LAW OF THE ART OF CHESSPLAY. 

I. The Column of Attach ceases to exist whenever the 
net value of the Kindred Determinate Force is less than 
the mobility/ of the Objective Plane. 

II. The Column of Support ceases to exist whenever 
the last hiyidred promotable factor is eliminated, 

III. The Column of Manoeuvre ceases to exist whenever 
the last kindred point of imp eyietr ability is eliminated. 

In the position shown in the diagram following, Black 
has a column of support, but no column of attack nor 
column of manoeuvre ; while White has columns of attack 
and of manoeuvre, but no column of support. 

Note. — The student readily perceives that the com- 
bined White Rook and Knight constitute a column of 
attack movements, as they jointly are able to command 
the Objective Plane ; that the three Black Pawns are a 
column of support, and that the White King is a column^ 
of manoeuvre, inasmuch as it can defend the white strat- 
egetic rear against the Black Pawns. 

FOURTH LAW OF THE ART OF CHESSPLAY. 

In every situation and at every turn to move., always 
manoeuvre either with that kindred Prime Strategetic 
Factor which has the advantage; or with any Kindred 
Factor to make subordinate a dominant adverse Prime 
Strategetic Factor. 



72 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

Black. 



m 






White. 



PROCESSES OF GEEATER LOGISTICS 

(JIAJOK). 



PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS 

(MAJOR). 

The student who attempts to master this volume with- 
out having thoroughly familiarized himself with " Minor 
Tactics," "Major Tactics," and "Grand Tactics," will 
have his labor for his pains. 

Before he can comprehend the art of chessplay, he 
must first have thoroughly educated himself in the sci- 
ence of chess ; it is not possible that one may under- 
stand the processes of Greater Logistics and the 
complexities of Lines of Manoeuvre and of Operation, 
until he first has fathomed the preparatory intricacies 
of Lesser Logistics, as interpreted in Lines of Mobiliza- 
tion and of Development. 

In fact, it is now necessary to assume that the student 
has the whole chessic theory, as laid down in the three 
preceding volumes of this series, at his fingers' ends, so 
to speak; and that, in actual play over the board, he 
is not at loss to know the proper construction of any 
given primary base, to know how to mobilize and how to 
develop any desired strategic front, and how to avoid 
those errors in tactics whereby he may fall victim to a 
superior knowledge of routine evolutions on the part of 
his opponent. 

In other words, there is no " climbing in through the 
cabin window," as the sailors say ; the road to chessic 
excellence is steep and rugged, and even the directness 



76 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

and clearness of this synthetic method of chessplay 
can be of no avail to one who is ignorant of its simplest 
processes. 

As the student already has been taught, all calcula- 
tions having but a single point of command belong ex- 
clusively to the domain of Major Tactics ; they are 
determinate propositions, and are solved by simple 
arithmetic ; and until the student has thoroughly mas- 
tered them, he should confine his studies to the second 
volume of this series. For a similar reason, if the stu- 
dent is not entirely familiar with the proper construction 
of the several strategic fronts and of the direction which 
should be given to each ; and if he does not comprehend 
the utility of the various supplementary formations 
which appertain to these strategic fronts, — he should 
continue the study of "Grand Tactics" until he has 
acquired the knowledge which fits him to approach this 
volume with some slight idea of its import. In case he 
is ignorant even of the construction of primary bases, 
and the reasons therefor, then the " Minor Tactics of 
Chess " is the book he needs, — not this one. 

As before has been laid down, both the science of war 
and the science of chess are based upon the axiom that, 
all else being equal, two men can whip one. The art of 
warfare and the art of chessplay consist in getting the 
two men simultaneously upon the other man's hack. So 
simple and so indisputable are the principles and the 
processes appertaining to the science of war in the ab- 
stract, that even savages utilize them with vigor and 
accuracy, and every civilized man, whatever his condi- 
tion, feels himself competent to sit in solemn and final 
judgment on the profoundest military propositions, re- 
gardless of the fact that since the dawn of history only 
eleven men, out of many billions, have evinced a thor- 



PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 77 

ough understanding of the concrete processes of the art 
of warfare. 

In chess it is much the same. The practitioner, as a 
rule, and whatever may be his rank in the chess world, 
usually overestimates his weight in the chessic scale, — a 
fact upon which the famous master Mackenzie once 
commented, " We are none of us so strong as we think 
we are." 

The reason of this is that the minds of ordinary hu- 
manity seldom rise above the processes of simple arith- 
metic. So long as the proposition is exact, and all of 
the elements are known, even the tyro, whether at war 
or at chess, gets along fairly well ; his operations in the 
field or on the chessboard are successful, and his judg- 
ments, whether in military or in chessic councils, are 
just and conclusive. 

This condition, whether on the chessboard or on the 
battlefield, is the triumph of mediocrity, and is due to 
the fact that the theorist pure and simple is the most 
pitiably helpless and useless of all human beings. On 
the other hand, the man with but little education, yet 
possessed of the faculty of making full use of what 
knowledge he has, is the man more properly equipped 
for success, whether in chessplay, in warfare, or, for that 
matter, in anything else. 

But let a man arise who combines the thorough un- 
derstanding of theory with the thorough understanding 
of those processes whereby theory is correctly applied, 
whether in chessplay or in warfare, and you have 
Morphy and Napoleon. Those processes, whereby theory 
properly is applied in actual warfare or in chessplay, are 
not the processes of simple arithmetic. This is the 
reason why there is but one Morphy in the annals of 
Chess and but one Napoleon in the annals of War. Any- 



78 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

body can simultaneously attack one man with two men, 
either on the chessboard or on the battlefield, — if he is 
given time enough, and no resistance is made by the 
single man. But the moment that the unknown ele- 
ments of the single man's resistance and of time and 
distance enter into the calculation, then the proposition 
beco'mes indeterminate ; it is no longer a sum in simple 
arithmetic, but a problem in the differential calculus. 
It is now that the theorist, pure and simple, although 
utterly impotent, inasmuch as his comprehension of the 
science is offset by his lack of understanding of the art, 
nevertheless rubs his hands and howls with glee at the 
sight of so-called " practical " chessplayers or soldiers — 
mere arithmeticians, rather — ignominiously overthrown, 
horse, foot, and dragoons, as the old saying is, by a 
" genius," a " prodigy," a " supernatural intelligence," 
which last, being interpreted, simply means that a man 
has come to the top who thoroughly comprehends both 
the theory and the art of applying it. 

Thus the student will observe that there is nothing 
miraculous in the fact of a boy of twenty-one, in the per- 
son of Morphy, defeating with ease and in the most bril- 
liant manner the greatest chessmasters of his day ; nor 
in a boy of twenty-six defeating the greatest generals of 
his day with equal ease and in an equally brilliant man- 
ner. Both of these prodigies are dead and gone, and 
both are by posterity admitted to stand at the head of 
their respective professions. The success of the one was 
due to the fact that he had a theory in regard to chess, 
and thoroughly understood the art of applying this 
theory in actual chessplay, for the overcoming of time, 
of distance, and of the resistance of the opponent ; the 
success of the other was due to the fact that he had a 
theory in regard to war, and thoroughly understood the 



PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTTCS. 79 

art of applying this theory in actual warfare for the 
overcoming of time, of distance, and of the resistance of 
the opponent. 

The reason why the generality of men are neither 
Morphys nor Napoleons is because the generality of 
men base their conclusions upon results ; because they 
are ignorant of the causes which bring about these 
results ; and because they are oblivious to the fact that 
causes and not results are the prime essentials for suc- 
cess, and that in comparison with these causes, mere 
results are matters of insignificance, being at most 
nothing but necessary sequences. 

Consequently, the generality of men never look deeper 
than mere results, and, sillily accepting these latter as 
primary elements, they project a horizon lacking in 
exactness and con\prehensiveness. Then by a simple 
process of addition and subtraction — in which all their 
mental energy not infrequently is expended — they gain 
what success they do gain, not as the logical outcome of 
profound and accurate calculations, but as the direct out- 
come of blunders on the part of the opponent, and because 
these blunders happen to be more numerous and more 
egregious than those which they themselves commit. 

That is to say, the processes of ordinary chessplayers 
and of ordinary generals at best are no more than the 
processes of Major Tactics, — processes which are simple 
and exact ; whose results are determinate, and whose 
validity depends upon the commission of a blunder by 
the opponent and not infrequently upon the commission 
of such a blunder as logically only the tyro in chessplay 
or in warfare should be guilty of. 

On the other hand, the processes of Napoleon and of 
Morphy are based upon logical deductions as to the 
relative values of causes^ whereby harmony of theory is 



80 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

established in the midst of tactical and strategic differ- 
ences created by lack of time, topographical obstacles, 
and the resistance of the enemy. These processes of the 
differential calculus, infinitely superior to the methods 
of the average chessplayer and of the average general, 
are thus defined by Napoleon : — 

"Questions of high tactics are indeterminate physico- 
mathematical problems, which admit of several solutions, 
and cannot be determined by the formulas of elementary 
geometry." 

Every school-boy is familiar with the fact that Napo- 
leon won his victories before his battles were fought 
by sticking his inap of Europe full of pins surmounted 
by divers-colored balls of sealing-wax. This perform- 
ance is thus described by the distinguished military 
writer. Baron de Jomini : — 

"Napoleon knew how to collect together, with admirable 
precision, upon the decisive point of the zone of operations, 
his corps d'armee which previously had departed from the 
most divergent posts. The choice of this decisive point 
was a skilful strategic combination, and the calculation of 
the movements of the corj^s (Tarmee was a logistic oj)era- 
tion which emanated from his closet. Eurnished with a 
compass opened at a scale of from seven to eight leagues 
in a right line, leaning over and sometimes lying down 
upon his map, where the positions of his corps cVarmee 
and the presumed position of the enemj^ were marked by 
pins of different colors, he ordered the movements of his 
army ivith an assurance of ivhich it icould he difficidt to 
give a just idea. Moving the compass with vivacity upon 
the map, he judged, in the twinMing of an eye, of the 
number of marches necessary to each of his corps for 
arriving at the point ichere he luished to have it at a given 
day ; then placing his pins in these new positions and 



PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 81 

combining the rapidity of the march which it would be 
necessary to assign to each of their columns with the 
possible epoch of their departure, he dictated those in- 
stimctions which of themselves alone would be a title to 
glory." 

This extract is quoted for more than one reason, and 
among others to show how easy it is for a man to 
wTite interestingly, even upon a subject of which he is 
totally ignorant. The Baron de Jomini is the most 
conspicuous example afforded by military annals of a 
theorist pure and simple, — i. e., a man devoid of the 
least understanding of the art. He was educated in 
the regular service ; was personally present in many 
campaigns, and for nine years served under Napoleon, 
who never would intrust him even with the command of a 
battalion in the field. Had Jomini possessed military 
ability equal to his enthusiasm and his industry, he 
obviously not only would have been the greatest of 
Napoleon's marshals, but he must have become even 
the rival of the illustrious Corsican. 

The student who attentively reads the above extract 
from Jomini's " Art of War," p. 271, will at once notice 
an incongruity. Of course, there are a number of incon- 
gruities, but, in particular, the student will observe that 
Jomini, while seeming to explain Napoleon's calculation, 
utterly fails, — 

1. To state the rule by which this decisive point is 
to be determined ; 

2. To describe the " logistic operation^^^ whereby the 
corps d''armee were made to concentrate at this decisive 
point; or, 

3. To formulate that grand law of the art of war- 
fare, whereby Napoleon was enabled to solve " in the 
tivinkling of an eye " propositions which on page 305 of 



82 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

his Memoirs the great captain describes as " problems 
of transcendant geometry which would have turned 
Lagrange and Laplace pale ; " and of which he further 
opines, " they [Lagrange and Laplace] would have studied 
many nights before they could free them from unknown 
quantities and have brought them to a solution." 

As a matter of fact, the Baron de Jomini had no idea 
of what Napoleon was doing as the latter lay prone upon 
his map of Europe, — whisking his dividers about over 
its surface, and sticking a red pin here, a blue pin there, 
and a yellow pin at some other place. There is a free- 
masonry among the great ; it is not well for the upper 
stratum that the lower billions, however well these 
may theorize, should comprehend the art of warfare, the 
art of government, or the art of finance, not to men- 
tion, incidentally, a few other arts intimately connected 
with the foregoing. Neither Epaminondas, Alexander, 
Hannibal, Caesar, Gustave Adolphus, Turenne, Prince 
Eugene, Frederic, Washington, nor Napoleon saw fit to 
put on paper, for the guide and enlightenment of the 
future man on horseback, the laws and processes of a 
complete and specific system of warfare ; neither did 
Morphy, Anderssen, McDonnell, De la Bourdonnais, 
Deschapelles, Philidor, Petroff, Der Laza, Ghulam Kas- 
sim, Greco, Lolli, Salvio, Stamma, Buy Lopez, Staunton, 
Buckle, Lowenthal, Harrwitz, nor any whose genius has 
illumined the literature of chess, see fit to put on 
paper the laws and processes of a complete and specific 
system of play. 

But although these prodigies in chess and in war suc- 
ceeded during their entire lifetimes in not divulging the 
secrets of their respective trades, and, dying, could take 
their vast knowledge with them out of the world, it was 
beyond the power even of Morphy to conceal the move- 



PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 83 

ments made by the pieces under his guidance over the 
surface of the chessboard ; and beyond the power even 
of the greatest captain to obliteratej the imprint made by 
his armies in march and in battle from the surface of 
the earth. Hence, he who intelligently can contemplate 
the processes of Morphy and the greater masters in chess, 
and the processes of Napoleon and the greater captains 
in war, may readily detect a similarity in their courses 
of procedure, and these processes, properly classified and 
arranged, obviously may be reduced to a system which 
latter may become available as the basis, not only of a 
theory, but of the true theory of chess and of war. 

Although the Baron de Jomini understood nothing of 
the art of warfare, and but little of the science of war, 
on the other hand, his veracity as to facts which came 
under his personal observation is beyond question. 

Therefore the following statement by the Baron de 
Jomini is of the highest value to the layman : — 

" In my presence the Emperor (Napoleon I.) once 
remarked, ' I know of but one way of making war, and 
that is — to act against the enemy's communications.'" 

This, of course, is the positive, the aggressive, the 
strategetic-offensive phase of that "way of making war" 
which is common to all great captains, from Epaminon- 
das to Yon Moltke. For the negative, the finessing, the 
defensive phase of scientific warfare, we must look to 
the words of the ablest of them all : — 

" The art of the great captain," said Frederic the 
Great, " consists in dividing up the enemy's force." 

Both of these great soldiers meant the same thing, 
but each clothed the idea in words which reflected that 
method for applying this idea in warfare which was dis- 
tinctively his own. In the first is seen a vast generali- 
zation, a contempt of detail characteristic of one whose 



84 CBESS STRATEGETICS. 

processes were nothing if not spectacular ; and in the 
second is seen the exact, definite conclusion of the 
greatest organizer of victory on the battlefield that 
the world has ever seen. 

Each meant to say that to seize upon and to occupy 
with your army the central space between two or more 
sections of a hostile army ; or, to seize upon and to 
occupy witli your army the central space between a hos- 
tile army and its base, is the chief idea in the science of 
war; and that so to manoeuvre your army as either to 
compel or to outwit the enemy into permitting you thus 
to seize and to occupy with your army such central 
space, is the chief process in the art of warfare. 

To effect the perfect union of science and of art is the 
province of mathematics. In this connection, as every 
mathematician knows, — 

" Things tliat are equal to the same thing are equal to 
each other. ^' 

Every student of military science knows that if a su- 
perior force can unexpectedly be precipitated between 
two inferior bodies of troops, that one and possibly both 
of the latter will be destroyed. 

Every student of this theory knows that if the point 
of command in any evolution be properly occupied 
by a kindred Prime Tactical Factor, the adverse force 
is lost. 

Any man can understand that if a body of troops, 
or a body of chesspieces, can take up such a position 
that the occupation of this point of command, whether 
on the battlefield or on the chessboard, is assured, such 
occupation is equivalent to the actual occupation of the 
point of command, — for things that are equal to the 
same thing are equal to each other. That ancient 
Israelite, Shylock, was a strategist, and that he under- 



PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 85 

stood the truth of the foregoing proposition is shown bv 
his logical and conclusive statement : — 

" You do take my house when you do take the prop 
by which my house stands ! " 

This statement admittedly is true ; and cliessplayer, 
soldier, and mathematician alike, having accepted it as a 
point of departure, may now start out in full accord to 
find out what the great Corsican was doing as he lay 
prone on his map of Europe, whisking his dividers over 
its surface, and sticking into it here and there divers- 
colored headed pins. 

" It is much easier to defeat an enemy than commonly 
is supposed," says Napoleon ; " the great art lies in not 
making any but decisive movements." 

Thus, logically, it is obvious that when Napoleon, 
stretched out upon his map of Europe, was whisking his 
dividers about from point to point, he was planning a 
" decisive movement .'' Furthermore, as he had selected 
a " decisive point," and was combining by a " logistic 
movement " the concentration of his corps d^armee at 
that point, it again logically is evident that this deci- 
sive point was nothing more nor less than one of two 
things : — 

I. The tactical key of a proposed field of battle ; or, 

II. That point whose occupation would insure the 
subsequent occupation of the tactical key of a proposed 
field of battle. 

The military mind will recognize the logic of this 
assertion at a glance ; for the benefit of others it may 
be well to remark that a diagram goes with this state- 
ment, which will be shown later. 

Now, the tactical keys always are in the possession 
of the enemy (unless the situation is merely one of 
Major Tactics, and in which the opponent has committed 



86 CHESS STEATEGETICS. 

a tactical blunder ^hich subjects him to loss, by means 
of a routine evolution), and the occupation of a tactical 
key in actual warfare is the normal outcome of a line 
of operations and the direct result of a pitched battle. 

In the matter under consideration, it is obvious that 
Napoleon is not planning a battle ; this is shown by the 
fact that he has selected, as the " decisive point," some 
place other than the one at which he then is ; were a 
battle being planned, his corps would be concentrating 
about his present headquarters, for on the eve of a 
battle the great captain always is with his vanguard. 

Hence, no battle being planned, it is evident that no 
line of operations exists, for a line of operations consists 
of a battle or a series of battles. Thus, Napoleon, not 
being engaged in destroying the enemy, is engaged in 
planning how to destroy the enemy, and consequently 
he is planning and preparing to act upon a line of 
manoeuvre. 

A line of manoeuvre always is directed for one of the 
three following purposes : — 

IN WARFARE. 

I. To cut off the adverse army from communication 
with its base of operations. 

II. To cut an army off from communication with a 
kindred army. 

III. To cut portions of the same army off from 
communication with each other. 

IN CHESSPLAY. 

I. To cut the bulk of the Determinate Force off from 
communication with the King. 

II. To cut the Hypothetical Force off from commu- 
nication with the Logistic Horizon. 



n 



PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 87 

III. To cut off adverse pieces from commimication 
with the bulk of the adverse Determinate Force. 

Even the layman thus readily may understand that 
the objective of a line of manoeuvre necessarily must be 
a point situated between two hostile masses, and that 
this point is a decisive point, provided the occupying 
force is strong enough to hold one of the hostile masses 
in check, while with the superior force it falls upon and 
destroys the second hostile mass. 

Applied to chessplay, the student readily sees that 
this idea merely is the elaboration of what in Major 
Tactics is termed the subgeometrical symbol. In all 
such situations there being the choice of two battles, — 
i. e., a battle against the one or against the other of the 
hostile bodies, — there necessarily must be two tactical 
keys. As it is required that the kindred force, when 
posted at the decisive point, shall act simultaneously 
against both of these tactical keys, or against those 
points whose occupation insures the subsequent occupa- 
tion of at least one of the given tactical keys, it also 
is evident that this decisive point always is the centre 
of that geometric symbol of which the two tactical keys, 
or those points from whence they are commanded, are 
perimetal points. Furthermore, it is obvious that the 
kindred piece which occupies the decisive point must 
be that integer of chess force to which this geometric 
symbol appertains. 

But it will be observed by the student that there is 
yet another consideration no less important than the 
foregoing, and that is : victory always is decided by 
the operation of the basic law of strategetics, — the 
greater force always overcomes the lesser, — and there- 
fore it is imperative that the radii of offence operated 



88 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

by the attacking body shall be in excess numerically 
of the radii of defence operated by the defending body. 
Now it is obvious that in all situations wherein the 
forces are equal, one antagonist can obtain no advantage 
over the other except tkrough the latter's error, and that 
the effect of snch error always is to expose two points 
to be simultaneously attacked when such points can- 
not be defended in a single move, — that is to say, in the 
situation taken as an entirety, — the attacking force will 
operate at least one more radius of oiTence than the 
number of radii of defence operated by the opponent. 
Furthermore, it is obvious that the point from which 
this additional radius of offence is operated is the deci- 
sive point, and that this decisive point or strategic key 
naturally takes the form of the vertex of a triangle, or 
of the centre of a straight line whose extremities are 
occupied by tactical keys ; i. e., of those centres and 
vertices which in Major Tactics are termed points of 
command. Hence, to the student of war, or of chess, 
or of mathematics, the following is true and valid : — 

FIFTH LAW OF THE ART OF CHESSPLAY. 

Whenever two tactical Jcei/s, or tic o points of command, 
or a tactical key and a j^oint of command, are situated on 
the perimeter of the same geometric symbol, then the centre 
of the given geometric symbol is the strategic key. 



PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 



89 



THE STRATEGIC KEY. 

Figure 47. 

Paul Morphy. 



i^ 



mi 



'i'm/iV/ 



Hi 



i » 





ip 

^M fl 




% t#j 




^: ■^lAl 






m. ,jmm.., 

m isi 







W////yM 



^ ^^^P 

M S a 






Jacob Lowenthal. 



This position occurred in the first game of the match 
between these masters. 



90 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

THE PLAY. 
Hekk Lowenthal. IVIk. Moepht. 

18. P-QE3. 

Had "White played otherwise, he would have lost a 
pawn. Black threatened to occupy the Strategic Key 
(Black Q Kt 5) with his Q, whence he would command 
the undefended White Q and the undefended White 
Q Kt P. As White could not in a single move have 
defended both of the pieces thus simultaneously attacked, 
one of them necessarily would be lost. 

It is now easy for the student to understand that when 
Napoleon spread out his map on the ground and lay 
down upon it, the first thing he did was to stick into 
it a number of pins, each of which was surmounted by 
a wad of green sealing-wax, and represented a French 
corps d^armee and its position at the moment, and then 
to stick into the map as many pins covered with red 
sealing-wax as his information led him to decide was 
the number and position of the hostile corps d'armee. 
So far Jomini got the right idea, and the distinguished 
Swiss also is correct in his statement that Napoleon used 
his dividers to estimate distances and the marches of his 
troops. But here Jomini's knowledge of the Napoleonic 
process leaves off, and the real understanding of the 
subject begins. 

Napoleon did not determine the decisive strategic point 
" in his closet," as Jomini states. It was only after the 
great Corsican had specified the position of his own, and 
of the opposing bodies of troops, that he did, or even that 
he could, so determine this decisive point ; and he de- 
termined it in this way. 

After Napoleon had marked out on his map the posi- 
tion of the contending armies, his next step was to find 



PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 91 

a means for '' acting against the enemy's communications ; " 
or, as Frederic puts it, " to divide up the enemy's forceP 
His method was this : — 

Locating the extremities and the configuration of the 
enemy's strategic front, and noting exactly the relations 
of the latter to the existing topographical conditions, the 
great Corsican remarked that point which if occupied by 
his army would — 

1. Cut the adverse army in two ; or, 

2. Would cut the adverse army off from its base. 
Then, regarding the army thus separated, either from 

its remaining integrals or from its base. Napoleon 
located, in the position occupied by these two pro- 
spective isolated integrals, those two points which, if 
occupied by his troops, would lead to the destruction in 
detail of each isolated hostile mass. These commanding 
points always are the tactical keys and usually are 
heights from which the whole of each prospective battle- 
ground may be enfiladed by artillery. 

In chessplay, the tactical key always is that point 
whose occupation either checkmates the adverse king^ 
eliminates an adverse piece from the hoards or queens a 
kindred pawn. 

Whenever the hostile army was massed in a single 
body, Napoleon always employed the second process, and 
manoeuvred to cut the adverse army off from its base 
without exposing his own. But whenever the adverse 
army was not massed in a single body, he always made 
use of the first process, which in military mathematics 
may be expressed thus : — - 



92 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



Figure 48. 

d' c^ 



D^ ♦ 



•. 



k: — ' ^: — c 






» - V Qi 



A Topographical Centre. 

B^ Point of Command in left wing. 

B'^ Point of Command in right wing. 

C^ >- Hostile Corps of left wing and tactical keys. 

^;) . 

D" > Hostile Corps of right wing and tactical keys. 



PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 98 

In order to understand how to locate these points of 
command, the student of war must study the campaigns 
of the greater captains, and the student of chess must 
study "The Major Tactics of Chess." 

PRINCIPLE. 

Having located two tactical keys^ or two points of com- 
mand^ or a tactical key and a point of command^ connect 
these hy their most direct lines of communication and the 
points upon such lines equidistant in time between the 
two strategic vertices will he the topographical centre. 

It is evident from this diagram that a kindred force 
posted at the point A commands the communications 
between the points B^ and B^ and thus prevents the ad- 
verse corps d^armee^ C^, C^, and C^, from co-operating 
with the adverse corps d''armee^ D^, D^, and D^o Never- 
theless, it is equally easy to see that the kindred force 
will lose the advantage of this central position, if it per- 
mit all the adverse corps simultaneously to attack it at 
A, and consequently it obviously is imperative that the 
kindred force keep both of the adverse forces divided 
and at arms' length, so to speak, and that it attack them 
separately and not at the same time. Hence it follows 
that while the kindred superior force is destroying one 
of the inferior adverse forces, the kindred column on the 
opposite wing must hold the second hostile force in 
check and prevent it from interfering in the battle, or 
series of major tactical evolutions, which is being exe- 
cuted by the united kindred columns of the centre and 
left, against the first-mentioned hostile force. 

All this is applicable to chessplay, and may be de- 
picted on the chessboard thus : — 



94 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



FiGrPvE 49. 
Black. 



■r^^'w 







p 




m 'mm. 



m ,^^^ 






a I^H 



A 




White. 



XoTE. — A = Tactical Key which, if occupied by an 
adverse Queen, the existing Objective Plane (Class B) 
will be commanded. 

White Q Kt 2 = Tactical Key which, if occupied 
bv any adverse piece, will result in the loss of the 
White Q B. 

As the B cannot be posted at White K Kt 2, and as a 
point cannot move, there is no Line of Communication. 



PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 9o 

The military principle may also be adapted to the 
chessboard, viz. : — 

SIXTH LAW OF THE AET OF CHESSPLAY. 

Having located two tactical keys^ tivo points of command^ 
or one tactical key and one point of command^ then con- 
nect these two points hy logistic radii., and those points at 
which the given logistic radii intersect will he points of 
communication, and that point of communication common 
to both ivill he the topographical centre. 

Having first disposed of this most important prelimi- 
nary calculation, Napoleon next proceeded to determine 
the strategic key of the adverse position, that is, the 
point from which — his columns of the right and the 
left liaving taken up their proper positions against the 
hostile left and right, respectively — he could throw his 
column of the centre against whichever of the adverse 
isolated masses that he might choose. 

Consequently the student of mathematics readily sees 
that it is imperative that this decisive point be : — 

1. Nearer in time to that topographical centre which 
in the given situation is the true point of communica- 
tion, than is any equal adverse force ; in order to pre- 
vent its being occupied by the enemy. 

2. Equidistant in time from the two tactical keys ; 
or the two points of command, or the tactical key and 
the point of command, in order to be able to attack 
either with like facility. 

Consequently the rule for locating this strategic key 
is easy to deduce, and both Napoleon and the student 
of mathematics solved the problem Avith equal readi- 
ness, viz. : — 



96 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



RULE. 

The Topographical Centre being given, describe a 
circle of which this point is the centre, and whose 
circumference passes through the points of command ; 
then draw a second diameter at right angles to the first 
diameter, and the point where the second diameter 
intersects this circumference is the strategic key. 

This may be mathematically expressed thus : — 

Figure 50. 




B' c 



Topographical Centre. 



Point of Command in hostile left wing. 



A 

B^ ' Point of Command in hostile right wing. 

C'^ >- Hostile Corps on left wing and tactical keys. 

C^ ) 

DM 

D"- V- Hostile Corps on right wing and tactical keys. 

E Strategic Key. 



PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 



97 



This also is applicable to chessplay, and may be de- 
picted on the chessboard thus : — 



Figure 51. 

Black. 




White. 



A = Tactical Key. 
White Q Kt 2 = Tactical Key. 
B = Strategic Key. 
Black Q R 3 = Point of Manoeuvre of White corps of 
the centre. 
Black Q R 3 + B = Eoute of White corps of the centre. 



98 CHESS stuategetics. 

The student thus will perceive that, by the plain and 
exact process of logical deduction, a tangible situation 
now is established and that this situation is composed 
of a prime strategic point, two prime tactical points, 
one or more known points occupied bj kindred cor/?s 
d'armee, and two or more known points occupied by 
adverse corps d'armee. 

Napoleon, having thus mathematically determined the 
strategic key, then, according to Jomini, proceeded to 
whisk his dividers about the map and to calculate the 
movements of a " logistic operation," in order to get 
each of his eorys d'arime " to where he wished to have it 
on a given day." 

As neither the Baron de Jomini nor any other mil- 
itary writer has seen fit to inform us of the nature 
of this " logistic operation," nor to elucidate the pro- 
cesses incident to its execution, it seems proper and 
even necessary for us to make the discovery for our- 
selves. 

At the very beginning of this logistical calculation, 
we must, of course, get down to first principles and 
come at once to a correct understanding of what we 
want to do. As a matter of fact, the object of this 
logistical operation is to place, in the briefest time, the 
attacking force at those points where, — 

1. It divides the hostile force into at least two 
isolated masses. 

2. Controls the communication between these two 
or more isolated masses, thus preventing them from 
reuniting. 

3. Acts simultaneously against two tactical keys, or 
two points of command, or a tactical key and a point 
of command ; and proposes, from a central post, to con- 
versre a third column ao;ainst one or the other of the 



J *-^ 



PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 



99 



adverse points at a time when it is impossible for such 
adverse point to be properly reinforced. 

This projected situation may be mathematically ex- 
pressed thus : — 



bV 



Figure 52. 

A 



C^ 



^B' 






Q 



A 

B^ 
E 

a 
b 



Topographical Centre. 
First Point of Command, or tactical key. 
Second Point of Command, or tactical key. 
Strategic Key. 

Kindred Corps of the Centre. 
« " " Eight. 

" " Left. 



From this diagram the student readily sees that each 
of the kindred corps has a specific destination. Napo- 
leon determined this destination, as the mathematical 
mind readily perceives, by the following : 



EULE. 



Given the strategic key and taking it as a centre, 
describe a circle whose circumference shall pass through 
the topographical centre ; then, unite the strategic key 
with the adverse points of command by straight lines, 



100 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



and the points where these lines intersect the given 
circumference will be the destinations of the kindred 
columns of the right and of the left, respectively. 
Obviously, the strategic key always is the destination 
of the column of the centre. 

This position may be depicted on the chessboard thus : 

Figure 53. 

Black. 




White. 



K Kt 1 = An Objective Plane of Class B which 
may be commanded by a Q at K 
Kt"^2. 
Q Kt 2 = Exposed Point Material. 
K Kt 2 — Q Kt 2 = Strategic Plane of Class B capable of 
beinf^ commanded hv a Q or E. 



PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 101 

B = Strategic Key whicli in this position 
should be occupied by a Q in order to 
threaten mate at K Kt 2. 
Q R 3 — Point of Departure of Col. of Centre. 
QR1= " " " Right. 

K B 3 = " " " Left. 

C = Point of Command in Left Evolution. 
D = " " Right Evolution. 



The military principle may be adapted to the chess- 
board, viz. : — 

SEVENTH LAW OF THE ART OF CHESSPLAY. 

Given the strategic vertices^ then unite each of these with 
a kindred piece by means of logistic radii which appertain 
to the kindred piece, and the line formed hy these logistic 
radii will he the route of the given piece ; and the number 
of logistic radii contained in such route will he the number 
of marches required of the given kindred piece. 

It now remains to explain in detail the routes and 
the reasons therefor which must be taken by the three 
kindred columns. The student will recall the Napoleonic 
dictum, " Unity is the soul of strategy," and will ob- 
serve that Napoleon's calculation is based upon the fact 
that this law has been violated by the enemy. Conse- 
quently the logical mind sees at a glance how imbecile 
it would be to imitate the error of the opponent, and 
easily comprehends that these three columns must 
march, not necessarily as a single mass, but at least as 
three united masses, i.e.., in such relative position that 
each may effectively cover and support the others. 



102 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

Hence, while not moving as one body, the three col- 
umns yet must constitute the right, the centre, and the 
left of a grand army, and must simultaneously move 
toward three distinct and specific points, the mere occu- 
pation of which, all else being equal, will insure victory. 
Thus, to the military student and to the mathematical 
mind it is obvious that the following is true and valid : 

EIGHTH LAW OF THE ART OF CHESSPLAY. 

The destinations of the Corps Offensive being determined, 
unite these hy logistic radii with the points of departure, 
and the resultant lines will he the routes of the kindred 
corps respectively. 



PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 103 

This situation may be mathematically expressed thus : 

FlGUKE 54. 



(-^-st. 




A 
B- 



Topographical Centre. 

Point of Command in hostile Left. 

Point of Command in hostile Right. 

Hostile Corps on Left Wing and Tactical Keys. 



Hostile Corps on Eight Wing and Tactical Keys. 



104 



CRESS STRATEGETICS. 



E Strategic Key. 

F^ Destination of kindred Left Column. 
F^ " " " Eight Column. 

G Point of Departure of Centre Column. 
H " " " " Right '' 

I " " " » Left '^ 

EG- Route of kindred Column of the Centre. 



F^I 



Right. 
Left. 



All this appertains to chessplay, and the situation 
may be depicted on the chessboard thus : — 



FlGUKE 55. 

Black. 




White. 



PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 105 

A =: Tactical Key in Left Evolution. 
White Q Kt 2 = Tactical Key in Kight Evolution. 
B = Strategic Key. 
Q =: Corps of the Centre. 
Q R = Corps of the Eight. 
K R = Corps of the Left. 

C = Point of Command in Left Evolution. 
D = Point of Command in Right Evolution. 
Q R 1 = Right Point of Manoeuvre. 
K B 3 = Left Point of Manoeuvre. 
Q R 3 = Central Point of Manoeuvre. 
Q R 1 - D == Route of Corps of the Left. 
Q R 3 — B = Route of Corps of the Centre. 
K B 3 - C = Route of Corps of the Right. 



STRATEGIC HORIZONS. 

The method whereby the great Corsican constructed 
his Strategetic Horizon thus having been outlined, and 
the adaptation of this method to the chessboard indicated, 
the student readily will understand that the detail pro- 
cesses which appertain to the method thus adapted to 
the chessboard necessarily are but logical sequences, — 
mere corollaries of the general principles laid down in 
the preceding volumes of this series. 

As the first and a most essential detail in the applica- 
tion of Napoleon's system of warfare to chessplay, the 
attention of the student is called to the mathematical 
figure formed by combining the strategic key with the 
two tactical keys, or by combining the strategic key 
with the two points whence these tactical keys are 
commanded. 

This mathematical figure is termed in this theory the 
Strategic Horizon^ and these strategic horizons, it is im- 
portant for the student to observe, are divided into three 
classes, viz. : — 



STRATEGIC HORIZONS. 



107 



I. Strategic Horizons in which the three vertices 
which appertain to the mathematical figure are a strate- 
gic key and two tactical keys. 



STRATEGIC HORIZON. 

(a.) 

Figure 56. 
Black. 




White. 



Note. — The White Kt occupies the strategic key. 
The Black K B and R occupy the tactical keys. 



108 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



11. Strategic Horizons in which the three vertices are 
a strategic key, a tactical key, and a point of command. 



STRATEGIC HORIZON. 

(6.) 

FlGUEE 57. 

Black. 








m ./mm.. 



% m^/VA 




^IM 






m ^» 




White. 



Note. — The White Kt occupies the strategic key ; the 
P at Black Q B 5 occupies the tactical key, and the 
point of command is Black's K B 4. 



STRATEGIC HORIZONS. 



109 



III. Strategic Horizons in which the vertices are a 
strategic key and two points of command. 



STRATEGIC HORIZON. 

FlGUKE 58. 

Black. 




White. 



Note. — Tlie White Kt occupies the strategic key ; the 
points of command are Black's K B 5 and Q B 4. 



110 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

That vertex contained in the strategic horizon and 
which is designated as the strategic key always is the 
centre of a geometric symbol, of which the other two 
strategic vertices are points on a common perimeter. 

In consequence, there are fifteen mathematical figures 
which appertain to the strategic horizon, and the prac- 
tical application of these fifteen mathematical figures 
to the chessboard is governed by the following : — 

NINTH LAW OF THE ART OF CHESSPLAY. 

Whatever the form of the strategic horizon, two of its 
sides always are radii of offence appertaining to the 
kindred corps of the centre, and the point where these 
radii intersect always is the strategic key. 



STRATEGIC HORIZONS. 



Ill 



A strategic horizon 1 is limited to the attack of two 
adjacent tactical keys or to two adjacent points of com- 
mand situated diagonally on the front. It is typified 
by the geometric symbol of the Pawn, and in this 
system of chessplay it is designated by the letter t. 
The strategic key always is the apex and may properly 
be occupied either by the P, B, Q, or K. 



STRATEGIC HORIZON {t). 
Figure 59. 

Black. 




White. 



112 



CRESS STRATEGETICS. 



A strategic horizon 2 is limited to the attack of the 
logistic horizon. This attack always is directed against 
two points of junction, one of which also is an exposed 
Point Material. It is typified by a right-angled triangle 
and is designated by tlie letter r. The strategic key 
always is a point in the seventh horizontal for White 
and in the second horizontal for Black, and cannot be 
properly occupied except by a kindred P. 



STRATEGIC HOEIZOX (/•)• 

FiGUEE 60. 
Black. 




White. 



STRATEGIC HORIZONS. 



113 



A strategic horizon 3 is expressed by a triangle 
composed of the obliques which unite the centres of 
three knights octagons, the extremities being points 
of command in evolutions appertaining to the knight, 
and the vertex being the strategic key. This horizon 
is designated by the letter 0, and cannot properly be 
occupied except by a kindred Kt. 



STRATEGIC HORIZON (0). 

Figure 61. 

Black. 




White. 



114 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



A strategic horizon 4 is expressed by an oblique line, 
upon which are located tlie centres of three knights 
octagons, the extremities being either tactical keys or 
points of command in evolutions appertaining to the 
Kt, and the central point being the strategic key. This 
horizon is designated by the letter o, and cannot prop- 
erly be occupied except by a kindred Kt. 



STRATEGIC HORIZON (o). 

Figure 62. 

Black. 




White. 



The oblique line is formed by the white points Q 2, 
K 4, and K B 6. The centre is the strategic key, and 
the extremities are points of command in evolutions 
appertaining to the Knight. 



STRATEGIC HORIZONS. 



115 



A strategic horizon 5 is expressed by the geometric 
symbol of the B. Its sides are diagonals, and the 
vertex is the strategic key. The latter properly may 
be occupied by the B or the Q. The extremities always 
are either tactical keys or points of command in other 
Bishop's triangles ; or the centre of a Queen's polygon. 
It is designated bv the letter T. 



STRATEGIC HORIZON {T\ 
Figure 63. 

Black. 





m »^J 














m 

I v/m;^y._ 




Wa ....wm. ^mm. 



Wldte, 



116 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



A strategic horizon 6 is expressed by a diagonal upon 
which are situated the vertices of three Bishop's tri- 
angles and Queen's polygons, the extremities being 
either tactical keys or points of command in evolutions 
appertaining to the Bishop or to the Queen, and any 
point between these being the strategic key. This 
horizon is designated by the letter i), and cannot 
properly be occupied except by a kindred B or Q. 



STRATEGIC HORIZON (D). 

Figure 64. 

Black. 




White. 



For the Q, the diagonal is formed by the white points, 
R 2, Q B 4, and K 6 ; for the Bishop, the diagonal is 
formed by the white points, K 4, Q B 6, and Q Kt 7. 



STRATEGIC HORIZONS. 



117 



A strategic horizon 7 is expressed by a diagonal 
composed of three adjacent points, the extremities being 
either tactical keys or points of command appertain- 
ing to the B, Q, or K, and the central point being 
the strategic key. This horizon is designated by the 
letter d and cannot properly be occupied except by a 
kindred B, Q, or K. 



STRATEGIC HORIZON [d). 

Figure 65. 

Black. 




White. 



118 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



A strategic horizon 8 is expressed by the geometric 
symbol of the Rook. Its sides are right lines, the 
angle is the strategic key, and the extremities are either 
tactical keys or points of command in evolutions which 
appertain to the R or Q. It is designated by the letter 
Q, and cannot properly be occupied except by the kin- 
dred R or Q. 



STRATEGIC HORIZON (Q). 
Figure 66. 

Black. 



y//////m, ^ 












^1 ''<^^^. 



y/. y/////M 

m 








White. 







m 



m 



m 



STRATEGIC HORIZONS. 



119 



A strategic horizon 9 is expressed by a right-angled 
triangle formed by three adjacent points, the angle 
being the strategic key and the extremities being either 
tactical keys or points of command in evolutions apper- 
taining to the R, Q, or K. It is designated by the letter 
q, and may properly be occupied only by a kindred R, 
Q, or E. 



STRATEGIC HORIZON {q). 
Figure 67. 

Black. 




^mg 



m^jM 



^.^ ^ 




1 








m mm. 
Wy. MA 





VA Wm^A 




White. 



120 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



A strategic horizon 10 is expressed by a straight line 
formed by three points situated on the same horizontal, 
the extremities of which are either tactical keys or 
points of command in evolutions appertaining to the 
R or the Q, and the strategic key being any point 
between. This horizon is designated by the letter H, 
and properly is occupied only by a kindred R or Q. 



STRATEGIC HORIZON [H). 
Figure 68. 

Black. 




White. 



STRATEGIC HORIZONS. 



121 



A strategic horizon 11 is expressed by three adjacent 
points situated on the same horizontal, the central one 
being the strategic key and the extremities being either 
tactical keys or points of command in evolutions apper- 
taining to the R, Q, or K. This horizon is designated 
by the letter A, and cannot be properly occupied except 
by a kindred R, Q, or K. 



STRATEGIC HORIZON {h) 

Figure 69. 

Black. 





m 

M yyy////y/yA 



If 1 ii"^~ 



m. mm.,. 









m mm. 





White. 



122 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



A strategic horizon 12 is expressed by a straight line 
formed by three points situated in the same vertical, 
the extremities being either tactical keys or points of 
command in evolutions appertaining to the R or the 
Q, and the strategic key being any point between. 
This horizon is designated by the letter F", and properly 
is occupied only by a kindred R or Q. 



STRATEGIC HORIZON (F). 

Figure 70. 

Black. 




White. 



STRATEGIC HORIZONS. 



123 



A strategic horizon 13 is expressed by three adjacent 
points situated on the same vertical, the central one 
being the strategic key and the extremities being either 
tactical keys or points of command in evolutions apper- 
taining to the R, Q, or K. This horizon is designated 
by the letter -y, and cannot be properly occupied except 
by a kindred R, Q, or K. 



STRATEGIC HORIZON (t). 
Figure 71. 

Black. 




White. 



124 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



A strategic liorizon 1-i is expressed bj the geometric 
symbol of the Q, the centre being the strategic key and 
the extremities being either tactical keys or points of 
command in evolutions appertaining to the Q. This 
horizon is designated by the letter P, and can properly 
be occupied only by the kindred Q. 



STRATEGIC HORIZON (P). 

Figure 72. 

Black. 




White. 



STRATEGIC HORIZONS. 



125 



A strategic horizon 15 is expressed by the geometric 
symbol of the King, the centre being the strategic key 
and the extremities being either tactical keys or points 
of command in evolutions appertaining to the Q or K. 
This horizon is designated by the letter R^ and properly 
is occupied only by the kindred Q or K. 



STEATEGIC HORIZON {R). 

Figure 73. 

Black. 







% y/y. 




kmii 



m...^ i 




i 

1 ^H 



m If 





%^ ^- 




White. 



TACTICAL HORIZONS. 

The student will observe that whenever the strategic 
horizon consists of a strategic key and two tactical 
keys, the process is direct, and by the occupation of 
one of these tactical keys, either the adverse king is 
checkmated, or an adverse piece is captured, or a kin- 
dred pawn is queened. 

But when the strategic horizon contains one or more 
points of command, there exists what is termed in this 
theory a Tactical Horizon. 

Tactical Horizons are formed by the union of the 
objective plane with the logistic horizon, or with the 
geometric symbols appertaining to the various integers 
of chess force, or with the formations appertaining to 
the several strategic fronts ; or by the union of these 
latter with each other. 

Tactical Horizons are divided into ten classes and 
are governed by the following : — 



TACTICAL HORIZONS, 127 



TENTH LAW OF THE ART OF CHESSPLAY. 

Every Corps Offensive must he a competent Prime 
Tactical Factor in that geometric plane against which 
it is directed. 



128 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



A Tactical Horizon of Class I. is composed of a 
Strategic Plane. It results from a strategic weakness 
of Classes I. or 11. ; it is the legitimate outcome of a 
complex line of manoeuvre and always is the ultimate 
situation in a strategic line of operations. 

TACTICAL HORIZON. 
(First Class.) 

Figure 74. 

Paul Morpht. 



i 

'm 








•yyM yy/////M,. 





iiili 







i 



M #7S7^7?^ mZW/, ^=- V/7^y7/. 



Louis Paulsen. 



This position occurred at the First American Chess 
Congress in the match between these masters. 



TACTICAL HORIZONS. 129 





THE PLAY. 




Herr Paulsen. 




Mk. Mokpht. 


• 




17. 


Q X B. 


18. 


P X Q. 


18. 


E-Kt3(ck). 


19. 


K-Rl. 


19. 


B-R6. 


20. 


E-Ql. 


20. 


B - Kt 7 (ck). 


21. 


K - Kt 1. 


21. 


B X P ((lis ck), 


22. 


K-B 1. 


22. 


B - Kt 7 (ck). 


23. 


K - Kt 1. 


23. 


B - R 6 (ck). 


24. 


K-El. 


24. 


B X P. 


25. 


Q - K B 1. 


25. 


B X Q. 


26. 


RxB. 


26. 


R - K 7. 


27. 


R - Q E 1. 


27. 


R -K R 3. 


28. 


P-Q4. 


28. 


B - K 6. 




Black 


won. 





130 



CRESS STRATEGETICS. 



A Tactical Horizon of Class II. is formed by the union 
of a Strategic and a Logistic Plane. It results from a 
strategetic weakness of Class lY. ; it is the legitimate 
outcome of a complex line of manoeuvre, and always is 
the ultimate situation in a strategic or a logistic line of 
operations. 



TACTICAL HOEIZON. 

(Second Class.) 

Figure 75. 
Paul Morphy. 




■ in 




^^7^^^ 



7///y. 













w/////%, 



■^ 



I 




mk 



V/7P^////. 



'mm m. 



Wa ^-^ #^S^ V////////A 






wm> ^ i"" 



Mr. Barxes. 



i 



TACTICAL HORIZONS. 131 

THE PLAY. 
Mb. Barnes. Mr. Mobpht. 

14. Kt - Q Kt 5. 

15. Kt - Q R 3. 15. B X K P. 

16. B X B. 16. Kt - Q 6 (ck). 

17. Q X Kt. 17. P X Q. 

18. Castles Q E. 18. B x Kt. 

19. B - Kt 3. 19. P - Q 7 (ck). 

20. K-Ktl. 20. B~B4. 

21. Kt-K5. 21. K-Bl. 

22. Kt-Q3. 22. E - K 1. 

23. Kt X B. 23. Q X E. 

Black won. 



132 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



A Tactical Horizon of Class III. is formed by the 
union of a Strategic and a Tactical Plane. It results 
from a strategetic weakness of Class III. ; it is the legit- 
imate outcome of a complex line of manoeuvre, and it 
always is the ultimate situation in a strategic or a tactical 
line of operations. 

TACTICAL HORIZON. 

(Third Class.) 

Figure 76. 
M. Baucher. 





^#1 






m^t 



illi.»l Hi 



V/w7////. 



fe 




M t^^wi. 




pi 



mztz'.m 





'wm, i 




^ "—^ 'y//////M 

'mm ^p 



Paul Morpht. 



This position occurred at Table No. 1 in the famous 
blindfold exhibition at Paris, 1858. 



TACTICAL HORIZONS. 133 



THE PLAY. 


Mk. Morpht. 


M. Baucher, 


22. R-R3. 


22. P-KE3. 


23. Q-Q2. 


23. K-E2. 


24. Q X B. 


24. B--Q3. 


25. E X P (ck). 


25. K X K. 


26. E-Q3. 


2Q. K-E4. 


27. Q-B 7 (ck). 




White 


won. 



134 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



A Tactical Horizon of Class lY. is formed by the 
union of a Strategic Plane and a Strategic Front. It 
results from tactical errors on the part of the opponent ; 
it is the legitimate outcome of a simple line of manoeuvre, 
and properly is preliminary to a complex line of ma- 
noeuvre. 



TACTICAL HOEIZOK 

(Fourth Class.) 

Figure 77. 
Paul Morpht. 



////////^//A 



M P 



m #' 



i 4M i 



y/M, 
Wa. 'mm. 



M.i. 




■ 



m i 




# 



'yy//////Y/, ...<^^^ *^S3=, '^//////^/, '^//y 



Mr. H. E. Bird. 



TACTICAL HORIZONS. 135 





THE 


PLAY, 






Mr. Bird. 




Mr. Morpht. 






16. 


R - Q Kt 1. 


17. 


Castles Q K. 


17. 


B X K B P. 


18. 


B X R. 


18. 


Q - Q R 6. 


19. 


P-B3. 


19. 


Q X RP. 


20. 


P - Kt 4. 


20. 


Q - R 8 (ck). 


21. 


K-B2. 


21. 


Q - R 5 (ck). 


22, 


K - Kt 2. 


22. 


B X Kt P. 


23. 


P X B. 


23. 


R X Kt P (ck), 


24. 


Q X R. 


24. 


Q X Q (ck). 


25. 


K - B 2. 


25. 


P-K6. 


26. 


B X P. 


26. 


B - B 4 (ck). 


27. 


E-Q3. 


27. 


Q - B 5 (ck). 


28. 


K-Q2. 


28. 


Q - R 7 (ck). 


29. 


K - Q 1. 


29. 


Q - Kt 8 (ck). 




Black 


won. 





136 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



A Tactical Horizon of Class Y. is formed bj the union 
of two Logistic Planes. It arises from a strategetic 
weakness of Class Yll. ; it is the legitimate outcome of 
a compound line of manoeuvi-e, and it always is the 
ultimate situation in a logistic line of operations. 



TACTICAL HORIZON. 
(Fifth Class.) 

FlGUEE 78. 
Herr Harrwitz. 



*^ 



%. 



J '■mma 

""W/4 



^^^^ % 



%m Pi' 



4M. 



% i 



'//7^///y 














Paul Morpht. 



This position occurred in the eighth game of the 
match between these masters. 



TACTICAL HORIZONS. 137 







THE PLAY. 




Mr. Mokphy. 




Herr Harrwitz. 


28. 


P - Kt 5. 




28. 


Kt - Kt 1. 


29. 


P-B6 (ck). 


29. 


K-Kl. 


30. 


P-B 7. 




30. 


Kt - Q B 4. 


31. 


P X Kt (Q 


ck). 


31. 


Kx Q. 


32. 


B X Kt. 




32. 


B xB. 


33. 


Q - K 2. 




33. 


Q-K3. 


34. 


Kt - Q 2. 




34. 


K-E 1. 


35. 


B - Kt 4. 




35. 


Q-K2. 


36. 


Kt - B 3. 




36. 


E-Ql. 


37. 


P-R4. 




37. 


E-Q3. 


38. 


K X E. 




38. 


PxE. 


39. 


Q-B4. 




39. 


E-KBl. 


40. 


Q-K6. 




40. 


B - K 6 (ck), 


41. 


K-Ql. 




41. 


Q - Q B 2. 


42. 


Kt - Q 2. 




42. 


B-B5. 


43. 


Kt - B 4. 




43. 


Q - B 4. 


44. 


Q-Q5. 




#4. 


Q x;'Q (ck). 


45. 


P X Q. 




•45. 


E-Ql. 


46. 


R-B3. 




46. 


K - Kt 2. 


47. 


P-B 3. 


White 


won. 





138 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



A Tactical Horizon of Class YI. is formed by the 
union of a Logistic and a Tactical Plane. It arises from 
a strategetic weakness of Class Y. ; it is the legitimate 
outcome of a compound line of manoeuvre, and it is the 
ultimate situation either in a logistic or a tactical line 
of operations. 

TACTICAL HOKIZON. 

(Sixth Class.) 

Figure 79. 
Paul Morpht. 



^P « 









■. ■— • 




m.l 



% --^'^-. 







m mm. 



"1 ■ m 




Adolph Axderssex. 



This situation occurred in the tenth game of the match 
between these masters. 



TACTICAL HORIZONS. 139 





THE 


PLAY. 




Adolph Anderssen. 




Mk. Morpht. 






60. 


P - K B 5. 


61. P X p. 




61. 


P-K6. 


62. B-K7. 




62. 


P - K 7 (ck). 


63. R X P. 




63. 


R - E 8 (ck). 


64. K-B2. 




64. 


Kt - Q 5 (ck) 


65. K moves. 




65, 


Kt X R. 



140 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



A Tactical Horizon of Class VII. is formed by the 
union of a Logistic Plane and a Strategic Front. It 
arises from tactical errors on the part of the opponent ; 
it is the legitimate outcome of a simple line of manoeuvre, 
and properly is preliminary to a complex line of ma- 
noeuvre. 

TACTICAL HORIZON. 

(Seventh Class.) 

Figure 80. 
Amateur. 



V/^^/^.. 




/A 












1 i^i ^^ i 
Hi 




m. i III mm^_M 



m 




m 





i^^ 



isi^ ■ 



m 



Paul Morphy. 



This position occurred in an exhibition at New Or- 
leans, Mr. Morphy playing six games simultaneously 
without sight of. boards or men. 



TACTICAL HORIZONS. 141 



THE 


PLAY. 




Mr. Morpht. 




AjMATEUR. 


21. E-K8. 


21. 


Q X E. 


22. Q X R. 


22. 


Q-K2. 


23. Q X KtP (ck). 


23. 


Q X Q. 


24. P - B 6. 


24. 


Q X Kt P (ck) 


25. K X Q. 


25. 


B X P (ck). 


26. K X B. 


26. 


P - K E 4. 


27. R-KKtl. 






White 


WOJl. 





142 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



A Tactical Horizon of Class VIII. is formed by the 
union of two Tactical Planes. It arises from a strate- 
getic weakness of Class VI. ; it is the legitimate out- 
come of a compound line of manoeuvre, and always is the 
ultimate situation in a tactical Ime of operations. 



TACTICAL HOKIZON. 

(Eighth Class.) 

ElGUKE 81. 

Hekk Harewitz. 




Paul Morphy. 



This position occurred in the fourth game of the match 
between these masters. 



TACTICAL HORIZONS. 143 





THE PLAY. 


Mr. Morphy, 


Here Harrwitz. 


30. 


P - Q B 5. 


30. E X P. 


31. 


E X P (ck). 


31. K X E. 


32. 


Q-KR5 (ck). 


32. K-Ktl. 


33. 


Kt X B (ck). 


33. K-Kt2. 


34. 


Kt - B 5 (ck). 


34. K-Ktl, 


^o. 


Kt X P. 






White 


won. 



144 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



A Tactical Horizon of Class IX. is formed by the 
union of a Tactical Plane and a Strategic Front. It 
arises from tactical errors on the part of the opponent ; 
it is the legitimate outcome of a simple line of manoeuvre, 
and properly is preliminary to a compound line of 
manoeuvre. 

TACTICAL HOKIZON. 

(Ninth Class.) 

Figure 82. 
Adolph Anderssen. 



mi 








iSil 




'mm wm 
i ■:« 





^ '/^//////V/, 4^my^. wy////M w/////Z^, 

Jl ^ 1 



^^^;^ I 



Paul Morphy. 



This position occurred in the third game of the match 
between these masters. 

It is a fine study in the construction of the major front 
by the right when K file is open. 



TACTICAL HORIZONS. 145 



THE 


PLAY. 


Mr. Morpht. 


Herr Anderssen. 


10. R - K 1 (ck). 


10. K-Bl. 


11. B X B. 


11. Q X B. 


12. P - Q J3 3. 


12. P-Q4. 


13. P X P. 


13. B-K3. 


11. Kt - B 3. 


14. P-QE3. 


15. R-K5. 


15. E-Ql. 


16. Q-Kt3. 


16. Q-K2. 


17. QR-Kl. 





10 



146 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



A Tactical Horizon of Class X. is formed by the union 
of a strategic front witli any of the supplementary for- 
mations appertaining thereto. It arises from errors in 
tactics on the part of the opponent ; it is the legitimate 
outcome of a simple line of manoeuvre, and properly is 
preliminary to a complex line of manoeuvre. 

TACTICAL HORIZON 
(Tenth Class.) 

ElGUEE 83. 

Paul Morphy. 




m m 



... m 



m 



im»imkm m 



m 'mm. 



Bl 





^AnPK^ 



m m 181 




W'^^4 



m ^m. 



Adolph Anderssen. 



This situation occurred in the second game of the 
match between these masters. 



TACTICAL HORIZONS. 147 



THE 


PLAY. 




Heer Anderssen. 




Mr. Morphy, 




18. 


B - Q B 5. 


19. Kt - K B 5. 


19. 


B X E. 


20. Q X B. 


20. 


Kt - K 2. 


21. KKt-KR4. 


21. 


Kt X Kt. 


22. Kt X Kt. 


22. 


Q-Q2. 


23. B X P. 


23. 


PxB. 


24. Q-QBl. 


24. 


B X QP. 


2b. Q X E, P, etc. 







LOCxISTIC EADII. 

The student, now being familiar with the mathematical 
forms of the strategic and the tactical horizons, readily 
sees that these are united to each other and to the strate- 
gic front by verticals, horizontals, diagonals, and obliques, 
along which latter the kindred pieces move from one 
point to other points contained within the strategetic 
horizon. 

These radii of movement, as the student already has 
been informed (" Major Tactics," p. 18), are entirely 
distinct from radii of offence and of defence : their char- 
acter is purely logis-tic, and their direction and extent 
always is determinate. A logistic radius always is either 
a vertical, a horizontal, a diagonal, or an oblique, and 
its extremities always are points of mobilization, devel- 
opment, manoeuvre, or operation. 



LOGISTIC RADII. 149 



ELEVENTH LAW OF THE ART OF CHESSPLAY. 

A Logistic Radius is not valid if it is interrupted hy a 
point of impenetrahility ^ or if its terminus is commanded 
hy an adverse piece. 



POINTS OFFENSIVE. 

In the formulas of " Grand Tactics," the student per- 
ceives how the primary bases of minor tactics are amal- 
gamated into the various minor, major, and grand 
strategic fronts ; and by means of the foregoing expla- 
nations and diagrams the amalgamation of the evolutions 
of Major Tactics into the strategic front is made equally 
clear. 

But in order that the student may thoroughly compre- 
hend that method by which the movements of each 
kindred piece are harmonized for the perfect amalgama- 
tion of the primary bases of minor tactics, the evolutions 
of major tactics, and the strategic fronts of grand tac- 
tics, and by which is made possible a mathematically 
exact survey of the Strategetic Horizon, it first is neces- 
sary to explain the two great subdivisions into which 
the latter is divided, viz.: — 

Strategetic Horizons are of two dimensions. 

In its second dimension the Strategetic Horizon is 
limited to the processes of Lesser Logistics (vide " Grand 
Tactics," p. 279), and comprehends nothing outside of 
Lines of Mobilization and Lines of Development. 

The topography of a strategic horizon of the second 
dimension is as follows : — 

(ci) Normal Posts. 

(6) Posts of Mobilization. 

(c) Posts of Development. 

(d) The Strategetic Objective. 



POINTS OFFENSIVE. 151 

The Normal Posts are those points which are occu- 
pied by the pieces originally (vide " Minor Tactics," 
pp. 51-56). 

The Posts of Mobilization are those points to which 
the pieces are deployed in the construction of a minor 
front (vide " Minor Tactics," pp. 94-169, and " Grand 
Tactics," pp. 114-158). 

Posts of Development are those points to which the 
pieces are developed in the construction of major and 
of grand strategic fronts (vide " Grand Tactics," pp. 
159-275). 

The Strategetic Objective is that point whose proper 
occupation is the aim of Lines of Mobilization and of 
Lines of Development (vide " Grand Tactics," pp. 19-22, 
and 370). 

In its first dimension the Strategic Horizon com- 
prises both Lines of Manoeuvre and Lines of Operation. 

The processes of Greater Logistics are divided into 
three classes : ■ — 

(a) Minor processes. 

(b) Major processes. 

(c) Grand processes. 

The major processes of Greater Logistics appertain 
exclusively to Lines of Operation and to compound and 
complex Lines of Manoeuvre. 

The minor processes of Greater Logistics appertain 
exclusively to simple Lines of Manoeuvre. 

The grand processes of Greater Logistics appertain to 
that calculation by which in any given situation is 
determined the true strategetic horizon. 

Following is the mathematical expression of a strate- 
getic horizon, which comprehends a strategetic weak- 
ness in the adverse position. 



152 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



Figure 84. 
STRATEGETIC WEAKNESS 




PM+TO K 



POINTS OFFENSIVE. 153 



T K = Tactical Key. 

S K = Strategic Key. 
To K = Topographical Key. 

P C = Point of Command. 

P Jf= Point of Manoeuvre. 

P M = Post of Mobilization. 

P D = Post of Development. 

P D = Point of Departure. 

L R = Logistic Padius. 

N P .= Normal Post. 
C L M = Compound Line of Manoeuvre. 
S L M = Simple Line of Manoeuvre. 
X L M = Complex Line of Manoeuvre. 



154 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

The Topography of a Strategetic Horizon of the first 
dimeusion is as follows : — 

(a) Points of Departure. 

(5) Points of Manoeuvre. 

((7) Points of Command. 

(t?) The Strategic Key. 

(e) Tactical Keys. 

(/) The Objective Plane. 

(^) The Strategic Horizon. 

(A) The Tactical Horizon. 

(i) The Logistic Horizon. 

(j) Logistic Radii. 

A Point of Deparf.ure is one extremity of that Logis- 
tic Radius of which a Point of Manoeuvie is the other 
extremity. It always is occupied by a kindred piece. 

A Point of Manoeuvre is one extremity of that 
Logistic Radios of which a Point of Command is the 
other extremity. It may or may not be occupied either 
by a kindred piece or by an adverse piece. 

A Point of Command is one extremity of that Logistic 
Radius of which a Tactical Key is the other extremity 
(" Major Tactics," pp. 50-52). It may or may not be 
occupied either by a kindred or by an adverse piece. 

A Tactical Key always is either a point of junction 
("Major Tactics," p. 68), or a point material (''^Major 
Tactics," p. 42), or that point which when occupied by a 
given piece, the adverse king is checkmated. It may 
or may not be occupied by an adverse piece, but never 
by a kindred piece. 



POINTS OFFENSIVE. 



155 



POINTS or DEPARTURE, OF MANOEUVRE, AND OF 
COMIVIAND. 

Figure 85. 

Black. 



^-"ir^m 



m 

Wa W////M.. 










V/, ,y//~M 



a.,.,,_w^^^ 



■JSI 



'm '^^J 



1^1 i 







White. 



Note. — The White Q R 1 is the Point of Departure ; 
the White K 1 is the Point of Manoeuvre, and the White 
K 8 is the Point of Command against the two Tactical 
Keys, Black K Kt 1 and Q B 1. 



156 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

The Strategic Key is that vertex of a mathematical 
figure of which either two points of command, or two 
tactical keys, or a tactical key and a point of command 
are the other two vertices (see this volume, p. 88). 

The Strategic Vertices are those points on the peri- 
meter of that geometric symbol of an integer of chess 
force of which the strategic key is the centre, and which 
geometric symbol constitutes, in the given situation, the 
strategic horizon. 



POINTS OFFENSIVE. 



157 



THE STRATEGIC VERTICES. 

Figure 86. 
Black. 




White. 



Note. — The Strategic Horizon consists of Black's 
K 4, and the points occupied by the R and B. The 
Strategic Key is Black's K 4, and this point, together 
with the Tactical Keys (Black K Kt 3 and Q B 5) con- 
stitute the Strategic Vertices. 



158 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

The Objective Plane already has been described 
("Minor Tactics," pp. 42-44, and "Grand Tactics," pp. 
25 and 82-92). 

The Logistic Horizon already has been described 
(" Grand Tactics," p. 19). 

The Tactical Horizon already has been described 
(see this volume, p. 127). 

The Strategic Horizon already has been described 
(see this volume, p. 106). 

The Logistic Radius extends from the Point of De- 
parture to any other point offensive (" Major Tactics," 
pp. 18-23). 



LINES OF MANCEUVRE. 

Lines of Manceuvre are divided into Simple, Com- 
pound, and Complex (" Grand Tactics," pp. 53, 312, 377- 
386). 

Compound and Complex Lines of Manoeuvre are 
divided into three classes, viz. : — 

A Compound or a Complex Line of Manceuvre of the 
first class is composed of eleven points offensive and 
ten logistic radii, and two of its strategic vertices are 
tactical keys. It may be mathematically expressed 
thus: — 



160 



CHESS Sr R ATE GE TICS. 



COMPOUND OR COMPLEX LINE OF MANGEL^YKE. 

(First Class.) 

Figure 87. 



T.K. 




RC<' 



RM." 



i> PC. 



RMf PM." 



RD.' 



PD.* 



*RD. 



LINES OF MANCEUVRE. 



161 



Adapted to the chessboard, this proposition of mili- 
tary art and science may be represented thus : — 



COMPOUND OR COMPLEX LINE OF MANCEUVRE. 

(First Class.) 

Figure 88. 
Black. 




White. 



Note. — The White Kt will occupy the strategic key 
Q 5, and the tactical keys, Black Q Kt 3 and K 2, will 
be simultaneously attacked by a superior force. 



11 



162 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



A Compound or a Complex Line of Manoeuvre of the 
Second Class is composed of ten points offensive and 
nine logistic radii, and one of the strategic vertices 
always is a tactical key, and the other always is a point 
of command. It may be mathematically expressed as 
follows : — 



COMPOUND OR COMPLEX LINE OF MANCEUVRE. 



(Second Class.) 
Figure 89. 




RMv 



RD* 



RM. 



iPD. 



^'PM. 



*PD 



LINES OF MAN(EUVRE. 



163 



Adapted to the chessboard, this proposition of militarj 
art and science may be represented thus : — 



COMPOUND OR COMPLEX LINE OF MANCEUVKE. 

(Second, Class.) 

ElGUKE 90. 
Black. 








y/z/z/zz/y^''^^''^^''''^''' ^^/z-^- 



111 




^ 



% -^ 



ill 



fMf 




White. 



Note. — The White Kt will occupy the strategic key 
(White Q B 5), attacking simultaneously the tactical 
key (Black Q R 3) and the point of command (Black's 
K3). 



164 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



A Compound or a Complex Line of Manoeuvre of the 
third class is composed of nine points offensive and 
eight logistic radii, and both of its strategic vertices 
are points of command. It may be mathematically 
expressed thus : — 



COMPOUND OR COMPLEX LINE OF MANCEUVRE. 

(Third Class.) 

FlGUEE 91. 



PC. 




RM.4 



RD-i 



PM.<' 



RD> 



RM, 



RD. 



LINES OF MANCEUVRE. 



165 



Adapted to the chessboard, this proposition of military 
art and science may be represented thus : — 



COMPOUND OR COMPLEX LINE OF MANCEUYRE. 

(Third Class.) 

Figure 92. 
Black. 




Bl 



a$ ■^//Jr'^'^'Vy^ 



il ■ 



mm ^ 




^»^".. 




^p ^P" ^ 








^i~p 




White. 



Note.— The White Kt will occupy the strategic key 
(White KB 4), and threaten to occupy one of the 
points of command (White Q 5 and Kt 6). 



LINES OF OPERATION. 

Lines of Operation are the natural outgrowth of 
Compound and of Complex Lines of Manoeuvre ('' Grand 
Tactics," pp. 57, 318-337). 

Every line of manoeuvre contemplates the bringing 
about of a position in which the occupation of two 
strategic vertices by a kmdred force is assured ; and 
when this position is brought about, the line of manoeu- 
vre becomes transformed into a line of operations. 

The process whereby this transformation is brought 
about varies in each of tlie three classes of compound 
and complex lines of manoeuvre ; but in each and every 
case it is contingent upon the inadequacy of the defen- 
sive resources of the strategic vertices. 

The defensive resources of the strategic vertices are 
expressed by numerical exponents, and the quantity of 
their defensive powers is denoted by letters, viz. : — 

(a) Signifies that the strategic vertices contained in 
the given compound or complex line of manoeuvre are 
not supported by any kindred piece. This situation is 
designated thus : — 

FORMULA FOR LIXE OF MANCEUVTEIE. 

Cxi a, C X 2 a, ot C x 3 a. 

In this position, if the corps of the centre can occupy 
the strategic key and the enemy cannot defend both 
strategic vertices in one move, then the line of ma- 



LINES OF OPERATION. 167 

noeuvre may "be transformed into a line of operations, 
and the resulting situation is expressed thus : — 

FORMULA FOR LINE OF OPERATION. 
Cxla={TK' -^ TK^)SK^^LO. 
Cx2a = (TK'+ F C) SK' = LO. 
C X 3 a = (F C + F C) S K^ = L 0. 

The logistic operation in all the foregoing situations 
is limited to two marches by the corps of the centre ; i. e., 
one march from the Point of Departure to the Point 
of Manoeuvre, and one march from the Point of 
Manoeuvre to the Strategic Key. This logistic opera- 
tion is expressed thus : — 

FORMULA FOR LOGISTIC RADII. 
C C\ 

(b) This letter signifies that one of the strategic ver- 
tices contained in the given compound or complex line 
of manoeuvre is supported by a kindred piece, but that 
the other vertex is not supported by a kindred piece. 
This situation is designated thus : — 

FORMLT.A FOR LINE OF MANCEUVRE. 
Cxlb, Cx2b, or GxSb. 

In this position, if the corps of the centre can occupy 
the strategic key, while the corps of the right or of the 
left occupies a point of command against that tactical 
key, or a point of manoeuvre against that point of com- 
mand defended by the enemy, and if the enemy cannot 
defend both of the strategic vertices in one move, then 
the line of manoeuvre may be transformed into a line of 
operations, and the resulting situation is expressed thus : 



168 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

PORMULA FOR LINE OF OPERATION. 

Cxlh= (TX^+ T K'') (SK^ + FC^) = L 0. 
Cx2b = {TK^- + FC) (SK^- + F C"-) = L 0. 
Cx3b=: (FC^ + FC) {SK^ + FC^)=LO. 

The normal logistic movement in the first two of the 
foregoing situations is limited to four marches ; i. e.,two 
by the corps of the centre, one from the point of depar- 
ture to the point of manoeuvre, and one from the point 
of manoeuvre to the strategic key, and two \j the corps 
of the right or of the left, one from the point of depar- 
ture to the point of manoeuvre, and one from the point of 
manoeuvre to the point of command. But in the Cx^a 
the total number of marches is only three, as the flank- 
ing corps has but one march to make; i. e.^ from the 
point of departure to the point of manoeuvre, from which 
latter point it attacks the point of command. This 
logistic movement is expressed thus : — 

FORMULA FOR LOGISTIC RADIL 

(7icl5and Cx2h= C C + F C\ 
CxZh= CC^ + FC.^ 

(c) This letter signifies that both of the strategic 
vertices contained in a given line of manoeuvre are sup- 
ported by kindred pieces. The situation is denoted 
thus : — 

FORMULA FOR LINE OF MANCEUVRE. 
Gxlc, Cx2c,ovCx3c. 

Ill this situation, if the corps of the centre can occupy 
the strategic key, while the corps of the right and left 
occupy tlie points of command against their respective 
tactical keys, or points of manoeuvre against their re- 



LINES OF OPERATION. 169 

spective points of command, and if the enemy cannot 
defend both of the strategic vertices in one move, then 
the line of manoeuvre may be transformed into a line of 
operations, and the resulting situation is expressed thus : 

FORMULA FOR LINE OF OPERATION. 

Cxlc= {TIO -{- TK^) (SIO + FC^ + P C^) = L 0. 
Cx2g^{TK^ + PC) {SIO -\- PC + PC^) =L0. 
Cx^G= (PC^ + P C) (SIO + P C^ + P C) = L 0. 

The normal logistic movement in the Cxi c is the 
maximum ; it consists of six marches : two by the corps 
of the centre, i. e.^ one from the point of departure to the 
point of manoeuvre, and one from the point of manoeuvre 
to the strategic key ; two by the corps of the right, i. e., 
one from the point of departure to the point of manoeu- 
vre, and one from the point of manoeuvre to the point of 
command ; and lastly, two marches by the corps of the 
left, i. e., one from the point of departure to the point of 
manoeuvre, and one from the point of manoeuvre to the 
point of command. 

FORMULA FOR LOGISTIC RADII. 
CC-'+ CE^ -{- 0^" = ^. 

The normal logistic movement in the Cx 2 c is but 
one march shorter than that of the Qx\g., and exceeds 
all other normal logistic movements. The corps of the 
centre and that flanking corps which is directed against 
the tactical key each have two marches to make, but 
that flanking corps which is directed against the point of 
command only has to march from the point of departure 
to the point of manoeuvre, making five marches in all. 

FORMULA FOR LOGISTIC RADIL 

CC ^ CPy} -^ CL^ = ^. 



170 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

The normal logistic movement in the Cx^c consists 
of two marches by the corps of the centre from the point 
of departure, via the point of manoeuvre to the strategic 
key, and one march by each of the corps of the right and 
the left from the point of departure to the point of 
manoeuvre. 

FORMULA FOR LOGISTIC RADII. 

CC2+ CE" -[- CL^ = 4.. 

Thus the student of chess, of mathematics, or of mili- 
tary science readily will see the validity of the following : 

TWELFTH LAW OF THE ART OF CHESSPLAY. 

I. A compound or a complex line of manoeuvre is 
transformed into a line of operations whenever the sum of 
the exponents of the corps offensive exceeds the sum of the 
exponents of the defensive radii luhich appertain to the 
strategic vertices ; and 

II. A projected logistic movement on a line of operation! 
is valid whenever the number of inarches to be inade by the 
corps offensive is less than the number of marches required 
to be made by the corps defensive^ in order that the sum 
of defensive exponents may equal the sum of the exponents 
of the corps offensive. 

There are four mathematical symbols typical of lines 
of operation, viz. : — 



LINES OF OPERATION. 



171 



LINES OF OPERATION, 
(a.) 

Figure 93. 




172 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

In this situation the line of operations is established 
for the reason that the corps offensive occupy the strate- 
gic key and both points of command. 

The corps offensive having the move win by simultane- 
ously attacking, from the strategic key and either point of 
command, the common tactical key, which, not having 
the right to play, is immovable, and consequently is un- 
able to avoid this attack, and being the lesser force is 
unable to repel it, according to the basic law of the sci- 
ence of Chess Strategetics (" Grand Tactics," p. 3). 

The corps offensive also win without the move, for, a 
strategetic weakness existing, neither of the adverse 
forces are able to support each other in a single move. 

Consequently, while, by means of the right to play, 
the opponent may retire one of his exposed pieces, he 
obviously is unable simultaneously either to defend or to 
vacate both tactical keys. Hence, that exposed force 
remaining immovable at the close of the opponent's right 
to play is lost according to the preceding demonstration. 

Adapted to the chessboard, this proposition of military 
art and science may be represented thus : — 



LINES OF OPERATION. 



173 



LINE OF OPERATIONS. 

FiGtrKE 94. 
Black. 






if fc fm 
mm... ■ SI 



^!Mli 



^^^.^. 







vMa .jmrn. 

m 
M 







TFA/^e. 



Note. — The Black Kt and B occupy tactical keys; 
the White B and R occupy points of command, and the 
strategic key is occupied by the White Kt. White wins 
either with or without the move. 



174 



CRESS STRATEGETICS. 



LINE OF OPERATIONS. 

ElGURE 95. 

STRATEGETIC WEAKNESS 




LINES OF OPERATION. 175 

In this situation the corps offensive having the move 
win by occupying the strategic key with the corps of the 
centre. Inasmuch as the kindred corps of the right 
and of the left are in possession of both points of com- 
mand, the situation after the capture of the strategic 
key is identical to the final situation in the preceding 
diagram. 



176 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



Adapted to the chessboard, this proposition of iQilitary 
art and science may be represented thus : — 



LIXE OF OPERATIONS. 
(6.) 

FlGUEE 96. 

Black. 




White. 



Note. — The Black Kt and B occupy tactical keys ; 
the White Kt occupies a point of manoeuvre. The 
strategic key is White's Q 5. White having the move 
will win. 



LINES OF OPERATION. 



177 



LINE OF OPERATIONS. 
Figure 97. 

STRATEGETIC WEAKNESS 



TK 




Obviously the corps offensive having the move vrin by 
occupying the right point of command with the corps of 
the right, the resultant situation being identical to the 
foregoing situations. 

12 



178 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



TK 



TlGUKE 98. 

STRATEGETIC WEAKNESS 



TK 




The corps offensive having the move win in this posi- 
tion by occupying the left point of command with the 
corps of the left. The student will observe that no line 
of operations exists in the last three situations if the 
corps offensive have not the move. 



PKOCESSES OF GREATER LOaiSTICS 

(MINOR). 



PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS 

(MINOE). 

The minor processes of Greater Logistics are con- 
tained exclusively in simple lines of manoeuvre. These 
processes contemplate neither the gain nor the defence 
of material, but their sole object always is to divide up 
the opposing force and especially to intensify and per- 
petuate that unscientific isolation of the adverse pieces 
which exists at the beginning of every game of chess. 

These processes always must be combined with the 
deployments of Lines of Mobilization, in order that the 
unscientific isolation of the kindred pieces which exists 
at the beginning of every game of chess may be elimi- 
nated, at the same time that the isolation of the adverse 
pieces is perpetuated. 

This idea is fundamental and underlies all the earlier 
moves of the chesspieces. Upon it all debuts which are 
true and valid are based, and no analysis is worthy of 
consideration whose every move does not conform to 
this basic truth. 

THIRTEENTH LAW OF THE ART OF CHESSPLAY. 

Every movement on a Simple Line of Manoeuvre should 
be a deploymeyit or a development, and the logistic radius 
should have its origin in a normal jjost or in a post of 
mobilization, and its terminus in a topographical key. 

If the student will set up the pieces and inspect the 
normal position, he will observe that with the exception 



182 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

of the knights and the pawns, all of the chesspieces are 
immovable, and that many of the latter must remain 
thus immovable for a number of moves. 

In short, it readily may be perceived that before the 
K R can be brought to K B 1, that the K Kt and 
the K B must be moved, and that before the Q R can 
be brought to K 1, that the Q Kt, the Q B, the Q, and 
the K must be moved. 

Obviously, then, these two pieces (K R and Q R) are 
isolated from each other, and eight moves must elapse 
before they can be brought into communication at their 
proper posts in the primary base. 

Again, it easily is discernible that the King is unsci- 
entifically posted at K 1, inasmuch as he not only 
is dangerously exposed, but he constitutes a point of 
impenetrability on the logistic radii of his own pieces 
and thereby prevents the proper deployment and co- 
operation of the latter in the formation of the strategic 
front. 

Furthermore, it is easy to see that this isolation of 
the K from the two powerful pieces of the right and 
the left wings respectively must, if perpetuated, result 
in a serious, if not a fatal, weakness in the general 
position. 

Understanding and accepting this premise, the student 
easily will see that after the move of 1. P — K 4 by 
White, the best and most quickly executed series of de- 
ployments possible to Black are 1. P — K 4, 2. Kt — Q B 
8,3. K B — B 4, and 4. P — Q 3 ; whereupon results 
the following situation : — 



PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 183 



Figure 99. 

Black. 




White. 



The student now will observe that, these four deploy- 
ments having been completed, Black will have no diffi- 
culty in making what further deployments are needed, 
viz. (K Kt — B 3 and Castles K R), in order to con- 
centrate all his originally scattered pieces into one 
united mass, whose communications in all respects 
are free and protected. 

This, then, necessarily, is the fundamental opening 
formation for Black, and, having established it, he has 
every reason to await the outcome of the game with 
confidence, for there is no apparent hope of victory for 
White, provided the subsequent play be equally good on 



184 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

both sides. The reason why this is so is that White 
has frittered awav his inestimable advantage of the 
initiative; i. e., instead of intensifying the isolation of 
the black pieces, he has Yolimtarily and as the direct 
outcome of a series of unscientific moves, permitted 
Black to make a series of scientifi.c moves and thereby 
to establish a scientific position, which, although inferior 
(being by the right refused), still is powerful enough to 
withstand any attack which White may bring to bear 
against it, and not improbably, on account of the 
unscientific processes of White, of becoming by com- 
parison the superior position and one possessing the 
germ of legitimate victory. 

Upon contemplating this black situation, the student 
will note two facts : {a) that the Black K B was deployed 
at Q B 4 before the Black Q P was moved, and that, as 
the result of this deployment of the Black K B (5), the 
communication of the Black K wing with the centre is 
assured, inasmuch as the Black K Kt can readily be 
deployed to its proper post at K B 3. 

A little thought will convince the student that the 
single deployment of K B — B 4 has vastly relieved 
Black's original situation ; inasmuch as it not only has 
brought this piece into a commanding position from 
whence it attacks directly the White K B P (which prior 
to castling K R is the vulnerable point in the King's 
position), but also, by removing a point of impenetra- 
bility (K B 1) from the logistic radius of the Black K, 
that it has insured him the privilege of castling K R 
and tlie union of the black centre and K wing. 

Hence, it needs no argument to prove that the deploy- 
ment of K B at Q B 4 is of the utmost consequence to 
Black, and that a prime object of White's simple line of 
manoeuvre sliould be to make this deployment of the 
Black K B at Q B 4: impossible. 



PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 185 

The student next will observe that the deployment 
of the Black Q P at Q 3 absolutely perfects this initial 
black formation, and that this deployment is second in 
importance only to the deployment of the Black K B 
at Q B 4. 

The reason of this is that after the move of P — Q 3 
the point K 4 is supported, and consequently not only 
is the Black K P securely defended, but the White K P 
is prevented from occupying the vertex of a major right 
oblique, and also prevented from either dislodging the 
Black K Kt from K B 3, or from making it impossible 
for this piece to occupy the last-mentioned point. Just 
here, it may be well to explain that the Black Q P is 
never properly played to Q 4, whenever the opponent 
can establish a valid major strategic front by occupying 
White K 5 with a pawn or with a piece. 

Again, after K B — B 4 and P — Q 3, it is obvious 
that the Black Q B will deploy without hindrance, and 
that the communications of Black's right, centre, and 
left will become free and open, and the mobilization of 
his originally isolated masses now easily effected. 

Therefore, again it is beyond dispute that after 1. P 
— K 4, a prime object of White's Simple Line of Ma- 
noeuvre should be to prevent the deployment of the Black 
Q P at Q 3. 

The student now will observe that the position of 
th€ Black K at K 1 prevents anything like a scientific 
massing of the black pieces and that, in short, it is 
imperative that the Black K castle at the earliest prac- 
ticable moment and usually on the K side. In any 
event it obviously is imperative that the point of impene- 
trability formed by the Black King be eliminated from 
the logistic radius of the Black K R and Q P. 

Therefore, it also is beyond dispute that a prime 



186 CRESS STRATEGETICS. 

object of White's simple line of manceuvre should be to 
prevent the Black K from castling. 

Again, the student will notice that the Black K B P 
at K B 2 is the peculiarly weak spot in the black posi- 
tion prior to castling K R, inasmuch as it is supported 
only by the Black K, and consequently if it be captured 
that the Black K after taking the adverse piece deprives 
himself of the privilege of castling. 

Hence, it equally is beyond dispute that a primary 
object of White's simple line of manoeuvre should be to 
attach the Black KB P at K B2 whenever this P is 
left supported only hy the Black K. 

Finally, the student will easily discern that after 
1. P - K 4 by White and 1. P - K 4 by Black, a strate- 
gic horizon exists for White, the two tactical keys 
of which are Black K B 2 and K 4, and the strategic 
key being White K B 5. The white corps of the centre 
is the Q, and the white point Q 1 is thus raised from 
merely a normal post to a point of manoeuvre. But the 
student readily observes that a line of manoeuvre against 
this strategic horizon is not valid, inasmuch as it is not 
based on a strategetic weakness for the reason that the 
Black Q by deploying at K 2 or K B 3 defeyids both tac- 
tical keys in a single move. Furthermore, the student 
will observe that by deploying the Black K Kt at K B 3 
the occupation of the strategic key K R 5 by the White 
Q is prevented. But that the occupation of this point 
K R 5 by the White Q is a serious menace to Black 
both before and after castling K R, is manifest, and 
equally so that it is of the utmost importance that the 
Black K Kt maintains its post of mobilization at K B 3, 
or that it keep in easy communication with that point, 
in order to prevent the occupation of, or to dislodge the 
White Q from the White point K R 5. 



PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 187 

Hence, it also is beyond dispute that a prime object of 
White's simple line of manoeuvre should be to prevent 
the posting of the Black K Kt at K B S ; or, to dislodge 
the Black K Kt as soon as possible from this post when- 
ever the objective plane is located on the right or on the 
centre. 

These facts being established, it is not difficult to 
determine, by the process of logical deduction, the proper 
deployments for White and for Black which appertain 
to simple lines of manoeuvre. 

Reverting to the initial move of White, i. e., 1. P — K 4, 
it is first all-important that the student understand and 
accept once and for all the basic truth which underlies 
all true processes appertaining to Black, viz, : — 

Black never should adopt the Left Oblique Refused 
after White has initiated the open game by \. P — K ^. 

The reason for this is that, in order to prevent being 
overwhelmed by White's Major Right Oblique, Black 
will be obliged to play prematurely P — Q 4 in the open- 
ing, and thus to leave his K 4 unsupported by a black 
pawn at Q 3, which will permit White again to establish 
the Major Right Oblique by Kt - K 5. 

Furthermore, the obverse of this equally is true, and 
the student will understand, once and for all, that : 

Whenever Black adopts the close game, White never 
should permit the exchange or the advance of the Black 
K P, but should confine it immovable at Black's K S. 

Thus, by memorizing these few and simple basic 
truths, the student readily will grasp the true processes 
which apply to what is termed the opening of a game of 
chess. Furthermore, he readily will note the absurdities 
of the books of so-called "chess analj^sis," most of 
which are manufactured by fourth and fifth class chess- 
players, and all of which are destitute of anything in the 



188 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

nature of a scientific foundation. For it is easy to see 
that, such books being governed by no system of play, 
tliey necessarily and admittedly are in a continual " state 
of transition ; " i. e., what is true to-day is false to-mor- 
row, and vice versa. Finally, it is an open secret that 
the cliess-master puts no reliance whatever in such 
books of analysis, but makes his own analysis as he 
needs it. 

Thus, White opens the game by 1. P — K 4, for the 
reason that he at once establishes the open game and 
dictates Black's reply by threatening to play 2. F — Q 4, 
which would insure to White a major front, either by 
the right by P — K 5, or to the left by P — Q 5, accord- 
ingly as Black's formations should make most advisable. 

White, of course, on his initial move can play 1. P — Q 4, 
and 1. Kt — K B 3 ; but to these Black's best reply is 
1. P — K B 4, by which reply Black will prevent the 
deployment of the White K P at K 4 and establish the 
Close Primary Base 3 A (C P B 3 A, see " Minor Tac- 
tics," pp. 166-168), having the preferable position and a 
strong counter-attack against the White K. 

In reply to White's moves of 1. P — Q 4 and 1. Kt 
— K B 3, Black safely may reply 1. P — Q 4, but the 
reply of 1. P — K B 4 is preferable, for the reason that 
in the latter instance Black's strategic front extends 
towards the White K, and his advantage in position 
arises from the fact that White's strategic front will not 
extend towards the Black K, so long as Black can pre- 
vent the exchange or the advance to K 4 of the White 
K P, which Black should hold immovable on W^hite's K 3. 

Any initial move made by White other than 1. P — K 4 
and 1. Kt — K B 3 always should be met by Black with 
1. P — K 4. The reason of this is that mathematically 
White should wi7i the game hy the advantage of the first 



PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 189 

move. This advantage, derived from the first move, 
consists in the ability of White to establish his minor 
front on that great central diagonal extended toivards that 
side of the hoard on tvhich Black luill castle. 

Consequently, Black having originally a lost game, can 
win only by becoming transformed into White, so to 
speak ; i. e., hy establishing his j^ieces on the great central 
diagonal leading towards the White King^ and preventing 
White from establishing his pieces on the great central 
diagonal leading toward the Black King. 

In either case, it is obvious that the opposing king's 
pawns must be posted at their fourth squares, and that 
he ivho can post his own K P at K 4, and prevent the op- 
ponent from so doing, thereby attains a decided advantage. 

Thus, it follows that all initial moves except 1. P — K 4 
on the part of White are inferior for the reason that by 
no other move can White be certain of establishing his 
strategic front upon the strategetic centre. 



TOPOGRAPHICAL KEYS. 

As the student readily perceives, it should be the ob- 
ject of every movement made on a simple line of manoeu- 
vre on the part of White to deploy a kindred piece and, 
moreover, to deploy the given piece to that point whereat 
it prevents the deployment of the Black K B at Q B 4, 
or of the Black Q P at Q 3, or of the Black K Kt at K B 3, 
or to prevent the Black K from castling, or to capture 
the Black K B P at K B 2. 

Whenever such point exists, it is termed in this theory 
a Topographical Key. 

Topographical Keys are divided into three classes, 
viz. : — 

I. Those which are combined with a Post of Mobiliza- 
tion. 

II. Those which are combined with a Post of Devel- 
opment. 

III. Those which are not combined either with a 
Post of Mobilization or with a Post of Development. 



TOPOGRAPHICAL KEYS. 



191 



SIMPLE LINE OF MANCEUVRE. 
Figure 100. 

TK + PM TK TK+PP 




NP = Normal Post. 

TK = Topographical Key. 
TK + PM = Topographical Key + Post of Mobilization. 
TK + PD =: Topographical Key + Post of Development. 



192 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



Adapted to the chessboard, this proposition of military 
art and science may be expressed thus : — 



TOPOGRAPHICAL KEY COMBINING POST OF 
MOBILIZATION. 

Figure 101. 

Black. 




^I^mmi 



11 imikmt m i 




m 



m 



m 






v/. y///////A 



Whit 



Note. — White played on his last move P to Q 4, 

whereby he deployed his Q P to its proper post in the 

strategic front, and prevented Black from playing 
K B - Q B 4. 



TOPOGRAPHICAL KEYS. 



193 



TOPOGEAPHICAL KEY COMBINING POST OF 
DEVELOPxMENT. 

Figure 102. 

Black. 







if iimimi mi i 







m 



■mm % 






</^... y/////////A. 



^^m 



1^1 



White. 



Note. —White played on his last move P to Q 5, 
developing the major front by the left against the cramped 
Black centre. 



13 



194 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



TOPOGRAPHICAL KEY NOT COMBINING EITHER A POST 
OF MOBILIZATION OR A POST OF DEVELOPMENT. 

Figure 103. 

Black. 







m 



I 

//////////a 



V//. ^y^/////////. 

%. 



11 i 11 i ■ i ■ i 



m • ii^j^A 



iB PI 



^ ^» 





.-„„—. 




^ 




v/z/M. 



WA 






^'^- 



i^i i 




TFA/fe. 



Note — White played on his last move K B to Q Kt 5. 
This move is played to prevent Black from playing 
3. K B — Q B 4, and is made without regard to the Line 
of Mobilization or of Development. 



GEAND PROCESSES OF GREATER 
LOGISTICS. 

The student now arrives at the crucial phase of 
chessic art and science as interpreted in this theory. 

The first three books of this series — in which the 
knowledge derived from the experience of the greater 
chessmasters is classified and systematically arranged 
for the purpose of presenting a complete and concrete 
system of chessplay for the benefit of the student ; 
together with the present volume, which exploits the 
method whereby this theory is applied in practice — 
would perhaps be written in vain, did the author at this 
point lay down his pen. 

To the layman, whether in war or in chess, this fact 
well may seem inconceivable, and he properly may hold 
that the value of a completed science and of an art whose 
processes are formulated, is indisputable. As an abstract 
proposition this is true, and it literally would be true if 
all men were possessed of an understanding of art and 
of science in equal proportions. 

But it is matter of common knowledge that the man 
who merely is a theorist, and the man who merely is 
an artist, is to be found in droves, so to speak. The 
first is a worshipper of abstract propositions and falls 
in prostrate adoration before the shrine of scientific 
principle ; the latter, heedless of cause and effect and 
enamoured of tangible and material details, revels in the 
complexities of the present moment, without regard for 
the thing whicii ought to be, or perhaps may yet be. 



196 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

Both of these people have the utmost contempt for 
each other's methods. The one despises the lack of 
system in the other, and the latter mocks at what seems 
to him but egotistical pedantry. 

In the various walks of life, as on the chessboard and 
on the battlefield, the mere artist wins against the mere 
theorist. The reason for this is that the first knows 
more than he himself is aware of, — much more than he 
can put into language, and vastly more than the mere 
theorist gives him credit for knowing. Furthermore, 
lie possesses the ability to utilize all the knowledge that 
he possesses. 

On the other hand, the mere theorist usually lacks 
all understanding of the art of applying his vast fund 
of knowledge, and, in addition, he is handicapped by 
a fallacy which is world-wide and common to all theo- 
rists, viz, : — 

The theorist thinks the true use of knowledge is to 
bring about an ideal condition, in order to secure an ad- 
vantage; when, as a matter of fact, the true use of knowl- 
edge is to derive all i^ossible advantage from the condition 
which exists. This is the great secret which governs the 
application of knowledge to practical uses. 

Hence, singularly enough, it is the artist, the tactician, 
the contemner of principle, who unconsciously/ bases his 
processes upon the fundamental law wliich governs the 
practical utilization of knowledge ; while it is the mere 
theorist, the stickler for order, system, and the infal- 
libility of cause and effect, who, ignorant of the art, 
incessantly and unwittingly violates that basic law upon 
which the system he so idolizes is founded. 

This simple fact explains many seeming incongrui- 
ties ; it shows why the mere artist, the man of action, 
is a far more potent factor in the world than the mere 



GRAND PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 197 

theorist or man of learning. It shows that science />er 
se is of far less avail than is art j^er se and justifies the 
proverb of the ancient Persian : — 

" A pound of knowledge requires for its application 
ten pounds of common sense." 

But there is another type of man who at long inter- 
vals becomes manifest in the flesh, and before whom 
the mere scientist and the mere artist are as nought. 
The world, for want of a better name, sees fit to term 
such a character a "genius," to regard him as "in- 
spired " in some particular way, and assumes that his 
powers of mind are " supernatural." Such a man was 
Morphy in chess, and Epaminondas, Alexander, Hannibal, 
Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Prince Eugene, 
Frederic II., Washington, Napoleon, and Yon Moltke 
in war. A character who thus combines in himself 
both the erudition of the theorist and the discrimination 
of the artist is so rare, both in chess and in war, that 
the former has produced but a single and the latter but 
eleven examples, out of the billions who have populated 
the earth during the last twenty-four centuries. 

It is very easy and probably very complimentary to 
term such a character a " genius," and it unquestionably 
saves much mental labor to assume that his superior 
understanding is " supernatural." 

Nevertheless, it is a singular circumstance that the 
minds of these great men invariably have run in similar 
channels, and that their processes were so nearly iden- 
tical that it has seemed possible to the student of war, 
of chess, and of mathematics to reduce these processes 
to a system, and thereby to show that the only differ- 
ence between these " supernatural " processes and the 
ordinary processes of nature lies in the mere fact that 
the former are not understood. 



198 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

It is the history of chess and of war that men who 
were extremely skilful in the art were able to under- 
stand but little of the science, and, vice vei^sa^ that men 
profoundly erudite in matters relating to the science 
were able to comprehend but little of the art. That is, 
while these men had the same facilities and the same 
opportunities, neither could comprehend the secret of 
combining both the art and the science, and ultimately 
each would abandon tlie one branch and devote him- 
self exclusively to the other. Why this peculiar fact 
is so, we do not know ; but that it is so, is established 
by the history of mankind from the beginning of the 
world, and for want of a better reason its cause 
is ascribed to the difference in temperament among 
men. 

Hence, the mere tactician and the mere theorist have 
all sooner or later found themselves in exactly the 
situation that the student of these volumes finds himself 
at the present moment. Past masters either in the 
knowledge of the game or in the art of utilizing what 
knowledge they were possessed of, nevertheless, they 
were forced to admit that there was a limit beyond 
which their processes did not apply, and where neither 
the theorist nor the tactician could do more than grope ; 
and, furthermore, that it was when lost in this impene- 
trable maze that they were routed, horse, foot, and 
dragoons by the so-called ''genius" in the person of 
Morphy or Napoleon; who for some reason or other 
appeared to have no difficulty wha*tever in finding his 
way about in what to his victims was a night of Stygian 
blackness. 

Thus it appears that in the last analysis the term 
<' genius," as applied to the greater masters of chess and 
of war, is used by the world at large to designate men 



GRAXD PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 199 

who were alike superlatively equipped both in the theory 
and in the practice of their respective professions. 

Furthermore, it appears that the " genius " possessed 
by these great characters consisted in the fact that they 
knew how to bridge that vast impassable gulf which 
separates the tactician and the theorist, and to produce, 
by a method unknown to the mere artist or to the 
mere scientist, tJie perfect co-operation of theory and 
practice. 

Obviously, then, perfect comprehension of a science, 
or perfect comprehension of an art, is not enough to 
make of any man a " genius." In addition to this he 
also must perfectly comprehend that method of calcvlation 
whereby in any situation the laws of the art and the 
principles of the science may be reduced to mathematical 
harmony, in order that these may perfectly co-operate 
for the attainment of a mutually desired end. 

It therefore is evident that the science of chess strate- 
getics culminates in that calcidation whereby the prin- 
ciples upon which the art of chessplay is founded are 
correctly interpreted and properly applied to any given 
situation on the cliessboard. 

By his understanding of the minor and the major 
processes of greater logistics the student is enabled to 
treat correctly any chessic condition which may be com- 
prehended in a single strategetic horizon. But when two 
or more strategetic horizons are contained at the same 
time in a given topographical zone, it is imperative that 
the student be equipped with knowledge which will enable 
him to detect the true strategetic horizon and to describe 
the true course of procedure ; i. e., in the vernacular of 
tlie game, " to pick out the best move:' 

The student, therefore, must clearly understand that 
there is a difference between Science — the knowledge of 



200 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

wliat to do — and Art — the understanding of how to do 
it ; and that this difference is all the difference in the 
world. 

If, in a game of chess, the ojjpo sing force had no poiver 
of movement, all chess knowledge would be limited to 
Lines of Mobilization and Lines of Development, and 
the whole art of chessplay would be contained hi the 
processes of Lesser Logistics. 

All the conditions would be known, the proposition 
would be exact, the calculations would be merely those 
of simple arithmetic, and White would Avin by establish- 
ing his pieces on a grand front by the right oblique. 

But it so happens that the opposing force not only is 
able to move, but it is capable of being moved with 
vigor and effect ; and the resultant of all this is that the 
opposing force possesses, and can exert, a foicer for 
resistance which in common practice is quite equal to 
the power of attack put forth by White. 

Li war, this fact is emphasized, and often laughably 
exaggerated. The basic proposition of military science 
is that two men can whip one ; but the history of war is 
the story of the victory of the under dog, and in actual 
warfare the difficulty always is to prevent the one man 
from trouncing seriatim both of his usually unprepared 
and isolated enemies. 

Again, the powers for attack and the powers for resist- 
ance possessed by the opposing forces are indeterminate 
and irregularly distributed. 

The reason for this is, that while the right of move- 
ment appertains equally to every chesspiece, not more 
than one chesspiece can be moved at any given turn to 
play, and consequently the vigor and effect of any given 
move is problematical, and is dependent upon and pro- 
portionate to the support subsequently accorded it by kin- 



GRAND PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 201 

dred pieces and to the resistance offered to it by adverse 
pieces. 

Hence, it follows that it is imperative, from the midst 
of the strategic, tactical, and topographical differences 
which exist in every situation on the chessboard or on the 
battlefield, to establish mathematical harmony, and it is 
obvious that this harmony consists in consolidating as a 
unit the total strength of the kindred force, and in di- 
recting it against the strategic vertices of the true strate- 
getic horizon, whenever a strategetic weakness exists in 
the adverse position and against the To2:)ographical Key^ 
whenever a strategetic weakness does 7iot exist in the 
adverse position. 

With the minor processes of Greater Logistics which 
appertain exclusively to simple lines of manoeuvre, and 
with the major processes of Greater Logistics which ap- 
pertain to compound and to complex lines of manoeuvre, 
and to lines of operation, the student already is familiar, 
and, given the True Strategetic Horizon^ he will have no 
difficulty in detecting and describing the Strategic Ver- 
tices, the Points of Command, of Manoeuvre, and of 
Departure, the Topographical, Tactical, and Strategic 
Keys, and the Logistic Radii. 

That calculation whereby the True Strategetic Horizon 
is detected in the midst of a number of strategetic hori- 
zons coexisting in any given situation on the surface of 
the chessboard is the connecting link hetiveen the science of 
chess and the art of chessidlay ; it is that manifestation of 
" genius," whereby the greater master at chess and the 
greater master at war so easily and so completely over- 
throws his adversaries, and it is the touchstone by the 
use of which the mere theorist and the mere tactician 
may come to realize the full scope and the intellectual 
magnificence both of chess and of war, viz. : — 



202 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

BASIC PROPOSITION OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 
Theorem. 

To determine the TEUE Strategetic Horizon^ the true 
Tactical EvrAution^ and the true Tactical Sequence. 

Locate a tactical key in the adverse position^ the occupa- 
tion of which hy a given Mndred piece will — 

{a) Checkmate the adverse king ; 

(b) Or^ queen a kindred pawn ; 

(c) Or, win a hostile piece ; 

and connect this tactical key^ by a logistic radius, ivith 
that point of command ichich, at the given time, is occu- 
pied hy the given kindred piece. 

Locate a second hut vacant point of command, which, 
if occupied hy a second kindred piece, zvill operate radii 
of offence simultaneously against a second and third 
tactical keys in the adverse position ; and connect this 
point of command, hy a logistic radius, vAth that point 
of manoeuvre ichich, at the given time, is occupied hy the 
given second kindred piece. 

Then, if either the given second or third tactical keys, 
together ivith the strategic key (to he determined) and a 
third point of command occupied hy a third kindred 
piece, are contained in the same vertical, the same hori- 
zontal, or the same diagonal, and if the first tactical key 
and the tactical key last specified are hoth situated on the 
perimeter of that geometric symbol ivhich appertains to 
the third kindred piece, hut are not situated in the same 
topographical horizon ; 

(a) The occupation of the given second point of com- 
mand is the TRUE TACTICAL EVOLUTION ; 

(h) The tacticcd keys situated on the perimeter of this 
geometric symbol, together with the strategic key, — -which 
always is the centre of the given geometric symbol, — con- 



GRAND PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 203 
stitute the strategic vertices of the TRUE strategetic 

HORIZON ; 

{c) Of which the third kindred piece is the column of the 
centre : the first kindred piece is the column of the rights 
or of the left, and the second kiyidred piece is the column 
of the left or of the right, respectively ; and the arrange- 
ment of moves required to occupy the strategic vertices 
constitutes the true tactical sequence. 



THE TACTICAL SEQUE^XE. 

The Tactical Sequence consists of those marches 
Tvhereby the Corps Offensive leave their respective points 
of departure or of manceuvre and advance along the 
logistic radii which appertain to the true strategetic 
horizon, to their respective points of command against 
the strategic vertices. 

rOURTEEXTH LAW OE THE AET OE CHESSELAY. 

A projected march hy a Corps Offensive is valid when 
it is directed against a Point Offensive, and : 

(a) When such Point Offensive is the point of com- 
mand in a tactical horizon of which the given Corjjs 
Offensive is the prime tactical factor ; 

{h) And luhen one of the tactical Jcegs contained in the 
given tactical horizon is situated on the perimeter of that 
geometric symbol of which the strategic key of the true 
strategetic horizon is the centre ; 

(c) And when the exponent of the given Corps Offensive 
is not less than the defensive exponent of either of those 
tactical keys which are contained in the given tactical 
horizon : 

(d) And when such march is in propter sequence with 
the other marches of the kindred Corps Offensive, 

All marches which properly appertain to Corps Offen- 
sive are combined in three distinct ways, each of which 



THE TACTICAL SEQUENCE. 2U5 

methods constitutes a series of movements and is termed 
a Prime Logistic Operation, viz. : — 

FIRST TACTICAL SEQUENCE. 

March M. 1. — This march always is made either by 
the column of the Right or of the Left, which advances 
from a point of manoeuvre along an open logistic radius, 
and occupies a point of command against one of the 
tactical keys contained in that strategic weakness, which 
at the given time exists in the adverse position. 

March No 2. — This march always is made by that 
flank column which is not engaged in making March 
No. 1. It always advances from a point of manoeuvre 
along an open logistic radius, and occupies a ])oint of 
command against two or more tactical keys, one of 
which latter is contained in the perimeter of the same 
geometric symbol with that tactical key attacked by 
the first kindred column, but not in the same topo- 
graphical horizon. 

March No. 3. — This march always is made by the 
column 01 the centre, which advances from a point of 
manoeuvre along an open logistic radius, and occupies a 
point of command simultaneously against the strategic 
key of the true strategetic horizon and a tactical key. 

March No. ^. — This march always is made by the 
column of the centre, which advances from a point of 
command along an open logistic radius and occupies 
the strategic key of the true strategetic horizon. 

March No. 5. — This march always is made by that 
kindred column, whether of the Centre, Right, or Left, 
which can by that single move either win a hostile 
piece, queen a kindred pawn, or preferably checkmate 
the adverse king. 



206 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



FIRST TACTICAL SEQUENCE. 

Figure 104. 
Mr. Bukille. 



■§^'m± 



IliBi 



^ 



is 




e ^i5?^ 



tiii 



isi J| 



^ ^s^..^ fiii. 



^ mmA 












1 



I 



Mr. Youxg. 



XoTE. — In this situation it is obvious that if Black 
had the move he would win by playing P to Q 4. 

Hence, White must either act on a line of operations, 
or he must act on a simple line of manoeuvre and pre- 
vent the advance of the Black Q P. 

An exact reconnoissance of the situation shows that 
the Black force is divided into two s:reat isolated masses, 



THE TACTICAL SEQUENCE, 207 

and that only one of these masses — i. e,, that composed 
of the Black K, Q, R, K P, K Kt P, and K R P— is in 

action. 

According to Napoleon's dictum it is necessary for 
White to act either against the communications of these 
two isolated masses or against the communications of 
the active adverse mass with its base ; i. e., the Black K. 
The latter course would be brilliantly decisive, but in 
this case no strategic line of operations can be mathe- 
matically demonstrated. 

Thus it is White's sole resource, being inferior in 
force, to act on a simple line of manoeuvre and endeavor 
to perpetuate and to intensify the unscientific isolation 
of Black's divided army. 

But the exact reconnoissance of the general situation 
also shows that there is a prospective complex line of 
manoeuvre open to White, provided that the Black Q 
can be compelled or enticed to withdraw the radius of 
defence which is operating for the support of Black K 2. 

This prospective complex line of ma^qmjvre results 
from the fact that White's corps of the iSt (White Q) 
already occupies a point of command against one tactical 
key (Black K Kt 2) and remotely against a second 
tactical key (Black's K K 1) ; and that if the White K P, 
which occupies a point of manoeuvre, can advance to its 
point of command (Black's K 2), and from whence it 
would attack simultaneously two tactical keys (Black 
K B 1 and K 1), the White K B also would be brought 
into co-operation with the White Q. 

But although this is so, it still is the fact that this 
prospective complex line of manoeuvre never may be 
realized, and, as the student must always recollect, the 
most pressing need ahvays must first he attended to. 

Therefore, although White should hold in view the 



208 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

possibility of this prospective attack against the Black 
K, nevertheless, he on his turn to play must be governed 
by the principles of the simple line of manoeuvre, as his 
immediate object is to prevent the play of P to Q 4 by 
Black. 

That is to say, "White must dictate Black's next move ; 
i. ^., White must retain the initiative. White no^ 
applies the tactician's rule, and at once sees that he 
can compel the Black Q to perform two functions; viz,. 
to defend the Black K 2 and at the same time to pro- 
tect itself against attack, and White further sees that 
such onus, if thrown on the Black Q, will prevent the 
move of P to Q 4 by Black, and will dictate as his next 
move a move by the Black Q. 

This, of course, is just what White wants to do ; and 
he can do this in three ways ; viz., by Kt — Q R 4, by 
B - K 3, or by P - Q Kt 4.^ 

Either of these moves by White is equivalent, in wai', 
to outflanking a hostile corps which is defending a 
strategic point. A detachment made for such a pur- 
pose may be sacrificed if such sacrifice insures a line 
of operations. j 

Consequently, White selects his Q Kt P as a Corps 
Detached to be sacrificed as the most judicious method 
to fulfil the requirements of the immediate simple line 
of manoeuvre and to bring about the prospective com- 
plex line of manoeuvre, and he plays: — 

]\[k. Young. 
1. P_QKt4. 

If the Black Q retreats to Q 3 or to K 2, then the 
complex line of manoeuvre begins, and the initiative is 
retained for White by Kt — K 4, or B — K Kt 5. So 
Black plays : — 



THE TACTICAL SEQUENCE. 209 

Mr. Burille. 
1. Q X Kt P. 

Still White must keep to the simple line of manoeuvre 
in order to retain the initiative and to prevent Black 
from playing P — Q 4 ; so he continues : — 

2. E - Q Kt 1. 2. Q X Kt. 

Black evades the snare laid for him by the offer of the 
White Q; i. e., Black could have played 2. R — K B 8 
(ck);3.BxR,QxQ;4.P-K7,Q-K3; 5. B-R3, 
P-Q4; 6. KtxQP, PxKt; 7. B-QKt5, B-Q2; 
8. R - K B 1, and White wins. 

Of course, Black by taking the Kt permits White to 
act on a complex line of manoeuvre against the Black K. 
The situation is replete with instruction for the student 
of this theory. 

3. B-KR6. 

This is another sacrifice of a Corps Detached to 
dictate Black's reply and thus to retain the initiative, 
and is the beginning of the strategic line of operations. 

3. P X B. 

Black must avert the mate at the expense of a move 
and thus permit the White column of the centre to 
occupy its point of manoeuvre (White K B 1). This 
capture by Black also uncovers the Black K Kt 1 to the 
combined attack of the White Q and K B. 

4. P-K7. 

White now advances his corps of the left to a point 
of command whereat it attacks simultaneously two tac- 
tical keys (Black K 1 and K B 1). 

4. R-Kl. 

14 



210 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

The Black R thus attacked is obliged to preserve it- 
self and to support the kindred point of junction against 
the attack of the White K P. It thus acts as a part of 
the column of manoeuvre by constituting itself a point 
of impenetrability. 

But by so doing, as the student readily sees, the 
Black R abandons the strategic key, i. e. (Black K B 2), 
for it is evident that if a White R be posted at Black's 
K B 2, it simultaneously Tvill attack both Black K B 1 and 
K Kt 2, both of which are tactical keys, and thus the 
strategic horizon will be complete, with the strategic ver- 
tices occupied by the Corps Offensive, and consequently 
it will be a winning position for White. 

5. E-KBl. 

The White Corps of the Centre now occupies its point 

of manoeuvre and at the same time simultaneously 

attacks the strategic key and a tactical key, according 

to the grand law of chessplay as laid down in this 

theory. 

5. Q-QB4. 

The student will observe that although Black has 
captured three detached corps for which White has 
no further use, his position not only is not further 
developed, but on account of the removal of the Black 
K Kt P from K Kt 2, it is even weaker than before 
his first move, and that White still retains the initiative 
and the right to move. 

6. R - B 7. 

The White Corps of the Centre now occupies the 
strategic key from whence it simultaneously attacks 



THE TACTICAL SEQUENCE. 211 

the two tactical keys, which also are attacked by the 
Corps of the Right and of the Left, respectively. The 
position now is a winning position for White either with 
or without the move. 

6. R-Ktl. 

Black, obviously, cannot prevent both the threatened 
mate and the threatened occupation of the logistic 
horizon by the White K P. 

7. E X E P (ek). 7. K x E. 

8. Q X E (ck). 

Checkmate. 



212 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



SECOND TACTICAL SEQUENCE. 

March JVo. 1. — This march always is made by the 
column of the Right or of the Left, which advances 
from a point of manoeuvre along an open logistic radius 
and occupies a point of command against one of the 
tactical keys contained in the strategetic weakness 
which at the given time exists in the adverse position. 

March JVo. 2. — This march always is made by the 
column of the centre, which advances from a point of 
manoeuvre along an open logistic radius and occupies 
the strategic key of the true strategetic horizon. 

March No. 3. — This march always is made by that 
flank column which is not engaged in making March 
No. 1. It always advances from a point of manoeuvre 
along an open logistic radius and occupies a point of 
command against two or more tactical keys, one of 
which latter is contained in the perimeter of the same 
geometric symbol with that tactical key attacked by 
the first kindred column, but not in the same topograph- 
ical horizon. 

March No. 4- — This march always is made by that 
kindred column, whether of the Centre, Right, or Left, 
which can most effectively occupy a tactical key and in 
one move win a hostile piece, queen a kindred pawn, or, 
preferably, checkmate the adverse king. 



THE TACTICAL SEQUENCE. 



213 



SECOND TACTICAL SEQUENCE. 
Figure 105. 
Mr. Youxg. 




Mr. Harlow. 



Note. — This situation shows each of the three Black 
Corps Offensive posted on a point of manoeuvre. 

The strategetic weakness in the White position is that 
of Class III. (see " Grarud Tactics," p. 36). It consists of 
the undefended White^ B and the White K Kt P, which 
latter is defended only by the White K. 

The strategic horizon thus is formed, beiug composed 
of that part of the second horizontal which extends 



214 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

from White's K Kt 2 to his Q Kt 2. The strategic kej 
is White K 2, and this point is connected by an open 
logistic radius with Black's Q R 3, an adverse point of 
manoeuYre which at the present moment is occupied by 
the Black Q. 

An open logistic radius leads from White's Q Kt 2 to 
Black's Q Kt 1, which latter is a point of command for 
the Black Q R. This piece is connected with its point 
of command by an open logistic radius extending from 
the point of manoeuvre, Black Q R 1. 

Another open logistic radius leads from White's 
K Kt 2 to Black's K Kt 3, which latter is a point of com- 
mand for the Black K R. This piece is connected with 
its point of command by an open logistic radius extend- 
ing from the point of manoeuvre, Black K B 3. 

Following the rule which governs the first march in 
the Second Tactical Sequence, one of the Black flanking 
corps is deployed to its point of command. This choice 
necessarily falls on the Black Q R, inasmuch as no 
line of operation exists, it would be inadvisable to allow 
the White column of support the advantage of a passed 
pawn on the centre by B x Kt, which obviously would 
have to be done in order to play K R — K Kt 3. 

Hence, Black correctly deploys an inactive piece on 
the complex line of manoeuvre, viz. : — 

Mr. Youxg. 
1. QR-QKtl. 

Obviously the White Q B cannot retreat to Q B 1, as 
in that case the White Q B P would fall victim to the 
Black Kt, which in this situation is a Corps Detached 
and prevents the occupation of the supporting posts, 
White KB 2 by the White R, and Q 2 by the White Q. 
The P at Black's QR7 also is a Black Corps Detached 



THE TACTICAL SEQUENCE. 215 

preventing the White Q R from occupjing the supporting 
post, White Q Kt 1. White moved, viz. : — 

Mk. Harlow. 

2. Q-QBl. 

This was a fatal error. It is imperative that White 
in a single move support the attacked tactical key 
(White Q Kt 2) and also defend the strategic key (White 
K 2). The only move to do both of these things simul- 
taneously was to play Q — Q B 2. 

2. Q-K7. 

According to rule, the second march of a Corps Offen- 
sive in the Second Tactical Sequence always is made by 
the corps of the centre. White haying left the strategic 
key of the position undefended, Black at once occupies 
it with his Q, thus simultaneously attacking both tactical 
keys (White Q Kt 2 and White K Kt 2). 

This situation will command the attention of every 
student of strategetics, whether of war or of chess. It is 
the exact replica on the chessboard of those evolutions 
whereby Napoleon won the battle of Austerlitz, — the 
victory upon which he most prided himself. 

3. R X P. 

It made no difference what White played. " War," 
says Napoleon, " is a business of positions." White 
loses, not because Black has two pawns plus, but because 
two Black Corps Offensive occupy two of the strategic 
vertices of the position and dictate Wliite's next move. 

3. B X Kt. 

Here the student again sees the co-operation of a kin- 
dred corps detached. The White Kt prevented the 
occupation by Black's KR of the point of command, 



216 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

Black KKt3. White cannot take the Black KB, for 
he must prevent the Black K R from occupying its point 
of command, as then all three of the Black Corps Offen- 
sive would become posted on the strategic vertices, which 
would win offhand for Black, either with or without the 
move. (See Fig. 93.) 

4. Q-Ql. 

White, of course, is beaten. But to prolong the con- 
test he adopts the only course, and plays to subordinate 
the dominant adverse Prime Strategetic Factor. 

That is to say, White is threatened with checkmate 
by the Black Q ; he removes this danger for the time 
being. 

4. Q X Q. 

This is to dictate White's next move, and thus to gain 
the necessary time to save the Black K B. 



5. E X Q. 
White thus saves his King. 



5. B X B P. 



As the result of his tactical line of operation, Black 
has a piece and two pawns ahead, and, of course, wins 
easilv. 



THE TACTICAL SEQUENCE. 217 



THIRD TACTICAL SEQUENCE. 

March No. 1. — This march always is made by the 
column of the centre, which advances from a point of 
command along an open logistic radius and occupies 
the strategic key of the true strategetic horizon. 

March No. 2. — This march always is made by the 
column of the Right or Left, which advances from a 
point of manceuvre along an open logistic radius and 
occupies a point of command against two or more 
tactical keys, one of which latter is contained in the 
perimeter of that geometric symbol with a tactical key 
attacked by the column of the centre, but not in the 
same tactical horizon. 

March No. 3. — This march always is made by the 
kindred flank column which is not engaged in March 
No. 2. It always is directed from a point of manoeuvre 
toward a point of command against two tactical keys in 
the adverse position and under like conditions. 

March No. J^. — This march always is made by that 
kindred column, whether of the Centre, Right, or Left, 
which can most effectively occupy a tactical key, and 
by that single move either win a hostile piece, queen 
a kindred pawn, or, preferably, checkmate the adverse 
king. 



218 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



THIRD TACTICAL SEQUENCE. 

ElGUKE 106. 

Mr. Waee. 







m i 




m^^. * mm 



isii 



7/- ^^^z// 










'<M7//// < 




A 








lai 




^ 4/////M 



Me. Young. 



Note. — Tins is a most instructive situation and am- 
ply will repay the closest scrutiny. Herr Steinitz, in the 
" International Chess Magazine," states that " White's 
play is of a high order." 

An exact reconnoissance of the situation shows that 
the dominant Prime Strategetic Factor is White's col- 
umn of support. This results from the fact tliat his 
aligned Q P and Q B P outfront the P at Black's Q B 2. 



THE TACTICAL SEQUENCE. 219 

This advantage is supplemented by the fact that 
White, having the move, can establish the grand front 
by the left oblique ; and all this is intensified by the 
further facts that White can retain the initiative by 
attacking the Black Q, and thus dictate Black's next 
move. 

Thus, in obedience to the laws of the art, Wl;iite 
plays : — 

Mr. Young. 

1. P-QB6. 

This is the march of a corps detached for the purpose 
of nullifying the defensive force of a corps defensive 
(Black Q), and so enable the White Q to capture the 
Black Q Kt P. It also combines the true line of devel- 
opment according to the principles of " Grand Tactics." 

Mr. Ware. 

1. Q-QBl. 

This was a tactical error, as thereby Black posts his 
Q and R on the vertices of the geometric symbol of the 
pawn. 

2. Q X P. 

This is the march of the corps of the centre from the 
point of departure to the point of manoeuvre. 

2. P X P. 

Black plays to regain the pawn and to expose the 
White K. 

3. P-Q6. 

This is the march of a detached corps for the purpose 
of nullifying the point of impenetrability at Black's 
Q B 2 in order to clear the logistic radius for the ad- 
vance of the White corps of the left to its point of com- 
mand (Q B 7) against the tactical key (Q B 8). White 



220. CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

preserves the initiative by threatening P — Q 7 on his 
next turn to play. 

3. P X Q P. 

This seems to be Black's best defence. But the loss 
of time permits White to seize the strategic key (White's 
Q Kt 7). 

4. B X K B P. 

This is the march of a detached corps made for the 
purpose of capturing adverse material (Black K B P) 
and for retaining the initiative, i. e. dictating Black's 
reply. 

4. E - B 1. 

Black should have played R — K 2, thus defending the 
strategic key (Black Q Kt 2) against the White Q. 

5. Q - Kt 7. 

This is the first march of the third tactical sequence. 
The White corps of the centre (Q) occupies the strategic 
key (White Q Kt 7) and operates simultaneously against 
the tactical keys (White Q B 8 and Q Kt 2). 

5. B-K<jH^ 

Mr. Ware failed to comprehend the mathematics of 
this situation. 

6. B X Q P. 

The White corps of the right moves from the point 
of manoeuvre (White Q Kt 4) and occupies the point of 
command (White Q 6), thus attacking the corps defen- 
sive (Black K B) which guards the tactical key (White 
Q Kt 2). The White Q B is secure in this movement, 
as it is sustained by tlie White Q ; for the Black K B 
cannot act at two points at once, and consequently it 
cannot both defend the tactical key (White Q Kt 2) and 



THE TACTICAL SEQUENCE. 221 

capture the White Q B at Black's Q 3. Furthermore, 
White retains the initiative, as he threatens to play 
Q B X B on his next move. 

6. B-Kt2. 

Seemingly, there is no more preferable alternative. 
To avoid a strategic line of operation Black is compelled 
to submit to loss of material. 

7. B X R. 

The White corps of the right takes possession of the 
spoil resulting from the superiority in position. 

7. Q X B. 

Black also is forced to withdraw his point of impene- 
trability on the logistic radius of the White corps of the 
left. 

8. P - B 7. 

The march of the White corps of the left against the 
tactical key (White Q B 8), in which movement it is 
supported by the White corps of the centre posted on 
the strategic key (White Q B 7). 

8. Q X B. 

9. P-B 8 (Qck). 

The march of the White corps of the left from the 
point of command, and occupation of the tactical key, 
which is a point of junction in the kindred logistic 
horizon. 

That is, White's column of support has forced its way 
to the battlefield, and the united White columns of 
attack and of support will now easily overwhelm the 
single Black column of attack. 



CORPS DEFENSIVE. 

Those chesspieces which in a given situation are 
engaged in protecting other kindred pieces, or in oppos- 
ing tlie occupation of points offensive by adverse corps, 
are termed in this theory Corps Defensive. 

This species of chess-force is divided into three 
classes, viz. : — 

(a) Sustaining Corps. 

(5) Supporting Corps. 

(c) Covering Corps. 

Sustaining Coiys are those which at a given time are 
defending a given point or piece, by threatening to 
inflict upon the opponent a greater loss if such point or 
piece be captured. 



CORPS DEFENSIVE. 



223 



This threat of the sustaining corps always assumes 
one or two forms : — 

{a) To capture the adverse piece should it capture the 
kindred point or piece. 

{!)) To capture some other adverse piece or point of 
greater value than that which is lost. 

SUSTAINING CORPS. 

Figure 107. 

Black. 












i 



y/, <//77777 




White. 



Note. — The White Kt is a sustaining corps, as it will 
win the Black Q by Kt to K B 6 (ck) if Black K B 
takes the White R. 



224: 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



Supporting Corps are those which at a given time 
protect a given piece or point by directing against it a 
radius of defence. 



SUPPORTING COEPS. 

FiGUEE 108. 

Black. 




^ mm mm '^m 

im i m 



1^y..„ %S^A, 













-mm. % 




W 
m w/m. 




i M 



White. 



The Black Q B P and Q R P are supporting corps, as 
they protect the Black K B against the attack of the 
White R. 



CORPS DEFENSIVE. 



225 



Covering Corps are those which in a given situation 
intercept an adverse radius of offence which otherwise 
would fall upon a kindred piece or point. 



COVERING CORPS. 

Figure 109. 

Black. 



w 







M.\JM... 



ifili 




W£m> m. 





©PI 






m 





feM^ wmA, 




y/////////. 



White. 



Note. — The Black Kt is a covering corps, as it covers 
the Black K B P from the attack of the White R. 



15 



226 



CEESS STRATEGETICS. 



All else being equal, a Corps Defensive is lost when- 
ever it is attacked bj an adverse force and is unable to 
retire, or to be properly supported, covered, or sustained, 

A Corps Defensive is unable to retire : — 

(a) When it is not its turn to move. 



CORPS DEFENSIVE SURPRISED. 

Figure 110. 
Black. 




'm//M. m 





^— — „ 



m i& 



% "^ 



1 W/WA 

WMi. 'MW/i. m. 







White. 



White to move and win. 

In this situation the Corps Defensive is said to be 
surprised. 



CORPS DEFENSIVE. 227 

(5) When there is no point to which it can move. 



CORPS DEFENSIVE SURROUNDED. 

Figure 111. 

Black. 




White. 



White wins either with or without the move. 
In this situation the Corps Defensive is said to be 
surrounded. 



228 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



(c) When it is posted in support of a more important 
kindred piece, which latter also is attacked. 



CORPS DEFENSIVE OUTNUMBERED. 
Figure 112. 

Black. 




White. 



White wins either with or without the move. 
In this situation the Corps Defensive is said to be 
outnumbered. 



CORPS DEFENSIVE. 



229 



(fZ) When it is covering a more important kindred 
piece. 



CORPS DEFENSIVE COMMANDED. 

FiGUKE 113. 

Black. 




White. 



White wins either with or without the move. 
In this situation the Corps Defensive is said to be 
commanded. 



230 



CHESS STRATEGETICS. 



(e) When it is posted in support to prevent the occu- 
pation of a point offensive. 



COEPS DEFENSIVE OUTFLANKED. 
Figure 114. 

Black. 






w--*. 




'»i 




s^'m 




VA y//////M 




Wa m m. 



White. 



White, having the move, wins a piece by R takes Kt 
as the Black K B cannot leave Black K B 3 unsupported 
on account of the White Kt winning the Black Q by 
Kt B 6 (ck). 

In this situation the Corps Defensive is said to be 
outflanked. 



CORPS DEFENSIVE. 



231 



(/) When it is posted to cover and prevent the occu- 
pation of a Point Offensive. 



COEPS DEFENSIVE OUTERONTED. 
Figure 115. 

Black. 





m. 



m\wM ^^ 



■ i 




^^ v/////////: 




^_". 










White. 



White, having the move, wins a piece by P to K 5, as 
the Black Kt must cover the tactical key, Black K B 1. 

In this situation the Corps Defensive is said to be 
outfronted. 



COKPS DETACHED. 



A Corps Detached is any chesspiece which, in a 
given situation, although actively participating in an 
offensive movement, is not a corps of the Centre, nor 
of the Right, nor of the Left. 

Those marches which appertain to Corps Detached 
are termed Secondary Logistic Operations, and the 
object of such movements always is to eliminate or to 
neutralize the resistance of adverse Corps Defensive. 

Although a Corps Detached always acts independ- 
ently of the remaining kindred pieces, nevertheless it 
always must be a strategetic mass governed in its deploy- 
ments, developments, manoeuvres, and operations by the 
laws of the art of chessplay, and at all times it must 
act in harmony with the Prime Strategetic Factors. 

A Corps Detached eliminates or neutralizes an adverse 
Corps Defensive, by either surprising, surrounding, out- 
numbering, commanding, outflanking, or outf routing a 
compromised adverse piece. 

The Queen or the Knight can surprise and capture 
any adverse piece. 

The King, Rook, or Bishop can surprise and capture 
any adverse piece except the Queen. 

The Pawn cannot surprise and capture any adverse 
piece. 

The Queen can surround and capture an adverse 
Knio'ht or Pawn. 



CORPS DETACHED. 233 

The King can surround and capture an adverse 
Knight or Pawn. 

The Rook can surround and capture an adverse 
Knight or Pawn. 

The Bishop can surround and capture an adverse 
Knight or Pawn. 

The Knight can surround and capture an adverse 
Knight or Pawn. 

Any piece aided by kindred pieces can surround and 
capture any adverse piece. 

Any piece aided by adverse pieces can surround and 
capture any adverse piece. 

Any piece can command, outflank, and outfront any 
adverse piece. 

Any two pieces can outnumber any adverse piece. 

Every movement of a Corps Detached is governed by 
the following : — 

FIFTEENTH LAW OE THE ART OF CHESSPLAY. 

At every turn to move note tJiose points which hy the 
last move of the opponent are left uncovered^ unsupported., 
and unsustained ; and ivhether the occupation of such 
point hy a kindred piece will outfront, outflank^ surround, 
outnumber, command, or surpi^ise one or more adverse 
pieces. And if so, combine this tactical defect with a 
similar defect in some other part of the adverse position. 



PLANS OF CAMPAIGN. 

Any given plan of campaign may endure for many 
moves, or it may become vitiated after a few moves, or 
it may be changed at every move ; but in all cases the 
true plan of campaign is governed by the following : 



SIXTEENTH LAW OF THE ART OF CHESSPLAY. 

I. In every true jjilan of campaign, the Prime Logistic 
Operation ahuays emanates from that Kindred Prime 
Strategetic Factor ivhich dominates the given situation 
and always takes direction towards the natural objective 
of the given Kindred Prime Strategetic Factor. 

II. In all cases ivherein the given situation is domi- 
nated hy an adverse Prime Strategetic Factor, the Prime 
Logistic operation cdivays emanates from that Kiyidred 
Primie Strategetic Factor ivhich at the given time is best 
calculated to reduce the dominant adverse Prime Strate- 
getic Factor to a Factor Subordinate. 

III. A true plan of campaign never contemplates a 
Prime Logistic Operation by a Factor Subordinate. 

By means of this law the student readily sees that 
every true plan of campaign changes as the relative 
value of the opposing^ Prime Strategetic Factors changes, 
nnd that the duration of any plan of campaign, there- 
fore, is indeterminate and may be altered with each 
succeedino; move. 



PLANS OF CAMPAIGN. 235 

Hence, obviously it is imperative that, at every turn 
to move, the entire situation be exactly reconnoitred. 
This is done in the following manner, viz. : — 

RULES FOR MAKING A RECONNOISSANCE ON THE 
CHESSBOARD. 

(a) Compare the opposing columns of manoeuvre, 
and note that one which has the advantage. 

(6) Specify in what this advantage consists. 

(c) Compare the opposing columns of support, and 
note that one which has tiie advantage. 

{d) Specify in what this advantage consists. 

(e) Compare the opposing columns of attack, and 
note that one which has the advantage. 

(/) Specify in what this advantage consists. 

At every turn to move, the plan of campaign should 
be either strategetically offensive or strategically defen- 
sive. 

(a) If offensive, it should combine those measures 
whereby that column in which the kindred force lias 
the advantage may be made the Predominant Prime 
Tactical Factor in the given situation. 

(^) If defensive, it should combine those measures 
whereby that column in which the adverse force has 
the advantage may be reduced to a subordinate Prime 
Tactical Factor in the given situation. 

A plan of campaign should be offensive whenever the 
kindred force has the advantage : — 

1. With the column of attack, with the column of 
support, and with the column of manoeuvre. 

2. Both with the column of attack and with the 
column of support. 



23G CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

3. Both with the column of attack and with tlie 
column of manoeuvre. 

4. Both with the column of support and with the 
column of manoeuvre. 

5. With the column of attack, no offsetting advan- 
tage appertaining to the adverse column of support. 

6. With the column of support, no offsetting advan- 
tage appertaining to the adverse column of attack. 

A plan of campaign should be defensive whenever the 
opponent has the advantage : — 

1. Both with the column of attack and with the 
column of support. 

2. With the column of attack, no offsetting advan- 
tage appertaining to the kindred column of support. 

3. With the column of support, no offsetting ad- 
vantage appertaining to the kindred column of at- 
tack. 



PRIME LOGISTIC OPERATIONS. 

Having decided on the plan of campaign, the logistic 
operation will either be a line of manoeuvre or a line of 
operation ; each of which may or may not combine with 
itself a line of mobilization or a line of development. 

Whenever the logistic operation takes the form of a 
line of manoeuvre, the latter always is either : — 

1. Simple, 

2. Compound, or 

3. Complex. 

The simple line of manoeuvre always should be adopted 
whenever an exact reconnoissance of the entire situation 
at any given turn to move shows no strategetic weakness 
in the adverse position. 

A simple line of manoeuvre preferably should com- 
bine with itself a line of mobilization or a line of 
development ; in direction it should be coincident with 
the dominant Kindred Prime Tactical Factor, and at 
every move it should either occupy the topographical 
key, or attack simultaneously the topographical key and 
one or more tactical keys in the adverse position. 

The compound line of manoeuvre always should be 
adopted whenever an exact reconnoissance of the entire 
situation at any given turn to move shows a true strat- 
egetic horizon whose vertices constitute an adverse 
strategetic weakness of either Class lY., V., YI., or 
YIL, in a direction coincident with the dominant kin- 
dred Prime Tactical Factor. 



238 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

A compound line of manoeuvre preferably should 
combine with itself a line of mobilization or a line of 
development ; in direction it should be coincident with 
the dominant Kindred Prime Tactical Factor, and at 
every move it should attack simultaneously two or 
more tactical keys in the adverse position. 

A complex line of manoeuvre always should be 
adopted whenever an exact reconnoissance of the entire 
situation at any given turn to move shows a true 
strategetic horizon whose vertices constitute an adverse 
strategetic weakness of Classes I., II., and III., in a 
direction coincident with the dominant Kindred Prime 
Strategetic Factor. 

A complex line of manoeuvre preferably should com- 
bine with itself either a line of mobilization or a line of 
development ; in direction it should be coincident with 
the dominant Kindred Prime Strategetic Factor, and at 
every move it should attack simultaneously two or more 
tactical keys in the adverse position. 

Whenever the logistic movement takes the form of a 
line of operation the latter always is either 
I. Strategic. 
11. Tactical. 
III. Logistic. 

When the line of operation is strategic, it is coin- 
cident with the kindred column of attack and always 
takes direction towards the objective plane. The tac- 
tical key always is that point from which the Prime 
Tactical Factor may command the ultimate objective 
plane, and the Prime Tactical Factor always is that 
Corps Offensive whose exponent of force is equal to the 
net mobility of the adverse king. 

When the line of operation is logistic, it is coincident 
with the kindred column of support and always takes 



PRIME LOGISTIC OPERATIONS. 239 

direction towards the kindred logistic horizon. The 
tactical key always is a point of junction, and the 
Prime Tactical Factor always is a kindred pawn. 

When the line of operation is tactical, it may be coin- 
cident either with the column of attack, or with the 
column of support, or with the column of manoeuvre. 
The tactical key always is a point occupied by an 
adverse piece, and the Prime Tactical Factor alw^ays is 
a kindred piece posted on the centre of its own geo- 
metric symbol at a time when the tactical key is a 
point on the perimeter of the same geometric symbol. 

Whether the line of operations be strategic, tactical, 
or logistic, every move of a Corps Offensive should simul- 
taneously attack two or more inadequately defended tac- 
tical keys^ both of which are not situated in the same 
topographical horizon. 



ORDERS OF BATTLE. 

Having determined whether the balance of advantage 
is with the kindred or with the adverse force, and 
whether, in consequence, the kindred plan of campaign 
is to be strategetically offensive or strategetically defen- 
sive ; and having designated the Prime Logistic Opera- 
tion and determined the true strategetic horizon, the true 
tactical evolution, and the true tactical sequence of moves 
appertaining to the corps offensive ; the next step is to 
depict the correct order in which the corps offensive shall 
be brought into action against the strategic vertices, — if 
a strategetic weakness exists in the adverse position, or 
against the topographical key, if no strategetic weakness 
exists in the adverse position, — or how the corps de- 
fensive shall be brought into action in order to neutral- 
ize the dominant adverse prime strategetic factor. 

It is thus easy to see that all orders of battle neces- 
sarily are divided into two classes : — 
I. Offensive. 
IT. Defensive. 

Offensive orders of battle are of three kinds : — 

(a) Those in which the corps offensive are manoeu- 
vred according to the first tactical sequence. 

(5) Tliose in which the corps offensive are manoeu- 
vred according to the second tactical sequence. 

{c) Those in which the corps offensive are manoeu- 
vred according to the third tactical sequence. 

The fundamental idea of strategetics, whether of war 
or of chess, is that the strategetic offensive always wins, 



ORDERS OF BATTLE. 241 

and the strategetic defensive alwaj-s loses. Consequently, 
it is obvious that no valid system of defensive tactics is 
possible — since any defensive system must lose — and 
equally so it is only by assuming the offensive strateget- 
ically that the chessplayer, or the military commander, 
can hope to achieve, or even to deserve, victory. 

But of course situations will necessarily and fre- 
quently arise, both in warfare and in chessplay, wherein 
even the greatest master and the greatest captain will 
find himself, for reasons beyond his control, at least 
temporarily compelled to act on the strategetic defensive. 

According to all writers on strategetics, the defending 
party admittedly is in a bad pickle, and all these writers 
invariably have left him in that condition. For the first 
time by any author, the basic law of defensive tactics 
was announced on page 349 of " The Grand Tactics of 
Chess," viz. : — 

''The nature of the offensive is constructive, and the 
nature of the defensive is destructive, and the prime ener- 
gies of the defence always must be devoted to destroying 
those formations which the attack labors to erect." 

Hence, it is clear that the defensive order of battle 
must absolutely conform to the adverse offensive order of 
battle^ and that its prime object must be to reduce the 
dominant adverse prime tactical factor to a subordinate 
factor^ viz. : — 

1. By eliminating the adverse corps offensive. 

2. By commanding the adverse points offensive. 

3. By obstructing the adverse logistic radii. 

Thus it is that these special duties of detail appertain 
particularly to the defending force, viz. : — 

(a) To adequately cover, support, and sustain all 
kindred tactical keys. 

16 



242 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

(b) To maintain a point of impenetrability on every 
adverse pawn altitude. 

(c) To permit no corps defensive to be outfronted^ 
outflanked, commanded, outnumbered, surrounded, or 
surprised. 

(<i) To prevent the development of the adverse minor 
front into a major front directed towards the kindred 
prime strategetic point. 

But it is not sufficient for the defending chessplayer^ 
or for the defending military commander, to limit him- 
self to the strategetic defensive, even though the latter 
be supplemented by the tactical offensive. 

On the contrary, the defending party must seize the 
first opportunity/ to assume the strategetic offensive, in 
accordance with the following (see " Grand Tactics,'^ 
p. 249) : — 

'^ Having the strategetic defensive, assume the strate- 
getic offensive at the earliest possible moment ; and hav- 
ing assumed the strategetic offensive, deploy, develop, 
manoeuvre, and operate as though having the strategetic 
offensive originally." 

Hence, it is obvious to the student, whether of chess, 
of war, or of mathematics, that at every turn to play 
the defending player either should occupy an adverse 
tactical key, or should unite with a deployment or devel- 
opment an attack against one or more adverse tactical 
keys. 

In order that even the veriest tyro may be able to 
understand what this means, the following dictum is 
laid down in simple and unmistakable language : — 



ORDERS OF BATTLE. 243 

THE TACTICIAN'S RULE. 

At every turn to play^ the piece moved^ whether white or 
hlack^ and whether acting on the offensive or on the defen- 
sive^ should — either directly, hy its own movement ; or 
indirectly.) hy opening a way for the movement of some 
other kindred piece ; or^ hy the comhining of its own move- 
ment with the disclosed movement of some other kindred 
piece — attack and threaten to capture on the next turn to 
play two or more points or adverse pieces, such capture 
winning the game. 

This is the rule invariably followed by the mere 
tactician, and the rule invariably ignored by the mere 
theorist. 

Because he tries to conform to this rule, and thereby 
to profit to the uttermost by the condition which exists, 
is the reason why the tactician, the artist, the man of 
action, achieves success to the measure of his natural 
ability ; and it is because he utterly ignores this rule 
and seeks to establish an ideal condition, instead of 
seeking to profit to the uttermost by the condition which 
exists, that the mere theorist, the scientist, the man of 
learning, meets with failure in practice. 

The reason why the strategist infinitely is superior 
both to the theorist, the man who cannot apply his 
system, and to the tactician, the man who has no system 
other than to hit every head he sees, simply is because 
the strategist avails himself both of the system of the 
theorist and of the tactician's rule. 

That is to say, by means of his understanding of 
theory, the strategist readily detects the flaws created 
in the adverse position by his opponent's violations of 
those laws which govern the art of chessplay. These 



244 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

flaws the tactician usually fails to observe, and in 
consequence he most frequently gives a false direction 
to his lines of mobilizationj of development, and of 
manoeuvre. 

Having given the proper direction to the lines of 
movement along which his pieces are to deploy, the 
strategist now avails himself of the tactician's rule 
in order to extract all j^ossible advantage from the situa- 
tion ivJiich exists. 

The conclusion thus deduced is truly laughable. The 
tactician, bedazzled like a child by the elegance and 
magnificence of the details of the Art, is too lazy to 
devote the time and the application necessary to com- 
prehend that Science upon which his beloved art is 
founded ; while the theorist, with his soul enraptured 
by the beatific visions of the idealist, refuses to recognize 
the truth of the mathematician's axiom : " Things that 
are equal to the same thing — are equal to each 

OTHER ! " 

Hence, in the last analysis of this question, it is 
obvious that the strategist — the man who combines 
great knowledge with great skill in its application — 
beats the tactician on account of his inadequate knowl- 
edge, and beats the theorist on account of his inadequate 
skill ; while in a contest between the theorist and the 
tactician, the latter wins, notwithstanding the vast 
knowledge of the former, for the reason that the tac- 
tician can apply in practice all the knowledge of which 
he is possessed — which the theorist cannot do. 



THE INITIATIVE. 

This perfect combination in a single move both of the 
tactician's rule and of the theorist's system produces 
that element which bridges the seemingly impassable 
abyss that is fixed between Science and Art — between 
Theory and Practice — between the man of learning 
and the man of action. 

This element, for which there is no verbal equivalent 
in any language, is what was meant by Frederic the 
Great when he wrote ; — 

" He who gains TIME — gains everything ! " 
It is what was meant by Napoleon when he said : — 
" Ask me for anything except — TIME ! " 
In the use of the word *' time," there is concealed a 
far deeper significance than is apparent in the respective 
statements of these illustrious strategists, — a far more 
subtle meaning than is conveyed by the measurement 
of days and hours. 

What they both meant is that element which in this 
theory of chess strategetics is termed, for want of a 
better and more explicit word, — the initiative. 

Mere time., as measured by the clock, does not signify 
the initiative^ although the initiative comprehends time, 
i. e., days, hours, minutes, and seconds, inasmuch, and 
in the same way, as the whole comprehends all its 
parts. 

Again, whether in campaigning, and on the field of 
battle, as well as on the chessboard, it is possible for 
a force to be in motion and not to he possessed of the 



246 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

initiative, and it is possible for a force to be at rest and 
jet at the same time to have the initiative. 

That is to say, while the initiative expresses motion 
and is expressed by motion, it does not necessarily imply 
motion, and, as a matter of fact, a force may have the 
initiative and yet be in a state of absolute rest. 

Thus, as the student readily perceives, the fact that a 
body of chessmen situated on the chessboard, or a body 
of troops in the field, have the move, or are in motion, is 
merely an incident among other incidents. True, this 
incident may be of greater or less advantage, or it may 
even be positively detrimental, but in no case does the 
fact of itself constitute the initiative, although in every 
case it is contained in and is a part of the initiative. 

The word '' time," as used by Napoleon and Frederic 
the Great, and the term '• the initiative," as used in this 
'theory, signify that in a given situation a given force 
occupies such a position relative to the opposing force, 
that either with or without the move, — i.e., the state 
of being or of not being in motion, — it dictates the next 
step taken hy the opponent ; compels him to do what of 
choice he would not do, and what according to the laws 
of strategetics he ought not to do ; and as the result of 
which, his position after he has availed himself of his 
subsequent opportunity to move, is weaker than it was 
before. 

Again, a given force may be possessed of the strate- 
getic offensive, and yet not have the initiative. This is 
the scientific fact which is the salvation of the defending 
player. Did the strategetic offensive carry with it the 
initiative, a force once compelled to adopt the strategetic 
defensive would be without resource. 

But it so happens that a force on the strategetic de- 
fensive may, by a single inferior move of the opponent, 



THE INITIATIVE. 247 

acquire the initiative ; then by proper use of this inesti- 
mable element, it may, as the logical sequence, wrest the 
strategetic offensive from the opponent. 

This peculiarly subtle and inestimable element — the 
initiative — is the Promethean spark of strategetics, 
whether the latter relate to chessplay or to warfare ; by 
its proper use all things are accomplished on the battle- 
field and on the chessboard ; without it — nothing. 

It is because that a profound, although unconscious, 
appreciation of this element pervades the tactician's 
rule, that success and honors, often in measure most as- 
tonishing, even to the recipient himself, is the constant 
reward of the man of action, and whether in warfare or 
in chessplay : and it is because this vital element in the 
practice of warfare and of chessplay has no place in the 
science either of war or of chess that the theorist, the 
man of learning, is comparatively but a child at the di- 
recting either of a chessic army or of troops in the field. 

The secret of the irresistible power of the initiative, 
when properly availed of, is that by its means a force, 
numerically not more than an equal, and possibly even 
the inferior force, is raised to the superior force at the 
given time and in the given situation. 

This outcome results from the fact that the one player' s 
move is dictated hy his enemy, and the ultimate effect of 
such dictation must be fatal, inasmuch as it tempora- 
rily makes a player commander-in-chief, not only of his 
own army, but also of the hostile army which he seeks 
to destroy. 

Hence, it is obvious that, in the last analysis of the 
term, what is meant by the initiative is something en- 
tirely distinct from chessic art and science, although it 
indissolubly is connected with the highest interpretation 
of each. 



248 CHESS STR ATE GE TICS. 

In short, the initiative is a condition — in fact, it is the 
only condition — in which the perfect application of strate- 
getic knowledge to warfare and to chessplay hy means of 
the processes of their resiyective arts, is possible. In other 
words, it is the bridge which unites the principles and 
formulas of strategetic science with the processes of the 
strategetic art. 

That condition which properly is termed the initiative 
exists whenever the opponent's immediate move is dic- 
tated by inexorable requirements appertaining to the 
given situation, over which he has no control, and when 
he is compelled to submit to such dictation and to move 
in accordance therewith. 

In every situation the initiative is governed by the 
following: — 

SEVENTEENTH LAW OF THE ART OF CHESSPLAY. 

At every turn to play dictate the opponents reply, 
either : 

Strategically, i.e., hy occupying a topographical key, 
and threatening on the next move to occupy another topo- 
grajyhical key ; or. 

Tactically^ i, e., by occupying^ or by threatening on the 
next move to occupy, an inadequately defended tactical 
key. 



GRAND LAW OF THE ART OF 
CHESSPLAY. 

The complete adaptation of military art and science 
to the chessboard is contained in the following supreme 
law, — that law which since the dawn of history has 
governed the processes utilized by the greater captains 
on every battlefield and in every campaign, whether of 
war or of chess. 

GRAND LAW OF THE ART OF CHESSPLAY. 

Section L 

At every turn to play^ exactly reconnoitre the given sit- 
uation to determine the dominant Prime Strategetic Fac- 
tor and whether it is contained in the kindred or in the 
adverse position. 

Having located the dominant Prime Strategetic Factor 
in the kindred position^ specify the resultant adverse 
strategetic weaknesses and describe the True Strategetic 
Horizo7i. 

Having described the True Strategetic Horizon^ desig- 
nate the Corps Offensive^ the Corjjs Defensive, and the 
Corps Detached ; mark out the True Evolution and depict 
the True Tactical Sequence. 

The True Tactical Sequence having been depicted, locate 
the adverse Points of Impenetrability situated on the 
Kindred Logistic Radii and the adverse Points of Re- 
sistance to the occupation of the Points Offensive by the 
Kindred Corps Offensive, 



250 CHESS STRATEGETICS. 

Then having decided on the Plan of Campaign^ and, 
having selected the proper Prime Logistic Operation^ and 
having determined the Order of Battle^ and havirig the 
right to move : — 

Combine the initiative ivith the occupation of that point 
by a Corps Detached^ which occupation will either out- 
front^ outflank^ command^ surprise, surround, or outnum- 
ber an adverse Corps Defensive, which in the given strat- 
egetic horizon is either a point of impenetrability or the 
origin of a point of resistance. 

All the adverse points of resistance and of impenetra- 
bility on a given logistic radius having been nullified by 
the Kindred Corps Detached, then : — 

Combine the initiative with the occupation of the points 
of command and of the strategic key by the Corps Offen- 
sive according to the tactical sequence governing the order 
of battle adopted. 

Section II. 

Whenever the dominant Prime Strategetic Factor is 
found to be contained in the adverse position, then: — 

Combine the initiative with the occupation of that point 
by a Kindred Corps Defensive which will reduce the 
adverse dominant Prime Strategetic Factor to a Subordi- 
nate Prime Strategetic Factor. 

Having reduced the adverse dominant Prime Strategetic 
Factor to a subordinate Prime Strategetic Factor, then : 

Combine the initiative with the occupation of that p)oint 
by a Kindred Corps Defensive which will reduce the 
adverse Prime Strategetic Factor next dominant to a 
subordinate Prime Strategetic Factor, and so continue 
until the adverse Prime Strategetic Factors are so reduced 
that all are dominated by a Kindred Prime Strategetic 
Factor ; ivhereupon ^proceed according to Section I. 



APPENDIX. 



THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 

HISTORICALLY AND TECHNICALLY ILLUSTRATED 
ON THE CHESSBOARD. 

This world-renowned encounter took place in Belgium 
on the afternoon and evening of June 18, 1815. 

The French army, 68,000 men, directed by Napoleon 
in person and when engaged in destroying 70,000 British 
under the command of the Duke of Wellington, was 
attacked both in flank and rear, and utterly routed by 
65,000 Germans led by Field-Marshal von Bliicher. 

TOPOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD. 

White. 

K Kt 1. Hamlet of Mont St. Jean. 

K R 2. Stone chateau of Hougoumont. 

K Kt 2. ^ 

K B 2. [-Plateau of Mont St. Jean. 

K2. ) 

K B 4. Park of Hougoumont. 

K 3. Farmhouse of La Haye Sainte. 

Q 4. Hamlet of Papelotte. 

Q 5. Hamlet of Smolhaiu. 

Q B 4. Hamlet of La Haie. 

Q Kt 4. Hamlet of Frischermont. 

Q R 3. Chapel of St. Lambert. 

K B file. Charleroi road. 

K R file. Mvelles road. 

Second Horizontal. Wavre road. 




254 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 

Black. 

Parmhouse of La Belle Alliance. 

Heights of La Belle Alliance. 

Hamlet of Planchenoit. 
Hamlet of Pajeau. 
Seyexth Horizoxtal. Gembloux road. 

cojmposition of the contending armies. 
The Allies {White). 

EyGLISH. 

Commanded by the Duke of VTellington. 

K. Duke of Wellington, Maitland's Boot Guards, Bruns- 
wick and Nassau contingent. 
Pirst Corps — Prince of Orange. 
K E. Two divisions English regular infantry under 

Gen. Alten. 
K Kt. Coldstream Guards — Gen. Perponcher's light 

horse, Gens. Chasse's and Colbert's cavalry. 
Q Kt. Dutch-Belgic contingent under Gen. Bylandt and 

Gen. Steadman's infantry division. 
Second Corps — Lord Hill. 
Anglo-Hanoverian Auxiliaries. 
K P. Gen. Ponsonby's dragoons. 
Q P. Gen. Picton's cavalry division. 
K B P. Gen. Coleville's infantry division. 
K Kt P. Gen. Clinton's " 
KRP. Gen. Lambert's " '' 

English regular cavalry — Lord Uxbridge. 
K B. Gen. Yandeleur's light horse. 
Q B. Gen. Vivian's hussars. 



THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 255 

Germans. 

Commanded by Field-Marshal Prince von BlUcher. 

Q. ^ 

_ * -Fourth Army Corps — Gen. Biilow. 

Q Kt P.. 

2d Q. I p.^.g^ ^ ^^ _ ^g^^ Ziethen. 
Q B P. 3 ^ ^ 

_J^' [■ Second Army Corps — Gen. Pirch. 



French Army {Black), 

K. The Emperor Napoleon I. and staff. 

K Kt. Cuirassiers of the Imperial Guard — Gen. Kel- 
lerman. 

Q Kt. Cuirassiers of the Imperial Guard — Gen. Mil- 
haud. 

K R. Grenadiers of the Imperial Guard — Gen. Morand. 

K P. (a) Division infantry — Prince Jerome Bona- 
parte. (IS) Infantry division — Gen. Donze- 
lotte. (c) Grenadiers of the Imperial Guard — 
Gen. Friant. 

K B P. Artillery of the Imperial Guard. 

Q. Eeserve, Field Artillery Corps. 

First Corps d^Armee — Count D'Erlon. 

Q P. Infantry division — Gen. Durutte. 

Q Kt P. " " Gen. Guyot. 

Q B P. Lancers — Gen. Jaquinot. 

Second Corps d^Armee — Count Reille. 

Q R. Two divisions infantry — Gens. Bachelu and 
Girard. 

K Kt P. Infantry division — Gen. Foy. 

K R P. Light cavalry — Gen. Pire. 



256 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 

Sixth Corjjs d'Ar/nee — Count Lobau. 
K B. (a) Part of light cavalry — Gen. D'Homond. 

(p) The Young Guard — Gen. Duhesme. 
Q B. Two divisions infantry — Gens. Simmer and 

Jeannin. 
Q E P. Infantry division — Gen. Teste. 



Technical and Descriptive. 

RUr LOPEZ OPENING. 

The Feexch (Black). The Allies (White). 

1. P-K4. 

(11 A.M.) Prince Jerome, younger brother of the 
Emperor, opens the battle of Waterloo by attacking the 
Park of Hougoumont. 

1. P - K 4. 

Ponsonby's English dragoons covering La Haye Sainte. 

2. Kt-KB 3. 

Milhaud's cuirassiers taking position in support of the 
coming assault against the English centre. 

2. Q Kt - B 3. 

Bylandt's Dutch and Belgians advancing in support of 
La Haye Sainte. 

3. K B - Kt 5. 

French light cavalry moving against the English left 
wing. 

3. P - Q K 3 

(12.30 P.M.) Advance guard of the German Fourth 
Army Corps occupying St. Lambert. 

4. B - R 4. 



THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 257 

Gen. D'Homond taking post at Pajeau on the lookout 
for the expected French right wing under Marshal 
Grouchy. 

4 Kt - K B 3. 

English regular troops moving to the support of 
Hougoumont. 

5. P - Q B 3. 

Jaquinoi's lancers advancing to the attack of La Haye 
Sainte. 

5. P-QKt4. 

Billow's vanguard driving back French light cavalry. 

6. B - B 2. 

The Sixth French Corps cVArmee under Count Lobau 
masses about Planchenoit to cover the French rear and 

right wing against Biilow. 

6. KB-B4. 

Yandeleur's cavalry opening up communication with 
Biilow, and covering English left wing. 

7. Castles. 

Napoleon and the Imperial Guard taking position on 
the heights of La Belle Alliance. 

7. Castles. 

The Duke of Wellington and his reserves taking posi- 
tion at Mont St. Jean. 

8. P-Q4. 

(1 P.M.) Marshal Ney leads D'Erlon's corps to 
the attack of the English left and centre. 

8. P X P. 

Overthrow of Durutte's division by Ponsonby's dra- 
goons. 

9. P X P. 

17 



258 



THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 



Ponsonbv's dragoons destroyed bj Jaquinot's lancers. 

D'Erlon carries Souhain by the bayonet. 

9. B-K2. 

Vandeleur's cavalry falling back on Mont St. Jean 
before D'Erlon. 

((7) This movement in defence of the right wing 
seems forced : for if 9. B - Kt 3, P - K 5 : 10. Kt - 

K sq. B X R P (ck. ; 11. K x B, Kr - Kr 5 (ck) ; 
12. K - Kt sq. Q - K P 5 : and Black wins. 

POSITIOX AFTER WHITE'S XDTTH MOVE. 
(About 2 P.M.) 

The Feexch. 



a ^ 






i i k 

« p 

«. mm, 



ill i 



^ — v/-. 








^^i^^^^^ WM'A 














^ o ^ 






The Allies. 
CapUire of Soiihain by D'Erlon's Corps. 



THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 259 

10. P-Q5. 

D'Erlon storms the town of Papelotte. 

10. Kt-QR4. 

Bvlandt's Dutch and Belgians retiring before 
D'Erlon. 

11. P-Ko. 

D'Erlon's corps advancing to the attack of La Haye 
Sainte. 

11. Kt-Kl. 

English outposts retiring to the main lines of 
defence. 

12. Kt - Q B 3. 

Milhaud's cuirassiers taking position on the French 
right. 

12. P-Q3. 

Picton's English cavalry supporting La Haye Sainte. 



260 



THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 



POSITION APTER WHITES TWELFTH MOVE. 
About (3 P.M.) 

The Pezxch. 



Hi J 



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The Allies. 
Capture of Papelotfe by D*Erl(ni*s Corps. 



13. Q-Q3. 

The French reserve artillery brought ev wasse into 
action against the English right and centre. 

13. P - K B 4. 

Gen. Coleville's division holding the Park of Hougoii- 
mont. 



THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 
14. P-K6. 



261 



Gen. Donzelotte's division of D'Erlon's corps carries 
La Haye Sainte. 



POSITION AFTER BLACK'S FOURTEENTH MOVE. 
(About 3.30 P.M.) 

The French. 



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wm. 



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The Allies. 
Capture of La Haye Sainte by D'Erlon's Corps. 



14. P - Q B 3. 

Vanguard of the First German Army Corps under 
Gen. Ziethen engaging part of D'Erlon's corps near 
Papelotte. 



262 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 

15. P-KKt4. 

Gen. Foy's division of Reille's corps attacking the 
Park of Hougoumont. 

15. P X Q P. 

Part of D'Erlon's corps overthrown near Papelotte by 
Ziethen. 

16. P X P. 

Foy drives the English from the Park of Hougoumont. 

POSITION AFTER WHITE'S SIXTEENTH MOVE. 
(About 4 P.M.) 

The Erexch. 



m 



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The Allies. 
Capture of the F'arh of Mougnumont by Reiile^a Corps, 



THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 263 

16. Kt - K B 3. 

Coldstream Guards and other English regulars defend- 
ing Hougoumont. 

17. QB-B4. 

Lobau moving on the centre to the support of D'Erlon. 

17. B - Q Kt 2. 
English cavalry supporting Ziethen. 

18. Q R - Q B 1. 

Reille's remaining divisions moving into action against 
Hougoumont. 

18. Kt-QB5. 

Bylandt's Dutch and Belgians attacking the French 
right. 

19. P-QKt3 

Gen. Guyot's division attacking Bylandt. 

19. E-Q B 1. 

Billow's main body advancing to the attack of 
Planchenoit. 

The doubled and isolated Queen's Pawns render 
White's game lost by its nature. 

This sacrifice of the Q Kt for the purpose of restoring 
the integrity of his Pawn position seemingly is White's 
only resource. 



26^ 



THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 



POSITION AFTER WHITE'S NINETEENTH MOVE. 
(About 4.30 P.M.) 

The Eeench. 



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The Allies. 
J>*Erlon destroys the Dutch and Belgian Contingent, 

20. P X Kt. 

Guyot destroys the Dutch and Belgian troops under 

Bylandt. 

20. P X P. 

Ziethen repulses Guyot's division and attacks the 
French artillery. 

21. Q-K2. 

The French artillery falls back before Ziethen. 



THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 265 

21. P-Q4. 

English and Germans covering the advance of Biilow 
against Planchenoit. 

22. QR-Ql. 

Reille's reserves moving to tlie attack of Hougoumont. 

22. Q _ Q R 4. 
Biilow attacking the French right in force. 

23. B-Q2. 

Lobau's corps again concentrated at Planchenoit to 
oppose Biilow. 

23. P-QKt5. 
Biilow marching on Planchenoit. 



266 



THE BATTLE OE WATERLOO. 



POSITION ATTEE 'WHITE'S TWEXTT-THIPwD MO^'E. 
(About 5 P M.) 

The Fee>-ch- 



% Vyh:7T//A 



tt 



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■^M Cl H .^. 

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The Allies. 
Biiloiv assaulting FlancheJioit. 



24. Kr - (J E 4, 

Milhaud covering the French right wing against 

Blilow. 

24. K E - Q 1. 

English resailars supporting Ziethen on the centre. 

25. B ~ Q B 1. 

Lobau covering the rear of the French armv against 
Biilow. 



THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 



267 



25. B-QB3. 

English cavalry co-operating with BUlow against 
Milhaud. 

2Q. Kt — Kt2. 

Milhaud manoeuvring in support of Lobau's corps and 
covering the rear of the French army against Billow. 

2Q. Q X R P. 

Billow overthrows Gen. Teste's infantry division and 
turns the right flank of the French army. 

POSITION AFTER WHITE'S TWENTY-SIXTH MOVE. 
(About 5.15 p. M.) 

The Erench. 



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The Allies. 
SUlow turns the French Right Flanh, 



268 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 
27. Kt-K5. 

Kellerman's cuirassiers charging the English on 
Mont St. Jean. 

27. B - Q Kt 4. f 

English cavalry co-operating with Btilow in the attack 
of Planchenoit. 

.28. Kt-KB7. 

Kellerman breaks the English centre and establishes 
the French cavalry on the crest of Mont St. Jean. 

28. E-Kl. 

English infantry moving to the support of Welling- 
ton's centre. 

29. E-Q4. 

Reille's reserves marching to the attack of Hougou- 
mont. 

29. B-QB4. 

English cavalry covering Wellington's left wing. 

30. E - K E 4. 

Reille's corps massed against Hougoumont. 

30. P-QKt6. 

Billow attacking Lobau's corps at Planchenoit in 
force. 

31. B-Ql. 

Lobau falling back before Btilow. 

31. P - Q B 6. 

Billow driving before him the entire French right 



THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 
32. E X K R P. 



269 



Reille's corps attempting to take Hougoumont by 
storm. 



POSITION AFTER BLACK'S THIRTY-SECOKD MOVE. 

(About 5.30 P.M.) 

The French. 




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The Allies 
Reille's Corps destroyed at Sougoumont. 

32. Kt X E. 

Reille's divisions are practically annihilated by the 
defenders of the stone chateau at Hougoumont. 

33. Q-KR5. 



270 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 

The entire French reserve artillery advances en masse 
to the support of the French troops attacking Mont 
St. Jean. 

33. E-QB2. 

German troops in march for Planchenoit, temporarily 
supporting English left wing. 

34. Q-Kt6. 

French artillery massed in front of, and enfilading 
the entire English position. 

34. Kt - K B 3. 

English regulars manceuvring for the defence of 
Hougoumont. 

Undoubtedly the proper line of defence against the 
lines of attack arising from 35. Kt — R 6 (ck), 35. Q — 
Kt6,35. K-Rsq, 35. B- K R 6, 35. P- KB 6, etc. 

35. B - K Kt 5. 

Part of Lobau's corps brought from the extreme right 
to aid in the attack on Mont St. Jean. 

35. Kt-E2. 
English retiring before the attack of Lobau. 

36. B - K E 6. 

Lobau assailing Mont St. Jean. 

36. B-KBl. 

English troops concentrating on Mont St. Jean for 
the defence of the English centre. 

37. B - K B 3. 

Part of Lobau's corps attacking the English left flank 
which is covered by Ziethen. 

37. E-QB4. 



THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 271 

Part of Billow's corps supporting Ziethen. 
To prevent 38. B X Q P ; followed by P - K 7 and 
Kt — Kt 5 (dis ck) and Q x Kt mate. 

38. Kt - Q 3. 

Milhaud advancing to the support of Kellerman at 
Mont St. Jean. 

38. Q-E6. 

Billow momentarily checked and thrown on the 
defensive. 

The Q R obviously is immovable and must be pro- 
tected. 

If 88. B X Kt, B X Kt P ; 39. B x B, Kt - R 6 (ck) ; 
40. K — R sq, Q X R (ck) ; 41. Kt or B interposes, 
P — K 7 ; and Black wins. 

39. Kt (Q 3) - K 5. 

Milhaud unites with Kellerman at Mont St. Jean. 

39. R-K2. 

English infantry manoeuvring to support Wellington's 
centre. 

To prevent 40. B x Kt P; 41. B X B, Kt - R 6 (ck) ; 
42. K - R sq, Kt ( K 5) - B 7 ; mate. 

40. B - Q B 1. 

Part of Lobau's corps is withdrawn from the attack of 
Mont St. Jean and returned to Planchenoit to oppose 
the further advance of Bulow. 



272 



THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 



POSITION ATTEPv BLACK'S FOETIETH 3I0VE. 
(About 6 p. M.) 

The FEEycH. 



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The Allies. 
Grand assault against Jlont St, Jean, 



40. Q X B. 

Billow destroys nearly half of Lobau's corps at 
Planchenoit. 

This is White's only move to prevent the immediate 
loss of the game. viz. : — ■ 

If 40. P - Kt 7. 4M. Kt - E 6 (ck). 

41. K-E 1. 41. Q-KB 7. A. 

42. Kt-KB3. B. 42. Kt - Kt 6 (ck). 



THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 273 



43. 


K-R2. 


43. 


Kt X B (ck). 


44. 


K-El. a 


44. 


Kt - Kt 6 (ck). 


45. 


K-R2. 


45. 


Kt X R. D. 


46. 


B-Kl. E. 


46. 


Q - Kt 6 (ck). 


47. 


Kt-El. F. 


47. 


Kt - B 7 (ck). 


48. 


B X Kt. 


48. 


PxB. 


49. 


R - Q B 1. G, 


49. 


B - K R 6. 


50. 


P X B. 


50. 


Q X P (ck). 


51. 


Kt - E 2. 


51. 


Kt - R 6. 



Checkmate. 

A. 
If 41. Kt (K 5) - B 7 (ck) ; 42. R x Kt, and White 

escapes with a draw. 

B. 

The only move to avert mate by either 42. Q — Kt 8 

(ck); or by 42. Kt - Kt 6 (ck). If R X Q, obviously 

Black mates on the move. 

C. 

Seemingly White is now without resource. 

D. 

The correct line of attack which apparently leads to a 

direct mate against the best play. 

E. 

If 46. PxB queening, Q - Kt 6 (ck) ; 47. K - R sq, 

Kt — B 7 ; mate. 

F. 

White cannot play 47. B X Q, on account of P x B 
(ck) ; 48. K - R sq, Kt - B 7 ; mate. 

G. 

To prevent 51. P — B 8 queening (ck) ; etc. 

If 49. Kt — R2, Q — KR5; and mates next move by 

either 50. P - B 8 queening (ck) ; or 50. Kt - Kt 6 (ck), 

etc. 

18 



274 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 

41. E X Q. 

Billow driven from Planchenoit by the Imperial Guard 
under Gen. Morand. 

41. P-QKt7. 

Billow's remaining divisions again assailing Planche- 
noit. 

42. E-Kl. 

The Imperial Guard advancing from the extreme right 
to attack Mont St. Jean. 

If 42. Kt - R 6 (ck) ; 43. K - R sq, Q - B 7 ; 44. P 
X R queening (ck), K - Kt 2 ; 45. Q X Kt, Kt - Kt 6 
(ck) ; 46. Q X Kt, Q X Q ; 47. B - B 7, and White wins. 

42. Kt-KB3. 

English troops manoeuvring for the defence of Wel- 
lington's centre. 

43. B-KR5. 

Remains of Lobau's corps brought from the centre to 
the attack of Mont St. Jean. 

43. B-Kl. 

English troops concentrating for the defence of Mont 
St. Jean. 

To prevent 44. Kt - R 6 (ck) ; 45. K - R sq, Q - B 
7 ; 46. R X Q, Kt X R (ck) ; 47. K - R 2, B - Kt 6 ; 
mate. 

44. K-Kt2. 

Napoleon abandons the Charleroi road and takes the 
Nivelles road for his line of communication with France. 

This move with its attendant combinations seems 
Black's only resource in this crisis. 

44. P - B 7. 



THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 



275 



Billow captures Planchenoit and establishes his corps 
on the right flank and rear of the position originally 
occupied by the French army. 

45. E-K3. 

The Imperial Guard takes post in front of La Haye 
Sainte. 

, POSITION AFTEE BLACK'S FORTY-FIFTH MOVE. 

(About 7 P.M.) 

The French. 






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The Allies. 
Tlve Frencli Army cJianges Front, 

Grand change of front by the French army, to oppose 
Wellington on the left and Btilow on the right. 



276 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 

45. P — Q B 8 (queening). 
Arrival of the main body of Ziethen's corps. 

46. E-KE3. 

The Imperial Guard marching to the attack of Mont 
St. Jean. 

46. P-QKt 8 (queening). 

Arrival of Pirch's corps, led by Field-Marshal Prince 
von Bliicher. 

The queening of these pawns is White's only resource. 

The one paralyzes Black's attack against the adverse 
king by preventing Kt — E, 6 (ck) ; and the other pro- 
vides the winning counter-stroke. 

47. B-Ql. 

The Young Guard covering the right wing of the 
French army against the entire German army. 

Obviating temporarily White's menace of 47. Q — 
K R 8, mate and disclosing a threatened mate by 
48. R-KR8(ck). 



THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 



211 



POSITION AFTER BLACK'S FORTY-SEVENTH MOVE. 
(About 7.30 P.M.) 

The French. 









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M. ■ • 







The Allies. 



Tine arrival of Sliicher* 



47. Q _ K 5 (ck). 

Bliicher attacking in force all along the French front 
" to let the English army breathe." 

This check with the succeeding sacrifice of the Q is 
the only method by which the checkmate of the White 
King can be averted. 

48. B - K B 3. 

The Young Guard covering the rear of the French 
army against Bliicher. 



278 TEE E ATI II :e ~^zirloo. 

4S. Q X B (ck). 
Destraction of the Young Guard by Blucher. 

49. E X Q. 

Pirch's Corps repulsed bj the I- ri: ' Guard under 
Gen. Morand. 
The only more ; if Kt x Q VThite wins by B x Kt. 

49. B - Q K: 4 

English cayalry co-operating with Blucher in the at- 
tack of La Belle Alliance. 

50. P- KB 3. 

Xapoleon preparing a line of retreat for the French 
army by the Xivelles road. 

To prevent 50. Q - K B 8 (ck), K - Kr 3 ; 51. Q - K 
K: S ; k . K mores ; 52- Q x Q. and wins. 

50. R-QBT. 

Billow's divisions co-operating with Bliicher in the 
attack of La Belle Alliance. 

Threatening to win by 51. Q - K B 8 (ck). K - E 2 ; 
52 E X K B P (ck), etc. 

ol K-KE2. 

The French army taking its final stand. 

Securing temporary safety as the White Queen cannot 
abandon the control of White's K E 3 square on account 
of Black's menace of K: — Pt 6 (ck) ; etc. 

51. B - Q Kt 2. 

English infantry preparing to co-operate with Blucher. 



THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 



279 



POSITION AFTER WHITE'S EIETY-FIRST MOVE. 

(About 8.30 P.M.) 

The French. 




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111 ■ 'WM . m. 







The Allies. 
Najioleoti^s Last Line of Battle, 



52. Kt-KKt5. 

Kellerman begins the last assault on Mont St. Jean 
— the final military movement of Napoleon's Grande 
ArmSe. 

52. B - K 1. 

English troops concentrating to defend Wellington's 
centre. 

To prevent 53. Q - B 7 (ck) ; 54. R x Q, P X R (ck) ; 
55. K — R sq, Kt — Kt 6 ; mate. 



280 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 

53. Kt (K 5) - B 7. 

Milhaud supporting Kellerman's manoeuvre. 

53. B - Q 3 (ck). 

" Up, Guards, and at them ! " To prevent the draw 
by perpetual check ; allow the King to retrograde to the 
Queen's wing and to strengthen and co-operate with the 
attack against the Black King. 

54. K-Kt2. 

Disorganization manifest among the French at La 

Belle Alliance. 

54. E-QKt8. 

English co-operating with Blticher against the French 
right. 

A crushing and decisive manoeuvre which forces the 
game through sheer weight of material. 

55. Kt - E 6 (ck). 

Milhaud' s last charge. 

55. K - B 1. 

English rallying by the left. If 55. K - R 1, Black 

wins. 

m. P-K 7 (ck). 

Gen. Friant's column of the Imperial Guard on the 
crest of Mont St. Jean. 

oQ>. K X P. 

Destruction of the Imperial Guard under Gen. Friant. 
If 57. B X P, Kt - K 6, mate. 

57. Q X P (ck). 

French artillery, almost devoid of infantry support, 
still keeping up the battle. 

57. K-Ql. 



THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 281 

Wellington forming a second line of battle. 

bS. Q X Kt (ck). 
Last effort of the French to restore the battle. 

bS, K - B 1. 
English rallying by the left. 

59. Q - K 6. 

French artillery taking post to cover the flight of 
the surviving French. 

59. B-Q2. 

English cavalry charging the French artillery. 

60. Q - Kt 8 (ek). 

French artillery retreating toward Nivelles road. 

60. K-Kt2. 
Wellington completes his second line of battle. 

61. R - Q Kt 3 (ck). 

Imperial Guard under Morand opposing the junction 
of Bliicher's and Wellington's forces. 

The only resource to avert immediate mate by 62. Q 
- K R 8, etc. 



282 



THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 



POSITION AFTEE BLACKS SIXTY-FIRST MOVE. 
(Abouc 9 P.M. I 

The Fee>"CH. 



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W'. 



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The Allies. 
Destruction of the Old Guard. 



61. E X E. 

MorancVs Infantrv of the Imperial Guard destroyed 
near Planchenoit. 

62. Kt - K 4. 

Kellerman's cuirassiers coverins- the centre of the 
French army. To prevent 63. R — K Kt 6 (ck). followed 
hy 64. Q - K Kt 8. mate. 



THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 283 

62. E X B P (ck). 

Billow storms La Belle Alliance and captures the 
artillery of tlie Imperial Guard. . 

63. Kt X Pv. 

Kellerman checks Billow and covers tlie French right 
against Bliicher. 

If 63. K X R, White mates in two moves by Q — K 6 
(ck), etc. 

63. R - K Kt 6 (ck). 
English regulars cliarging on La Belle Alliance. 

64. Q X P. 

Temporary repulse of the English infantry by the 
French artillery of the line. 

64. B X Q. 

Capture of the entire French artillery by the English 
cavalry. 

Q>o. Kt (R 6) - Kt 4. 

Milhaud unites with Kellerman at La Belle Alliance 
to cover the flight of the surviving French. 



28-i 



THE BATTLE OE WATERLOO. 



PuSniOX AFTER BLACK'S SIXTY-FIFTH MOVE. 

(About 9.30 P.M.) 

Thz FKi:>XH. 



mm ^ 'mm 

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1 fei • 








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The Allies 

Milhaud's and KeJlerinan's Cuirassiers covering 
the FfigJit of the French. 



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